Doha Summit and the future of the region

It would be no exaggeration to say that the geopolitical and demographic future of the Gulf states is highly dependent on the outcome of the Doha summit scheduled to take place on 9-10 December. This is due primarily to the outstanding regional and international factors affecting the region. Perhaps it is fortunate, then, that a regional academic conference on the subject of the Gulf summit, currently in its third session, is being held at the same time.

This annual academic conference, which is sponsored by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, aims to institutionalise knowledge based on well thought-out policies and political decisions in the Arab region, rather than the improvisation and individual moods that have impacted the region for a long time and have led us to the political earthquakes that we are experiencing today.

However, for the Gulf, the Doha Summit is of pivotal importance because it aims to discuss and potentially resolve the crisis within the Gulf, which threatens to dissolve the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The union went into a state of crisis after Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates recalled their ambassadors from Qatar last spring after the repercussions of the Arab Spring put a strain on the political scene in the Gulf and the rest of the Arab region.

It is also true that the summit held by the Saudi monarch King Abdul-Aziz on 17 November in Riyadh has helped to restore the flow of relations between the Gulf states, as it was decided that the recalled ambassadors would return to the Doha after speculations that the Doha Summit would not continue as scheduled.

And yet, despite such speculation, it makes sense for the summit in Doha to continue as planned as it is the only sure way to solve the majority of the region’s outstanding issues, such as the situations in Egypt and Yemen; the nature of US-Iranian relations; as well as the rise of terrorism, which is undoubtedly impacting the entire world.

The Egyptian issue

Apart from the standard issues pertaining to the Gulf that will be addressed in the Doha summit, one of the major questions today is whether or not the UAE and Saudi Arabia will drag the rest of the GCC countries into adopting their foreign policy in regards to Egypt, which currently stands in support of the military regime. Such questions do not change the reality of the fact that the Gulf states wish to change the balance of the power in the region by rendering Egypt dysfunctional due to internal insecurity and social, political and economic turmoil following the military coup that ousted the democratically-elected government formed following the 2011 revolution.

If one of the goals behind the Gulf Summit is truly to revive a dying Egypt – and to make it a deterrent in a new four-cornered regional balance of power, as it is represented by Turkey, Israel and now Iran – then it must be said that this plan is, quite frankly, stupid. If this is truly the goal behind Saudi-Emirati ambitions, they should have first tested the ground with one of the GCC member states, which have the capacity and the funds to function in such a role. Instead, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are ultimately increasing the Egyptian state’s ability to impose more tyranny and marginalisation on its own population.

The Yemeni issue

The strangest aspect of this whole scenario is the GCC’s intent focus on the situation in Egypt and its outstanding issues in lieu of focusing on more serious issues affecting the region such as the growing rapprochement between the US and Iran and Iran’s increasing presence in Yemen, evident from the Iranian-backed Houthi advancement in Sana’a as of 17 November.

The willingness of the Gulf states to overlook the situation in Yemen does not change the nature of the situation nor does their attempt to evade responsibility change the fact that their willingness to blatantly ignore Iran’s efforts in Yemen are, in fact, enabling the Houthi advancement in the country. For this reason, it is in the interests of the Gulf states to rectify their decision to ignore the worsening situation in Yemen and instead focus on creating a new balance of power in the country rather than allowing the current pro-Houthi status quo to continue as is.

The Brotherhood

The other significant issue affecting the Gulf states is undoubtedly the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in their countries, particularly after the UAE and Saudi Arabia both decided to place the organisation on their list of terrorist organisations. There is no doubt that the status of the Muslim Brotherhood in these countries is one of the central reasons behind the disagreements among the GCC member states, which threatens not only the future stability of the Gulf region but could also potentially affect the entire world.

All of the factors mentioned above help explain why we have seen a number of view points regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, the most significant of which is the UN attitude towards the organisation after they were ousted from power in Egypt. Ironically, the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was a plot that was sponsored by Gulf money despite the fact that the Gulf is in dire need of an organisation of the Brotherhood’s calibre if it wants to confront Iran’s expanding regional presence.

The decision to alienate a group such as the Muslim Brotherhood in the GCC member states will prove to be a big mistake in countries such as Bahrain and Kuwait who have a history of co-existing alongside the group for decades. The question here is not one that seeks to depict the Brotherhood as angelic in juxtaposition with a more demonic opposition; rather, the discussion merely centres on the reality on the ground. After all, one cannot argue that the Brotherhood has long been an ally in many of the Gulf states, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as it faced a nationalist threat in the 1960s. Thus, we can argue that there is very little benefit to eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood, as it will only serve to weaken countries in the region that are already weak.

Moreover, it is evident that Qatar’s decision to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate organisation has undoubtedly been the most intelligent Gulf stance in terms of strategy. Qatar’s decision to forgo threatening the very organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood ensures that the organisation will stand as an ally with the country in light of changing regional and international geopolitical realities.

The Iranian issue

The Iranian file is perhaps that of most current importance, as it directly threatens the general structure of Gulf national security, especially in light of alleged US-Iranian (and Western) rapprochement. The accelerated nature of new Western agreements with Iran confirm that the Gulf still lives in a state of illusion, one that centres on their belief that their global position will be secured by their ability to provide oil to the world. We all know that this is no longer the case with the recent discovery of oil in American rock supplies.

The repercussions and consequences of the Arab Spring or the Arab revolutions have turned the tables in Iran’s favour, especially in Yemen. As George Friedman predicted in his 2012 book, The Next Decade, the US has practically abandoned its allies in the Gulf and is by default, allowing Iran to control the rules of the game.

In light of these impending realities, the Gulf countries have no choice but to reconsider their policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood, which constitutes a huge political force in the majority of the Arab world. The Doha Summit comes at a crucial time, one that cannot afford the GCC states to continue their bickering or blatant ignorance of the region’s outstanding issues. It is not important for the GCC to announce that they have restored the union or that they have decided to establish a greater Gulf power. What we need is for the Gulf states to distinguish their enemies from their friends, their allies from conspirators and recognise the illogic behind their recent policies.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadid, 9 December, 2014

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.