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A new setback for Egypt

March 31, 2015 at 11:39 am

There are many reasons behind the sluggish progression of the Iran nuclear deal, one of which is Iran’s Arak Nuclear Facility that has sparked much controversy since 2006 as it consists of the IR-40 heavy water reactors (HWRs) under construction. Although Iran is constantly stating that the reactors are being built for peaceful purposes, there is much criticism among the P5+1 countries (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States and Germany) as they worry the reactors could be diverted to develop nuclear weapons.

Concerns of the West regarding the HWRs?

There are many concerns at present surrounding HWRs at the Arak Facility. Firstly, from 2006 until the Joint Plan Action (JPA), a deal to find compromise on Iran’s nuclear activities was signed in November 2013, Tehran had failed to provide the updated and detailed design information in 2009 and the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) until May 2013, a form describing the details of the nuclear facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Secondly, the HWRs would produce plutonium, which became as issue for not just the P5+1 states, but also for Iran’s adversaries in the region as they viewed Iran a potential nuclear weapon state. Thirdly, is the issue with the Additional Protocol (AP) that demands information on the HWRs be disclosed to the IAEA. However, owing to the fact that Tehran had only signed the AP and not ratified the same, the IAEA Safeguards does not currently apply to the IR-40 Reactors. Fourthly, since the HWRs produce plutonium, existential threat of Iran developing nuclear weapons is much higher since plutonium weapons would be lighter and more powerful in addition to its effort to develop sophisticated ballistic missile systems, one of the choicest delivery systems for delivering nuclear weapons.

What Tehran is doing?

Iran insisted that that their nuclear programme is only running for civilian use in addition to them being a stanch believer in their “inalienable” right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes as mentioned in Article 4 of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tehran accepted to halt construction of the IR-40 for six months in November 2013 when they signed the Joint Plan Action and also agreed to provide DIQ related to the controversial HWRs. In fact, post nuclear deal, Tehran immediately allowed an IAEA in December 2013 to visit at the Arak facility for the first time in two years. Tehran has also agreed to redesign the reactor to produce one fifth of the proposed plutonium in order to alleviate any concerns and apprehensions of the P5+1 countries on their nuclear program, but has disqualified any plans to attempt to convert the HWRs into Light Water Reactors (LWRs). Therefore, the ideal solution, which could have been the dismantling of the Arak reactor, is also unlikely to be accepted by Iran and they would interpret such a proposal as denial of their rights to NPT. In the meanwhile, since the nuclear deal had struck, Iran has committed not to separate plutonium from spent-fuel, nor construct any new facility. He further clarified that Tehran also has no interest to construct any reprocessing facility (a facility that would be required for production of nuclear weapons).

Possible reasons why Iran supports the HWRs

These HWRs use natural uranium and therefore, there is no hazard of enriching the uranium. Iran claims that it needs HWRs to produce isotopes, which can be used for medicinal purposes especially to treat cancer patients. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran. He further clarified that the reactor is a “research reactor” and not for producing plutonium and also views this reactor as a “scientific” and “technological achievement.”

There is little doubt that Tehran is also vouching to achieve self-sufficiency in nuclear energy to meet its domestic demands. Iran is aware of the restrictions that would be imposed on it for its centrifuge facilities, which would seriously undermine its capacity to produce enriched uranium. On the other hand, given Tehran’s claim that it would need nuclear power for electricity generation, lesser quantity of plutonium produced from the HWRs would be needed to generate the same level of electricity than with enriched uranium. Iran’s positive progression with the nuclear deal means it would make little sense for Tehran to now be in defiance of the Joint Plan Action, especially since their progression is one of the reasons behind easing the many sanctions imposed on them.

It is very likely that Iran would be firm on the number of gas centrifuges it would allow the West to limit. It is only a matter of time to see if Arak HWRs become a bargaining chip for retaining the number of centrifuges Iran wants to retain.

Conclusion

It would be too early to predispose if the HWRs would be used to develop nuclear weapons. There are HWRs operating around the world, for example, the CANDU, but is not used to produce nuclear weapons and in the case of Arak also, Salehi confirms that the plutonium that would be produced is not “suitable for a bomb.”

Debalina Ghoshal is a Research Associate at the Delhi Policy Group, in New Delhi.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.