Will Egypt’s road map open the Rafah crossing or keep it closed?

Former Fatah official Sufian Abu Zaida announced during his participation in a seminar held in Gaza City on 8 December 2015 that the Egyptian authorities had a road map to open the Rafah border crossing and resolve the crisis once and for all.

According to Abu Zaida, who is close to former Fatah official Mohammed Dahlan, the road map includes achieving reconciliation within Fatah first, followed by a national reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. It also involves forming a unity government that will control and manage matters in Gaza, including the crossing and border security, and holding presidential, as well as PLC and PNC elections.

This is the first time the Fatah official has said this and it seems to be true, as no denial was issued by the Egyptians or Palestinians. In addition to this, I do not believe that Abu Zaida could invest or fabricate such a matter that involves the Egyptian government. It is worth noting that he has repeated his words on two occasions. What is stranger is that this important statement passed quietly without stirring a Palestinian political or media discussion, and no one paid attention to it. Even the factional committee concerned with the crossing crisis did not give it any attention or respond to it in any manner.

The Egyptian road map simply means that there will be no complete opening of the crossing nor will there be a radical resolution to the suffocating crisis suffered by the people of Gaza without an internal Fatah reconciliation, i.e. a reconciliation between Abbas and Dahlan, followed by a national reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas or Abbas and Hamas. This basically means that they have disregarded or ignored the reconciliation agreement brokered by Egypt itself, which did not address the idea of a Fatah reconciliation, despite its importance. It also did not mention handing over the reins of power to Hamas or restoring legitimacy in Gaza, as Mahmoud Abbas always says.

It is worth remembering that the reconciliation agreement signed in Cairo in May 2011, i.e. during the rule of the Military Council which is now back in power in a newer form, stipulated a number of matters for their reconciliation including the formation of a national consensus government, the meeting of the PLO’s top leadership, the resumption of the PLC’s duties, resolving Gaza’s crisis, including its reconstruction, and merging institutions to create conditions conducive to holding full elections.

In the security context, for example, the agreement spoke of keeping the security situation as it is while gradually merging 3,000 members of the former security agencies associated with the PA into the existing security agency in Gaza. It also mentioned the formation of a higher security council by means of consensus that would make the necessary reforms, after elections are held, and re-merge the security agencies in cooperation with an Arab security committee, the backbone of which would be Cairo.

Matters changed after the coup in Egypt, as the new Egyptian leadership closed the crossing in order to suffocate and weaken Hamas. The Egyptian leadership also repeatedly called for the need for the “legitimate authority” to supervise the crossing, as well as the borders between Gaza and Egypt, with a coy reference to the reconciliation agreement and its mechanisms, especially with Cairo abandoning its responsibilities as the broker. Meanwhile, President Mahmoud Abbas totally obliterated the basis and foundations of the reconciliation with his constant talk of Hamas surrendering to the PA, or what he describes as restoring legitimacy in Gaza.

Simply, frankly and clearly, the blockade and the closure of the Rafah crossing has been used to blackmail Hamas and force it to surrender to Egypt’s and Abbas’s conditions by completely leaving power. In return, Abbas will kindly waive his condition of Hamas handing over its weapons, even if for a specific duration. Abbas ignored the equation that the Islamic movement agreed to after the April 2014 Al-Shati agreement, which included its acceptance and improvement of the famous Tunisian equation, which involves leaving government and remaining in power or authority and in the institutions in general.

Truth be told, despite the presence of a military political trend in Gaza that is not keen on the reconciliation and is looking for just the illusion of the PA’s return as well as a means to resolve Gaza’s problems without making any political or security concessions, the majority of the Hamas leadership, especially abroad, is serious and open to the reconciliation. They are willing for the government in Gaza to oversee the partnership and for institutions to carry out their duties without marginalising or excluding any party, given the fact that Hamas possesses the same legitimacy possessed by Abbas, as the constitutional term of the president and PLC have ended.

Therefore, after Abbas’s approval and openness, or rather his involvement in the blackmail of Hamas with the issues of the crossing and the siege in order to force Hamas to give in to his conditions, and his abandonment of the spirit of the reconciliation agreement and the concept of partnership in general, the Egyptian leadership proposed a new condition that is undoubtedly a complete and explicit blackmail of Abbas.

Cairo knows that Abu Mazen and a large part of the Fatah and PA leadership are rejecting reconciliation with Dahlan in any form. They also officially issued a firm response to this last November when Cairo attempted to gather the two sides together. They also responded to Egypt and Dahlan’s leaks promoting the idea in an official statement from Fatah, issued by its Central Committee, considering the Dahlan issue to be completely over and even criminal, accusing him of using political funds abroad to achieve personal and partisan political goals.

Despite this, Cairo proposed the condition of reconciling with Dahlan to tell Abbas if he wanted to achieve a political, economic and morale victory against Hamas and force it to surrender and give in to resolve Gaza’s crises and lift the siege, including opening the crossing, then it must do the same with Dahlan. Egypt is sending the message that the road to Gaza not only passes through the necessary reconciliation with Hamas, but also through a forced reconciliation with Dahlan that would put Dahlan back onto the scene, perhaps even as a serious candidate, in the eyes of his regional sponsors, Cairo and Abu Dhabi, to succeed Abbas.

We cannot deny the fact that reconciliation within Fatah is important and required because a large part of Fatah feels weakened and marginalised, especially those in Gaza. Resolving Fatah’s political conflicts must be in a partisan and democratic manner. As for the criminal accusations, they certainly belong in the just, independent and unpoliticised judiciary. However, it is not logical to link opening the crossing or the national reconciliation to the partisan reconciliation, specifically between Abbas and Dahlan.

The national reconciliation is also required, needed and urgent to achieve partnership without exclusion or a stronger and weaker party. This must be paired with honest and honourable implementation of the reconciliation agreements and understandings, of course by means of an unbiased and honest mediator by a party other than Cairo, as it abandoned its role and mediation and also refuses to allow any other party to carry out the dirty work. Despite this, the lack of a national or partisan reconciliation should not justify, in any case, the closure of the Rafah crossing or its use to blackmail Palestinian leaderships in the PA, Fatah or Hamas.

In short, the Egyptian road map to open the crossing includes unrealistic and even impossible demands. It is worth noting that opening the crossing in a regular and periodic manner for humanitarian purposes and emergencies, only requires Egyptian political will and decision, and this must not be associated, under any circumstances, with the developments and results of the internal Palestinian actions and movements. As for the permanent opening of the Rafah crossing, it must be linked to a necessary national reconciliation that practically occurred since the Al-Shati’ Agreement at the hands of the Palestinians themselves after Cairo abandoned its role and sponsorship, and the lack of any other party willing, or capable, of doing the job.

Translated from Arabi21, 3 February 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.