The power of diplomacy: Bringing Iran in from the cold

In the 24 hours since the news broke about the historic deal between Iran and the six world powers known as P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Un security council, plus Germany), a predictable stream of articles and analyses traversing the spectrum of all possible opinions has inundated media channels. Of the various camps that have been formed, the broad split between supporters and critics of the deal can be characterised by the positions of US President Obama on the side of the former and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the latter.

In the (somewhat petulant) words of Netanyahu, the recently agreed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran, the US, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany is “a bad mistake of historic proportions” that will guarantee Iran “a sure path to nuclear weapons”; while Obama has confidently affirmed that not only does the deal cut off “every path Iran might take to creating nuclear weapons”, but that it both “meets out national security needs, and those of our allies.”

The problem with both of these positions is that, like most of the words uttered by politicians over the world, they are far too simplistic. What both die-hard supporters and vehement critics of the deal fail to grasp in their one-dimensional rhetoric is that the true nature of the deal itself is neither a resounding victory nor a doomed failure for either party: it is a compromise that has been reached through weeks, months and years of painstaking negotiations and which has been implemented on the grounds of mutual trust and understanding and a willingness to meet each other halfway (albeit begrudgingly). Indeed, the JCPOA itself stipulates that all parties to the agreement “commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation.”

But what does the deal really involve? Ultimately, Iran has pledged to severely limit its nuclear capabilities for more than a decade and to only pursue “an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear programme” in return for the lifting of financial and trade sanctions that have crippled the country’s economy for the past few decades. Specifically, Iran has agreed to reduce its stockpile of low enriched uranium by 98 per cent, diminish its centrifuges by two-thirds, and commit to regular checks and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including on its military bases (a previous “red line” drawn by the Islamic Republic’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei). Moreover, while all international sanctions will eventually be lifted, the current restrictions on all missile capabilities and ban on the trade of missiles and related parts will remain in place for the next eight and five years respectively.

The combined result of this agreement on Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities means that even in the event of the Islamic Republic reneging on the deal it would take over a year before it could feasibly be in a position to build a viable nuclear warhead (what is known as “breakout time”) – a significant reduction from the current estimate of a couple of months. While if it sticks to the deal, the possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon in the next 15-20 years are slim to none, although it is still permitted to conduct a limited amount of uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes.

The predictable backlash from Israel and the American Right has come as a result of the fact that the current deal does not require Iran to halt all of its nuclear activity (a vain hope if ever there was one), and instead allows the Islamic Republic to continue enriching uranium (albeit on a much smaller scale and under constant supervision) as long as it doesn’t take any steps towards using its stockpiles for military purposes. This criticism, as rightly pointed out by Peter Beinart in an article for The Atlantic, is predicated on the assumption that America (and by extension Israel) possesses the necessary omnipotence to simply brow-beat Iran into accepting its own limited vision of reality. Contrary to the vocal cries of US Republicans and Israeli far-right, bullying and scaremongering are not successful tactics in international diplomacy, and if anything, will only serve to fracture what is already a highly fragile accord.

Because the only plausible alternatives to the current deal are either to allow things continue as they are – enforcing ever-crippling sanctions on Iran’s civilian population while the country’s government quietly works towards nuclear armament – or declaring all-out war, which quite apart from potentially igniting flashpoints across the entire Middle East (with the possible involvement of Russia and China), would also give Iran the perfect excuse to rush towards building a nuclear weapon.

Indeed, if anyone is the loser in this deal, it is Iran, not the powers with whom it has been negotiating. Despite its rhetorical flourishes to the contrary, the country has long been backed into a political and economic corner by the sanctions regime, which have not only made life increasingly fraught and difficult for millions of everyday Iranians but have also run the country into the ground financially. Public support for a deal to ensure the lifting of sanctions has been growing steadily over the past decade; the current president, Hassan Rouhani, arguably came to power in 2013 on the back of his pledge to end the ongoing UN-sanctioned siege on his country. The bottom line is that Iran needs this deal, even if it doesn’t want to admit it. Even supreme leader Khamenei’s ardent anti-American rhetoric, heaped on a mere days before the signing of the agreement, has been effectively undermined by the smashing of his so-called “red lines” on issues such as inspection of military bases. No matter how much it may preach about its role as a regional superpower, in signing this deal Iran has effectively agreed to give up all its goals of nuclear armament for the foreseeable future. In other words, the Islamic Republic has simply rolled over and given the international negotiators what they want in its desperate bid to be taken in from the political cold.

It remains to be seen, however, if Iran will make good on its promises. In its desperation to end the sanctions regime, the country has placed itself in a position that could potentially damage its self-modelled image as a military strongman in the region. Khamenei’s notorious anti-Americanism may ultimately get the better of him, and lead him to violate the terms of the agreement in a bid to portray himself as an independent and uncompromising leader. On the other hand, Iran’s new-found rapprochement with the West might mean that it is able to operate with greater impunity in countries such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, where it already has a vested strategic interest. Such a scenario will likely stir the shackles of Saudi Arabia, Iran’s hated regional enemy and a key trade partner to many Western nations and could potentially lead to further confrontation between the two nations; or even of backtracking on the part of the US and UK if the Kingdom’s sheikhs decide that the prospect of a non-pariah Iran too much to bear.

In the end, only time will tell if the deal struck yesterday will be a step towards more inclusive, friendlier diplomatic between Iran and the West, or simply a prelude to further conflict.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.