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Suez at 70: Has the Arab world forgotten how to say no?

November 19, 2026 at 8:00 am

Port Said seen from the air during the Suez Crisis [snl.no]

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Seventy years ago, on 29 October 1956, Israel invaded Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, triggering the military phase of the Suez Crisis, an episode widely regarded as a decisive turning point in the decline of the British Empire. It was a disastrous political and military miscalculation by Britain, undertaken in collusion with France and Israel, which exposed the widening gap between Britain’s imperial ambitions and its actual power. For a country whose rise to global dominance had been built over centuries on naval supremacy, commercial reach and formidable diplomatic and strategic calculation, the Suez adventure amounted to a spectacular act of self-sabotage. In attempting to restore its authority in the Middle East, Britain instead exposed just how far that authority had already eroded.

At one point, some 80,000 British troops were stationed in Egypt to guard the Suez Canal, while Egyptians needed British permission to enter the Canal Zone as if they were visiting another country! This was the reality of British occupation, despite Egypt having formally gained independence in 1922.

The confrontation started on 26th July 1956, when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, both as an assertion of Egyptian sovereignty and for economic reasons. He intended to use the canal’s revenues to finance the Aswan High Dam after the US and Britain refused to loan Cairo the money for the project. For London and Paris, this was far more than a dispute over the ownership and operation of a waterway. It challenged their influence in a region they had long treated as central to their strategic and economic interests.

READ: Sisi says Egypt lost about $20 billion in Suez Canal revenue amid regional instability

Britain convened an international conference in London in August, ostensibly seeking a diplomatic solution, while Prime Minister Anthony Eden was determined to remove Nasser.

The issue was no longer simply the canal; it had become regime change under false pretext. According to Anthony Nutting, Britain’s Minister of State at the Foreign Office at the time, Eden told him: “I want him [Nasser] murdered, can’t you understand?” and challenged him to come to the Cabinet and explain why this should not happen.

Nutting later resigned over the Suez invasion. Meanwhile, MI6 reports attributed to a supposed spy close to Nasser, codenamed “Lucky Break”, suggested that Egyptians would welcome British intervention and rise against him. Historians later questioned whether the source had ever existed, suggesting it may have been fabricated to tell Eden what he wanted to hear. The assumption proved disastrously wrong. A similar pattern of misleading intelligence would reappear in 2003, when Britain and the United States used claims about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction to justify the invasion and occupation. The alleged stockpiles were not found. It is later confirmed the case for invading Iraq was based on cooked up intelligence. 

Behind this public diplomatic process, however, Britain and France were secretly joining Israel in a plan to bring Nasser down. Under the agreement reached at Sèvres, France, between 22nd and 24th October, Israel would invade Sinai, creating a new situation that would justify British and French military intervention. Their major objective was not only to regain control of the Suez Canal but also to topple Nasser once and for all, and crush any growing belief across the region that the old colonial powers were there to stay and not about to give up their power and influence. The protocol was signed on 24th October. Israel launched its attack on 29th  October, and British and French forces began bombing Egypt on 31st October. There was also an intriguing warning before the invasion: according to Egyptian intelligence chief Amin Hewedy, Egypt’s military attaché in Paris had sent Cairo information about the cooperation between the three countries two days before the Israeli attack. Nasser reportedly did not initially believe it. The British and French publicly justified their intervention as an attempt to separate the warring sides. In reality, it was a coordinated assault on Egypt’s sovereignty.

READ: Egypt incurs $10B in Suez Canal losses over Gaza war, president says

Despite their initial military success, Britain and France were forced to halt their operation under mounting pressure from Washington, Soviet threats and international condemnation. The United Nations General Assembly called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and established the first UN Emergency Force to supervise the process.

British and French troops withdrew from the Canal Zone by 22nd December 1956, while Israel completed its withdrawal from Sinai in March 1957. Nasser remained in power, and Egypt retained control of the canal.

The outcome was a major political setback for the old colonial powers and a demonstration that their military superiority did not necessarily guarantee their ability to impose their political will.

The humiliation of Britain went beyond the failure of its military operation and the loss of its political objectives. The invasion encountered fierce resistance from ordinary Egyptians, particularly in Port Said, where civilians and local resistance fighters played an important role in confronting the invading forces. Their determination to defend their country’s sovereignty made it clear that Britain and France could no longer dictate Egypt’s political future through military occupation. Nasser emerged from the crisis considerably strengthened, not only as Egypt’s leader but also as a symbol of resistance to colonial domination across Africa and the Arab world. For Britain, Suez exposed the limits of its imperial power in a way that could no longer be concealed. It marked a decisive acceleration of Britain’s retreat from its former global position and encouraged independence movements elsewhere to believe that the old colonial powers could be challenged and defeated. Nasser remained in power for another 14 years, until his death in 1970, while British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was forced to resign in January 1957, just weeks after the invasion had collapsed. The contrast between the two leaders became one of the most enduring symbols of the outcome of Suez.

Seventy years later, the contrast with today’s Arab political landscape is clear. The same region that once witnessed Egypt’s defiance of the colonial powers is now characterized by the reluctance of most Arab governments to take meaningful action in response to Israel’s devastation of Gaza, while Nasser confronted Britain, France and Israel despite the enormous imbalance in military and economic power, today’s Arab capitals have largely confined themselves to statements, diplomatic appeals and expressions of concern. Although the geopolitics of the 1950s and today are vastly different, the central question remains: whether Arab governments are prepared to defend their sovereignty collectively, in accordance with their own mutual defence treaty of 1950.

Suez demonstrated that even powerful states can be forced to retreat when confronted by determined resistance. Its lessons were twofold: legitimacy comes from the people, and resistance will ultimately bring victory. Seventy years ago, the West was told no, and it had to accept it. Today, Gaza raises a much more uncomfortable question: why has so little of that determination survived among the governments of the Arab world?

OPINION: Kafr Qasim at 70: The massacre Israel still hasn’t owned up to

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.