Islamists and sectarianism

It seems logical to say that religious revival movements are essentially sectarian, as evidenced by the experience of the Protestant movement – which called for a return to the “origins” of Christianity away from what it believed to be “heresy” within the church. The emergence of Protestantism thus created a backlash from “conservatives” and those committed to the church’s traditions – both good and bad – which fostered a sectarian division between Catholics and Protestants and instigated religious wars that lasted for decades.

Similarly, the Wahhabi movement started with calls to expel all perceived heresies within Islam and return to the believed “origins” of the religion as mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah. The foundation of Wahhabism also resulted in sectarian tendencies due the insularity of the movement itself and the resistance it encountered from those protecting and preserving the old ways; as well as a result of the immoderation of some of its advocates.

I have suggested in some of my books that sectarianism is an ideology ultimately based on defeat. In this, I referred to the Mahdiyya movement in Sudan, which began by preaching the end of the world and that all Muslims should unite under the banner of the Mahdi. However, after the failure of its project it transformed into a closed sect that protected itself by demonising those outside the movement. On the other hand, following the murder of Imam Hussein, the Shiite movement, whose beliefs were based on uniting the Muslims under one wise leadership, went underground in order to lick its wounds. During that time, it established a new religious identity and created its own rituals and textual traditions.

It is surprising that Islamism resisted sectarianism in its early days. For example, Imam Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, supported bringing the various Islamic sects closer together under the 1947 initiative. He also contributed to the Sunni-Shiite dialogue. The Muslim Brotherhood also supported the 1948 revolution in Yemen led by the Zaidi reformers, which was also contributed to by one of the movement’s leaders, the Algerian Fodil El-Ouartilani. Perhaps this contribution to the Yemeni revolution, in addition to all the other work done by the Muslim Brotherhood, is what led to the killing of Al-Banna in 1949.

Likewise, the Shiite Dawa Party distanced itself from sectarian extremism and intolerance when it was established by Sheikh Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr. All Islamists , regardless of sect, read Al-Sadr’s writings, while all Shiites also read books by Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi. The first modern Islamist movement in Iran, the Freedom Movement of Iran, led by Mehdi Bazargan, brought both Shiite and Sunni members together in its ranks. Most Sunni Islamist movements welcomed the Islamic revolution in Iran, and one of the reasons behind the anger of Gulf state leaders at the elected Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi was his attempts to integrate Iran into the regional structure.

However, these foundations did not prevent sectarian rhetoric from leaking into the statements of both Sunni and Shiite Islamic movements, especially in light of the increased sectarian polarisation and the region’s hot and cold wars. Despite the fact that the modern Islamist movement represent a revolution in the traditional understanding of Islam, they still derive legitimacy from historical texts and a claim to return to the “origins” of religion. For example, Imam Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih represents an elimination of the Shiite idea of the Imamate and divine choice, and goes back to the Sunni idea of nominating an Imam based on their qualifications. However, this complete deviation from the foundations of the Shiite doctrine was accompanied by highly religious rhetoric that prioritised Shiite religious identity and focused on the points of dispute and contention between the sects, especially as a result of Iran-Iraq war and Khomeini’s attempts to mobilise Shiites in Iraq against Saddam Hussein.

The rise of Sunni-Shiite sectarianism has been exacerbated by Iran’s proxy war with Saudi Arabia, and the vast amounts of money channelled by both states into religious institutions and media propaganda.

Sunni discourse, on the other hand, has been affected by the rise of extremist Salafism and by writings of a sectarian nature. There has also been a new translation of historical animosities between Sunni and Shia regional powers (mainly Iran and the countries of the Arab Gulf) into conflicts over power and resources. Political propaganda during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s also contributed to fuelling sectarian tendencies, which became worse after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ongoing Syrian civil war.

The national disputes I have referred to in the past were not spared from this polarisation, as we witnessed in Iran and Saudi Arabia’s attempts to use sectarian militarisation in their respective political conflicts. Moreover, Islamic movements have historically not been immune from national polarisation, as we have seen many instances where a country is divided in accordance with a regional, political-ideological, or even personal (following a specific leader) bias.

This brings us back to the beginning, which is that Islamic revival consists of two parts: a religious part and a political part. The religious part seeks to construct a normative paradigm around the alleged return to the “origins” of religion; an origin that all Islamist movements agree dates back to the time of the Prophet. This is the essence of Islam, which was given to humans to declare that there is only one God, to rid the pagans of their myths and false beliefs, and to remove the additional burdens the people of the book put on themselves. There is no disagreement among Muslims regarding the significance of the Prophet, Imam Ali, Hassan, Hussein, Zaid El Abidine, or Ali Al-Ridha; their differences came after that. Therefore, the core approach of all modern revival movements is unity of the Islamic faith.

However, there are obstacles to this unity. The first obstacle dates back to the historical disputes that caused the sectarian rift within Islam. This overlapped with the second obstacle, which is the politicisation of sects. Politicised sectarianism has bred hatred and intolerance, and extremism has been and remains the bane of Islamist politics. In other words, extremism has taken control of the Islamist scene.

The Islamisation of the Islamists (in other words, to return Islamism to its true Islamic roots) thus requires the renunciation of extremism and intolerance. The driving force of all Islamic movements should be towards knowledge rather than ignorance; and towards rationalism rather than extremism and impulsiveness.

Translated from Al Quds Al Arabi, 27 April, 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.