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The Iran–USA conflict and the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

November 18, 2026 at 9:55 am

Demonstrators march through central Tehran toward the former US Embassy during a rally marking the 47th anniversary of the 1979 embassy takeover and hostage crisis, on November 4, 2026 in Tehran, Iran. [Fatemeh Bahrami – Anadolu Agency]

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The confrontation between Iran and the United States is more than a bilateral dispute; it represents a significant test of the credibility of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The central challenge is to protect states’ rights to peaceful nuclear technology while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The crisis also tests the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and raises questions about the consistent application of international rules. If military confrontation repeatedly replaces diplomacy, other states may begin to question whether the NPT provides a fair and reliable framework for their security.

The NPT framework and the Iran–USA dispute

Established in 1968 and entering into force in 1970, the NPT rests on three fundamental pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and nuclear disarmament. Article IV recognises the right of states to develop and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, subject to their treaty obligations, while Article VI requires all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

The Iran–USA dispute highlights an apparent imbalance within this framework. Non-nuclear-weapon states face close scrutiny over their nuclear activities, while progress towards disarmament by recognised nuclear-weapon states remains limited. Although this does not excuse violations of safeguards obligations, the legitimacy of the treaty depends on the implementation of all three pillars.

Iran maintains that its nuclear programme serves peaceful purposes, including electricity generation, scientific research, and technological development. However, the United States and its allies have raised concerns about uranium enrichment, transparency, and the possibility of military applications.

Consequently, the dispute is not simply about technical nuclear capabilities; it also concerns verification, trust, and the intentions that states attribute to one another.

The JCPOA and the breakdown of diplomatic confidence

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed by Iran and the P5+1, sought to address international concerns through restrictions on Iran’s nuclear programme and enhanced monitoring arrangements in exchange for sanctions relief. However, the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement in 2018 weakened this diplomatic framework.

Iran’s subsequent expansion of uranium enrichment activities and declining cooperation with international monitoring mechanisms further complicated efforts to restore confidence. Military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, followed by the US and Israeli operations beginning in February 2026, have made verification increasingly difficult.

The draft notes that the IAEA has faced obstacles in maintaining continuity of knowledge about nuclear material and obtaining access to relevant facilities. Without reliable information, uncertainty increases, creating greater opportunities for miscalculation and escalation.

Nuclear diplomacy depends on negotiations, inspections, confidence-building measures, and reciprocal commitments. Military pressure may damage nuclear facilities, but it cannot necessarily eliminate technical knowledge or the political motivations underlying a nuclear programme.

Indeed, military attacks may strengthen arguments within Iran that nuclear deterrence is necessary for national survival.

Meanwhile, Washington regards preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons as a strategic priority for regional security and the reassurance of its allies. These competing perceptions can create a dangerous cycle: US pressure deepens Iranian insecurity, confrontation erodes trust, reduced cooperation weakens verification, and uncertainty encourages further military preparations.

Coercion without a credible political settlement is unlikely to resolve the underlying dispute. A sustainable agreement must address uranium enrichment, transparency, sanctions, and security concerns through reciprocal and verifiable commitments.

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The role of the IAEA and international nuclear safeguards

The IAEA occupies a central position within the international nuclear safeguards system. Its credibility depends on technical independence, access to relevant facilities, and the ability to assess nuclear material on the basis of reliable evidence.

Iran must fulfil its safeguards obligations, while other states must respect the Agency’s professional mandate and avoid turning its work into an instrument of geopolitical rivalry. The current crisis illustrates a fundamental dilemma: effective verification requires cooperation, but cooperation becomes increasingly difficult when political trust collapses.

Iran cannot expect international confidence without credible monitoring arrangements. Equally, inspections cannot function effectively when access and relevant information are withheld. Restoring effective safeguards arrangements is therefore an urgent international security requirement rather than merely an administrative matter.

Nuclear disarmament and the question of double standards

The NPT recognises five nuclear-weapon states: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, their recognised status does not provide an unlimited right to retain nuclear weapons indefinitely. Article VI commits all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament.

The modernisation of nuclear arsenals and the slow pace of disarmament have fuelled concerns about whether the international nuclear order imposes unequal expectations on different categories of states. The treaty risks losing credibility if non-proliferation is demanded of some states while disarmament commitments receive insufficient attention.

At the same time, perceptions of double standards cannot justify non-compliance by Iran or any other State Party. The central challenge is to uphold international legal obligations consistently while addressing the unequal distribution of nuclear power and responsibility.

The 2026 NPT Review Conference and the Future of Non-Proliferation

The 2026 NPT Review Conference ended without a consensus outcome document, reflecting persistent divisions over nuclear disarmament, regional security, and treaty implementation. This failure does not make the NPT irrelevant; rather, it demonstrates the urgent need for renewed political commitment before the next review cycle.

The Iran–USA conflict may influence how other states assess the costs and benefits of remaining non-nuclear. From a realist perspective, governments operating in an uncertain international system may seek capabilities they believe will deter external aggression. If states conclude that nuclear weapons provide more reliable protection than international security guarantees, incentives for proliferation could increase.

Possible consequences include greater interest in uranium enrichment capabilities, reduced acceptance of intrusive inspections, and heightened regional arms competition in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, technological capability should not be confused with a political decision to develop nuclear weapons. The international community must demonstrate that compliance with the NPT, peaceful nuclear cooperation, and diplomatic engagement can provide meaningful security benefits.

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Iran’s possible withdrawal from the NPT

Article X of the NPT allows a State Party to withdraw from the treaty if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. Such withdrawal requires three months’ notice to all other parties and the United Nations Security Council, together with an explanation of the extraordinary events concerned.

Debate about possible Iranian withdrawal is therefore significant. Withdrawal would not automatically authorise the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and it would raise complex questions concerning safeguards obligations and nuclear materials.

The international community’s priority should be to ensure that continued membership of the NPT remains more beneficial to Iran than withdrawal. This requires addressing legitimate security concerns while maintaining the principle that nuclear non-proliferation obligations must be respected.

Recommendations for restoring nuclear diplomacy

Washington and Tehran should resume negotiations with the support of the European Union, China, Russia, and other relevant international parties. Iran should restore effective IAEA monitoring arrangements, while the Agency’s technical independence and professional mandate must be protected.

Any future agreement should address the security concerns of both sides through reciprocal commitments, effective verification mechanisms, and reliable dispute-resolution procedures. Nuclear-weapon states must also demonstrate measurable progress towards their obligations under Article VI, while non-nuclear-weapon states fulfil their nuclear safeguards obligations.

Furthermore, states should avoid attacks on nuclear facilities and pursue diplomatic solutions consistent with international law. The NPT review process should place greater emphasis on assessing practical progress in nuclear disarmament, safeguards implementation, and peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Conclusion

The Iran–USA conflict demonstrates the continuing challenges facing the international nuclear non-proliferation system. The credibility of the NPT depends not only on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also on ensuring that peaceful nuclear rights, safeguards obligations, and disarmament commitments are implemented consistently.

Sanctions and military pressure alone cannot resolve the political and security concerns sustaining nuclear competition. The United States must recognise that military superiority cannot guarantee a durable diplomatic settlement, while nuclear-weapon states must demonstrate genuine commitment to their disarmament obligations.

Ultimately, the future of the NPT will depend on whether states can rebuild confidence in diplomacy, strengthen international verification, and demonstrate that collective security can be achieved without encouraging further nuclear proliferation.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.