Why Qatar is buying American LNG while expanding its own exports

Qatar is buying American liquefied natural gas while spending billions to expand its own export capacity. That apparent contradiction offers a way to understand Doha’s diplomacy during the Persian Gulf crisis. Buying gas abroad gives QatarEnergy something to sell when tankers cannot leave Ras Laffan. It does far less for a customer whose contract specifies a Qatari loading terminal. My article examines what a peace agreement could restore within a week, what will take engineers years to rebuild, and why the decisions that Asian and European buyers make in the meantime could prove more consequential for Qatar than the immediate loss of revenue.

Qatar’s next LNG cargo depends on Hormuz. So does its next expansion.

In October, Qatar’s energy minister, Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, offered two very different answers to the question of how long his country’s gas industry would take to recover. If Washington and Tehran reached a peace agreement and enough tankers were available, QatarEnergy could restart its undamaged liquefied natural gas facilities within a week. Repairing the two production lines struck by Iranian missiles in March would take about three years. For a government trying to limit its losses in the Persian Gulf crisis, those estimates help explain where diplomacy can make an immediate difference and where even a durable settlement would leave difficult work ahead.

For Qatar’s customers, recovery has a more practical meaning. A utility needs to know whether a cargo will arrive in time to meet demand and, if it will not, when to buy a replacement. A government in Doha weighing the cost of another month of conflict has to consider what happens when that same utility negotiates its next supply contract.

The immediate loss is the revenue from a shipment that never leaves port. The longer-term risk is that a customer still willing to buy Qatari gas decides to buy less of it.

What the strikes cost Qatar

Follow a cargo back from the Strait of Hormuz and the geography of Qatar’s vulnerability comes into focus. The gas comes from the North Field, the offshore reservoir Qatar shares with Iran, where it is known as South Pars. On the Qatari side, it is brought ashore at Ras Laffan, processed and cooled into liquid form for shipment. Concentrating those operations in one industrial city helped Qatar build an export industry on an extraordinary scale. It also means that buyers thousands of miles apart depend on the same facilities and the same maritime passage for their deliveries.

The Iranian missile strikes of 18^th and 19^th March  damaged two liquefaction units at Ras Laffan, Trains 4 and 6. Together, they could produce 12.8 million tonnes of LNG a year, about 17 percent of Qatar’s prewar export capacity.

QatarEnergy estimated in March that the damage could cost roughly $20 billion in annual revenue. The effects extended beyond LNG. Production of condensate and liquefied petroleum gas also suffered, and the strikes damaged the Pearl gas-to-liquids plant that QatarEnergy operates with Shell. A single episode disrupted several businesses that draw on the same industrial complex.

By June, the cost of the wider conflict was visible in QatarEnergy’s accounts. First-half net profit fell to 15 billion Qatari riyals from 48 billion a year earlier, a decline of 69 percent. Revenue fell 35 percent. Those figures measure what happened across the company during the first six months of 2026. The $20 billion figure measures something different: QatarEnergy’s estimate of annual revenue at risk from the damage. The broader national toll is harder to isolate, although the IMF projected an 8.6 percent contraction in Qatar’s real GDP for 2026.

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A new plant can be ready before its customers can receive the gas

One of the clearest illustrations of Doha’s predicament stands at Ras Laffan itself. In early October, people familiar with the North Field East expansion told Reuters that its first new liquefaction train could be technically ready in November. Later that month, al-Kaabi said he expected it to start up in the first quarter of 2027, with production dependent on a US-Iran peace agreement. The distinction matters for a project of this size. Engineers can finish their work, suppliers can deliver the equipment and the plant can pass its tests while the date of its first commercial shipment remains beyond their control.

Qatar has decided to keep building. Before the war, Ras Laffan had annual LNG capacity of about 77 million tonnes. The North Field East, South and West projects are intended to lift that figure to 142 million tonnes. Al-Kaabi said in October that all contracts had been awarded and none of the announced projects had been cancelled. The first new train could help replace some lost output once shipping conditions allow. The later phases carry a larger commercial ambition. Qatar expects buyers to absorb substantially more of its gas for decades, even as those buyers reassess how much of their supply they want moving through Hormuz.

Consider the decision facing a utility that has bought Qatari LNG for years. It may value the relationship, expect the damage to be repaired and still choose a different supplier for its next tranche of gas. A second contract with another exporter gives it access to a different loading port when passage through the Gulf becomes difficult. Qatar could therefore retain a longstanding customer while losing part of that customer’s future business. This is a quieter risk than an outright cancellation. It would show up gradually, in the volumes buyers commit to as each new Qatari train comes onstream.

Why a leading gas exporter is buying American LNG

QatarEnergy’s response suggests that its own traders understand the value of a second loading port. In October, al-Kaabi confirmed that the company was buying long-term LNG supplies from the United States and other producers.

If a future disruption prevents Qatari tankers from sailing just as international prices rise, QatarEnergy could still earn money selling cargoes loaded elsewhere. For its trading business, the attraction is straightforward.

A shipment already available outside the Gulf becomes especially valuable precisely when gas at Ras Laffan is hardest to bring to market.

The limits of that strategy are written into QatarEnergy’s contracts. Al-Kaabi explained that its long-term customer agreements specify the terminal where a cargo must be loaded and the destination where it must be delivered. Under those terms, QatarEnergy cannot simply send an American cargo to fulfil an obligation tied to Ras Laffan. That distinction is easy to overlook when gas is discussed as a globally traded commodity. For the trading desk, access to American supply creates an opportunity to recover some income. For a buyer awaiting delivery under a Qatari contract, the immediate question remains when its scheduled shipment can sail. 

What Doha can gain from diplomacy

Qatar’s relationship with Iran gives that question a particular urgency. The two countries draw gas from opposite sides of the same reservoir, and Iran sits alongside the passage Qatar needs to reach its customers. Even after the March strikes, Doha kept a channel open. Al-Kaabi said in October that he had met Iran’s acting petroleum minister twice in recent weeks to discuss possible oil and gas cooperation after the war. For Qatar, there is a practical reason to hold those conversations while the political outcome remains uncertain. Its next phase of gas development will unfold alongside Iran, whatever course relations take after the fighting.

A settlement would give Doha something tangible almost immediately. With safe passage and ships available, the undamaged facilities could bring production back to roughly 83 percent of its prewar level while repairs continue. Customers could begin planning around deliveries again. The first North Field East train would have a clearer route to market. The harder judgment belongs to the utility deciding where to buy its gas for the next twenty years. What will matter to that buyer is whether cargoes keep arriving after the first tanker makes it through. Qatar has good reason to pursue an agreement that outlasts the immediate pressure to reopen the strait.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.