The Red Sea-Gulf of Aden corridor has in recent years become one of the most sensitive pressure points not only for global trade but also for regional power competition. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of the most visible players in this competition, has been building a multi-layered web of influence in the Horn of Africa through ports, infrastructure and security relationships. Along the southern shore of the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland and Puntland form two distinct but complementary pillars of this web.
The pledge by the Dubai-based multinational logistics and supply chain company, DP World, of $442 million investment in the Port of Berbera in Somaliland has, undoubtedly, consolidated Abu Dhabi’s central role in the Gulf-Africa trade network. This move has, however, triggered Somalia’s sensitivities over sovereignty and unity given Somaliland’s internationally unrecognized status.
Puntland, through the Port of Bosaso and its infrastructure and security cooperation, represents the other link in the same chain. Somalia’s termination of its security, defence and economic cooperation agreements with the UAE in early 2026 brought to the surface not only the commercial but also the sovereignty and legitimacy dimensions of this web, turning Berbera and Bosaso into two faces of the same tension. In this context, Puntland is one of the key regions through which Abu Dhabi’s Somalia policy must be understood, and it cannot be read in isolation from Somaliland.
Within this picture, Puntland, in northeastern Somalia and bordered by the Gulf of Aden, the Guardafui Channel and the Somali Sea, occupies a critical position not only for regional trade but also for the security architecture, given its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb, the Port of Bosaso and its overland connections.
The UAE’s port, infrastructure, training and security support for Puntland should therefore be read not merely as development assistance, but as part of a quest for strategic influence along the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden axis.
Bosaso: Where trade and security intersect
Beyond being Puntland’s main maritime gateway, Bosaso is a logistical hub that feeds the regional trade network through overland corridors extending into Ethiopia. While its proximity to Cape Guardafui makes the port an observation and intervention point overlooking the Horn of Africa’s maritime passages, its closeness to the Bab el-Mandeb also heightens its importance for the security of Red Sea trade.
The UAE’s investments around the Port of Bosaso and its airport, its infrastructure initiatives such as electricity and water, and its support for training the Puntland Defence Forces and police indicate that Abu Dhabi aims to build a lasting security-economic network in the region.
However, the Federal Government of Somalia argues that such agreements cannot be concluded without federal approval on grounds of national security and sovereignty, and it criticises the UAE’s military presence in Bosaso and its relationship with local security structures.
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This criticism is not merely a diplomatic dispute. Given Somalia’s fragmented political structure, the federal government’s de facto control over Puntland is limited. This makes Abu Dhabi’s direct cooperation with regional administrations more effective, but also more contentious. Puntland has clearly demonstrated its resolve to maintain its relationship with Abu Dhabi even after Somalia’s termination of the agreements it had signed with the UAE.
Encirclement or stability?
The UAE’s presence in Puntland is frequently viewed by Mogadishu as the “encirclement of Somalia.” This reading is reinforced when the DP World investment in Berbera, the security relationships in Bosaso and the connections in Kismayo are considered together: the UAE is building a sphere of economic and military influence along Somalia’s coastline through three important ports.
Somalia’s termination, in early 2026, of its security, defence and economic cooperation agreements with the UAE, together with its targeting of the port arrangements covering Berbera, Bosaso and Kismayo, is a concrete expression of this tension.
Somali Defence Minister Ahmed Moalim Fiqi’s accusation that the UAE fuels conflicts, buys loyalty and undermines the sovereignty of other countries clearly reveals how Mogadishu views the situation.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, for his part, alleges that the UAE has established military bases without federal approval and supports armed structures outside the national security framework; the UAE, however, rejects these accusations and emphasises its support for the Somali people.
The real risk is whether the UAE’s investment and security support in Puntland weakens Somalia’s institutional integrity. Although the Puntland administration and its people do not necessarily yet see this support as a choice against the federal government, the tension between the central government’s claim to sovereignty and the actual capacity of regional autonomies leaves room for external actors to intervene.
For the UAE, Puntland is part of an effort to protect maritime corridors against the Houthi threat, piracy and security risks in the Red Sea, as well as to secure allies against Iranian influence and regional rivals. For Somalia, however, the issue is not merely security: it is sovereignty, the balance between centralism and federalism, and how external powers’ relationships with local actors will affect national integrity.
Therefore, even when presented as “stabilisation,” the UAE’s Puntland policy is a test of balance that must be conducted without deepening Somalia’s political fragility. Lasting stability is possible not by increasing the logistical value of Bosaso and Berbera, but by managing these ports in harmony with Somalia’s sovereign framework, its federal structure and the political will of its people.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.








