The Egyptian policy on the Syrian crisis

Unlike the majority of Arab countries, the Egyptian policy on the Syrian crisis was not determined based on the developments of the crisis but rather on the internal situation in Egypt and the change in authority over the past four years. This formed Egypt’s political position on the Syrian crisis.

Thus, three contrasting and different political positions regarding the Syrian crisis were formed in Egypt. These positions were based on the three different political stages witnessed in the country since the outbreak of the January 25th Revolution in 2011.

Military Council

When the Syrian revolution had completely broken out on 18 March, 2011, Egypt was in the midst of its major revolution, the first phase of which was Mubarak’s step down from power on 11 February 2011. Authority was then given to the Military Council, led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who governed the country while elections were being held.

At this point, foreign affairs were only important enough for Cairo to express its presence in the official Arab system. Therefore, Egypt’s positions on the Syrian crisis were general (calling for a political resolution to the Syrian crisis that preserves the people’s aspirations and absolute rejection of any foreign military intervention) and were a part of the Arab League’s activities. Cairo supported calls in early August 2011 for the Syrian regime to begin implementing a group of political reforms and stop the killings in order to prevent internationalising the crisis.

A month later, in mid-September, Cairo accepted the first Arab initiative which called for the withdrawal of the army, stopping all forms of violence, and holding a dialogue with the opposition. Then, the Arab League issued a decision on 12 November, 2011, providing for suspending Syria’s membership to the Arab League and recalling the Arab ambassadors to Damascus. Egypt objected to this decision, but four days later agreed to the Arab League’s decision to send an Arab fact-finding envoy followed by the Arab League’s proposal of a second initiative to resolve the Syrian crisis in January 2012, which called for the formation of a national unity government and for Bashar Al-Assad to hand over all of his powers to his Vice President Farouk Al-Sharaa.

Cairo was not a key player in the formulation of the Arab League’s decisions and approaches at the time due to its internal situation which negatively affected the performance of the foreign ministry, thus allowing Riyadh and Doha to lead the Arab systems in matters related to Syria.

Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi

The Military Council did not get involved in the details and reasons behind the Syrian crisis. Instead, it was content with the main idea of “the need to resolve the crisis by political, not military means”. However, during the second phase, which began when the Muslim Brotherhood was elected into the People’s Assembly and Shura Council on 28 November, 2011. There was a noticeable change in the dealings with the Syrian issue, not only due to the developments in Syria, but also, mainly, because of the Brotherhood’s opinions regarding the reasons behind the Syrian crisis.

While they kept to the main ideas of the solution for the Syrian crisis approved by the Military Council, the Brotherhood held the Syrian regime responsible for the derailment of the revolution, turning it from a peaceful revolution to a violent one due the regime’s security decisions. Cairo’s political discourse on the solution for the Syrian crisis became linked to achieve the people’s will to overthrow the regime and establish a democratic government.

This political position provoked practical measures that began on 7 February, 2012, with a decision by the Egyptian People’s Assembly to freeze relations with the Syrian People’s Council. This was followed by the People’s Assembly’s Arab Affairs Committee’s decision to hold a meeting with the Syrian opposition parties during the same month.

Cairo was not content with these measures alone. They also recalled their ambassador to Damascus on 19 February. The foreign ministry spokesperson justified this decision by saying it was in response to the Egyptian people’s demands after all other options and means were exhausted with the Syrian regime.

At the beginning of March, Speaker of the People’s Assembly, Saad El-Katatni, stated during his speech to the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU) in Kuwait that the People’s Assembly is coordinating with representatives of the Syrian opposition. He also proposed an initiative for resolving the Syrian crisis, in a step reflecting the Egyptian diplomacy towards the Syrian crisis. The initiative consists of six points:

• The need to give top priority to immediately stopping violence.
• The need to propose a solution to the crisis.
• Start serious political dialogue.
• Provide support to the Egyptian people.
• Unite the opposition forces.
• Take care of the displaced Syrian people.

With every step that the Brotherhood took away from the Syrian regime, they were one step closer to the opposition. This is represented in the Egyptian attendance of the Friends of Syria conferences in Tunisia and Istanbul amid Egypt’s calls for the need to unite the Syrian opposition.

On 23 May, 2012, Mohamed Morsi was elected as Egyptian president, and the presidency became the main reference for the foreign policy, as the legal requirements of the political system were completed.

The Egyptian foreign policy towards the Syrian crisis under Morsi witnessed clear fluctuations in the beginning. Morsi raised the level of the political discourse by describing the Syrian regime as a dictatorship and that its overthrow was a matter of moral duty before being a political duty. Meanwhile, Egyptian-Iranian relations made apparent progress, evidenced by Ahmadinejad’s visit to Cairo in early February 2013. Egypt considered Iran part of the solution in Syria and insisted that Iran be part of the Quartet group resolving the Syrian crisis. Morsi also praised Russia’s policies in dealing with the Syrian crisis.

This policy raised a number of questions, not only within Egyptian circles, but within Syria’s government and opposition political circles. While Damascus remained silent regarding the close relations between Egypt and Iran, it continued to attack the Brotherhood for its closeness with the opposition, and the opposition strongly criticised the Egyptian behaviour and statements related to Iran and Russia.

However, the Brotherhood’s diplomacy did not last long. On 15 June, 2013, Morsi announced his complete severance of ties with Damascus, his recall of the Egyptian ambassador, closure of the embassy, and his request of the Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Syria thus, Cairo was placed in the ranks with the Saudis, Qataris and the Turks.

The Brotherhood’s rule clearly supported the Syrian opposition. Cairo was a safe haven not only for the opposition figures, but also many Syrians who found Egypt to be the most comfortable place for them due to the facilities granted to Syrians, and because of the similarities between the Egyptian and Syrian environments in terms of standards of living.

Al-Sisi’s phase

Along with the coup carried out by the Defence Minister Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi on 3 July, 2013, against the Muslim Brotherhood and the overthrow of the first democratically elected president after the revolution, the Egyptian support for the Syrian opposition ended. A new stage of indirect support for the regime began under the explicit pretext of Egypt’s national interests, and the implicit hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood.

Al-Sisi was not able to openly declare his support for Damascus due to the fact that the regime was directly responsible for the Syrian crisis, on one hand, and because such open positions would seem out of the ordinary amongst Arabs and the international community. He also wanted to avoid angering the Gulf states as he needed their financial support, especially in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Therefore, Al-Sisi adopted an opposite tactic, i.e. containing the radical Syrian opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, in service of the Syrian regime; this began with the clear suffocation and crackdown on the opposition, thus driving them to leave the country.

The Egyptian position on the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces was clear when Al-Sisi did not incite the coalition to attend the Arab Summit or the first and second Cairo meetings in an attempt to help the National Coordination Committee to face the coalition. This was clearly expressed by Al-Sisi when he stressed the need to support a moderate opposition.

While Egypt contained and cracked down on the radical opposition, it showed more openness towards the system, evidenced in Cairo’s welcoming of an official Syrian delegation on 17 December, 2014, headed by Imad Al-Assad, head of the Naval Academy in Latakia. This move carries many political connotations, despite Cairo’s claim that it was a routine visit.

Al-Sisi’s second tactic was reducing the Arab world’s crises, especially that in Syria, to terrorism and association with the Muslim Brotherhood. He began to call for a political solution in Syria that starts with combatting terrorism. This vision was also adopted by his allies in Iran and Russia.

He also took another step towards mainstreaming the Syrian regime’s vision for a political solution. This amounted to his statement during an interview with the UAE’s Al-Ittihad newspaper on 20 January, in which he said that the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad will be part of the negotiations process in the event that a dialogue between the regime and the opposition is held.

This last position was Al-Sisi’s open expression of his acceptance of a policy in line with Russia’s position. He distanced himself from his Gulf allies who consider Al-Assad to be a part of the problem, not the solution. This formed an alliance extending from Cairo to Moscow, via Tehran and Baghdad, compared to the opposite alliance, which Ankara, Doha and Riyadh, which has special relations with Cairo.

The idea of establishing a joint Arab-Turkish ground force in northern Syria is a fundamental point of disagreement between Ankara, whose involvement is linked to its expansion of the military operation to include areas controlled by the Syrian regime, and between Cairo, who calls for limiting the operation to the areas out of the regime’s control.

However, Egypt’s change in position was not only limited to the political and military aspect. It also reached the social situation of the Syrians living in Egypt. The first decision made by Al-Sisi in this respect was completely preventing Syrians from entering Egypt and restricting their movement in Egypt. This had negative social consequences on many, especially those who are no longer able to visit their families, and has prevented many Syrians from seeking asylum in Egypt.

Translated from Al-Jazeera on 26 May 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.