The true dimensions of Turkey’s open door to Baghdad

The historic state visit that Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim made to Iraq a few days ago came at a time in which the relationship between the two countries is clearly strained. The main reason for the tension is Baghdad’s protest at the presence of Turkish troops in Bashiqa in the north of the country. Turkey insists that they are there at the request of the Iraqi government, which Baghdad denies.

Moreover, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said that Haider Al-Abadi, Iraq’s Prime Minister, should “know his limits”. Soon after, accusations flew from both sides; Aws Al-Khafaji (the leader of the Abu Fadl Al-Abbas Brigades, a Shia militia) warned that, “Turkish interests and the Turks who are working in Iraq have both become a source of danger.”

Nevertheless, Yildirim’s visit to Baghdad should be seen as part of a smart manoeuvre of Turkish diplomacy.

The joint statement issued at the end of the talks between Iraq and Turkey emphasised a number of fundamental points, the most important of them being the commitment of both sides to maintaining security and working together to combat terrorism within a framework that upholds a unified view of sovereignty. Turkish forces will withdraw from Bashiqa, and Ankara has stressed its commitment to maintaining a unified Iraq, respect for its autonomy and a commitment to ensuring that no terrorist organisations will be allowed to thrive on Iraqi soil. The two countries have said that they will avoid taking part in any operation that threatens the security of either side. A close reading of the joint statement, however, leads me to conclude that this is a distinctly diplomatic deal from the Turkish point of view; most of the points agreed upon favour Turkey’s interests.

Among the most important points within the agreement is that about “terrorist” groups: “The two countries will not allow the presence of terrorist organisations on either side or the continuation of any activities that threaten the security of either side.” This is a serious blow to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known more commonly as the PKK, which is no longer viewed as a political party; it has used Iraqi territory as a base from which to launch attacks within Turkey.

Despite the fact that the government in Baghdad views the state visit as a diplomatic victory for Iraq and a testament to its ability to maintain and protect “Iraqi sovereignty” by bringing an end to the Turkish presence in Bashiqa, the Turks succeeded in using their presence there as a negotiation card. Turkey has also succeeded in weakening the PKK’s presence in Iraqi territory.

In his press conference with Abadi, Yildirim confirmed that, “Turkey will withdraw its forces from Bashiqa after it stabilises the situation there. The goal is to prevent the PKK from causing harm to Turkey from its outposts in Iraq. This is the primary concern. The Peshmerga [Iraqi Kurdish militias] and Iraq forces are taking the necessary measures to expel these terrorists from the city of Sinjar. We will work together to face the coming challenges from both Iraqi and Turkish territories.”

One must note that Yildirim did not confirm that Turkish forces will be withdrawn from Bashiqa per se; he emphasised that Turkish forces will pull out “after the situation in Bashiqa is stabilised.” What this means is that the Turks are waiting on Iraq to launch an operation against the PKK as part of a contingency for the withdrawal from Bashiqa.

“The PKK is a terrorist organisation in the area of Sinjar and from there it is poses as the biggest threat to Turkish territory,” said Yildirim. “It is essential that they are removed and our government is willing to cooperate in order to bring an end to this danger.”

The terrorist acts that have been carried out by the PKK have affected a number of Turkish cities and it is Ankara’s right to minimise this threat wherever it may be. I believe that the Turks have hit more than two birds with this one stone; they have now also thrown the ball into the Iraqi government’s court.

This agreement will embarrass the Abadi government because it does not have the military or intelligence capabilities to target the PKK in northern Iraq. The only solution would be for Abadi to discuss the issue with the autonomous Iraqi Kurd government in the northern territories. This will not be possible unless they discuss the outstanding issues between them, including the Iraqi budget, which has been stalled.

Yildirim’s visit was a master stroke on the part of the Turkish leadership. If the Iraqi government follows through with its part of the agreement, it will mean that the PKK stronghold covering a sizeable chunk of Iraqi territory will be neutralised. However, if Abadi does not do so, we are likely to see Turkey striking the PKK within Iraqi territory, which will be justified by Baghdad’s inability to do so. Ankara will see this as a necessary move to protect Turkey’s people and territory from attacks by the PKK.

The agreement between Turkey and Iraq boosts a number of security-related and economic portfolios, with benefits for both countries. There is no doubt that for Iraq, the main benefit is making sure that the relationship with Ankara goes back to the way it used to be, because the government in Baghdad is today facing a number of political and security threats and challenges. We will have to wait and see if Tehran allows Iraq to function beyond Iranian influence and align itself with the Turkey-Russia axis that is emerging in the region.

By visiting the Kurdish regions of Iraq as well as Baghdad, Yildirim sent a message to Abadi’s central government and the PKK: the Turkish government is playing its cards in all sectors and has the ability to put pressure on all parties. Such a diplomatic hit, if implemented, demonstrates the political craftsmanship and strength of the Turkish state and its government, despite all of the challenges it is facing at the moment.

Translated from Alkhaleejonline, 9 January 2017

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.