Saudi Arabia’s Muhammad Bin Salman and Iran

In a recent television interview, Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman added a new dimension to what some describe as a change in Saudi foreign policy during the reign of King Salman Bin Abd Al-Aziz. They say that such policy used to be centred on conservatism, the avoidance of conflict and exercising influence behind the scenes. As such, it was incumbent to avoid talking publicly about positions adopted toward those who disagree with Riyadh or have an issue with it.

Saudi foreign policy today is more inclined towards confrontation and the military option if necessary. In fact, though, in terms of its principles and constants, it has not changed. What has changed is the approach and political performance in response to the changing era, including events, dangers and balances, and in terms of the change of actors and their roles and objectives, whether declared or otherwise.

Seeing things from this angle, we may say that what Muhammad Bin Salman said last week represents, so far, the pinnacle of the change in the Saudi approach to foreign policy. This is manifest in his answer to the question put to him by his interlocutor about the potential for dialogue with Iran. He answered a question with a question: “How can we reach an understanding with a regime that is based on an extreme ideology that is stated in its constitution and in the will of Khomeini?” He added that the objective of this regime has been to spread its official religious doctrine “all over the Islamic world until the Messiah appears.” Then he asked: “How can I convince such a regime?”

Read: ‘No dialogue with extremist Iran’ says Saudi prince 

Such clarity and straightforwardness is unheard of from the Saudis. “We know that we are being targeted by the Iranian regime,” the prince continued. “Reaching the Qiblah of the Muslims [Makkah] is a main goal for the Iranian regime. We shall not wait until the battle occurs inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We shall work in order for the battle to be there inside Iran and not inside Saudi Arabia.” His words were not directed at the TV viewer in Saudi Arabia or even beyond it; they were directed at the Iranian leadership. This suggests the end of the era of mutual lying, lip service and avoiding clear positions in a bid to prevent confrontation. The Iranian leadership, meanwhile, apparently wants to maintain the “mutual lying” approach.

The Saudi official did not close the door of dialogue with Iran completely. Rather, he placed the Iranian leadership on notice in front of itself and regional observers that political dialogue between states should be purely political; official religious doctrines, together with their metaphysical views, should be put aside.

As such, the most important prerequisite for a serious and viable dialogue is that Iran should abandon its use of sectarian militias as a lever for its regional role and interventions, and as a tool to influence the course of dialogue. In other words, dialogue should be between one state and another but not while one is armed to the teeth with doctrines and militias employed to spread them. Iran’s insistence on sticking to the militia tool in its role in the Arab world means that it is using the notion of dialogue as a cover for something that has nothing to do with genuine dialogue and what it should lead to.

What is noteworthy in this context is that while Iran establishes and finances militias across the Arab world, it prohibits them on its own soil. Iran complements this by building its alliances in the Arab world exclusively on a doctrinal basis.

Read: Saudi’s comments ‘destructive’, add to tensions

As I was listening to the interview with Prince Muhammad I remembered what I heard from a former Iranian official whom I met last summer in a closed seminar in Doha about Arab-Iranian dialogue. As he insisted on the necessity of dialogue, I asked him about the benefit of having dialogue while his country was insisting on imposing its military presence and deploying its political influence in Iraq and Syria. His answer was noteworthy and uniquely blunt: “Because of the Iraq-Iran war and the Saudi and Gulf support given to Saddam at the time, the Iranian leadership decided to shift Iran’s lines of defence from within Iran to within the Arab world.” That, I suggested to him, was adopting the Israeli strategy for dialogue and negotiations with the Arabs.

In fact, when we consider what Iran says and what it does, we discover a near-mirror image between Iranian policy and Israeli policy toward the Arab world. They are part of the regional system with all its underpinnings, tools and dynamics. From day one, what is declared in Israel’s policy is the fight against terrorism, particularly “Palestinian terrorism”, whereas the real objective behind this has been the seizure of more land and imposition of a fait accompli on everyone. As far as the Israelis are concerned, negotiations are nothing but a tool to buy time for achieving the undeclared objective of as much Palestinian land as possible with as few Palestinians on it as possible.

Iran resorts to the same tactic. What is declared in its discourse is a fight against infidelity, and specifically Arab Sunni infidelity. Yet, what is concealed in its policy is expansionism and the extension of Shia influence within the Arab states via alliances with local minorities which share Iranian doctrine. Another point of convergence is that Israel bases its claims on Jewish heritage, which it believes gives it the right to regain the land of Palestine and declare the exclusive state for the world’s Jews, while the “Islamic Republic of Iran” derives its doctrine from Shia heritage; more specifically from the idea of the infallibility of the Imam and from the concept of the authority of the jurist. Its policy toward the Arabs specifically and exclusively emanates from that belief. As such, it regards itself as the state for all of the Shia in the world.

In other words, just as Israel negotiates with the Arabs in order to gain more land, Iran would like dialogue with the Arabs, and specifically with Saudi Arabia, to provide it with cover to gain more influence and expansion and to reinforce sectarian division within the Arab world. It considers this to be its gateway toward maintaining its influence.

Read: Iran issues complaint to UNSC against Saudi

Going back to the statement made by that Iranian official in Doha, we see that the decision to shift the Iranian defence lines to within the Arab world is what Iran has actually done. It is clear for all to see in Iraq and Syria, and prior to that in Lebanon. It is a decision that has been welcomed by the cooperation and support of local militias, and the spread of political and financial influence within these states. Such a policy may seem to be smart because it uses local forces in order to achieve the same objective, instead of an overt military invasion.

However, it is an exposed plot that involves blatant aggression under the guise of doctrine. Where should these lines of defence stop? Religious thought is limitless, especially in its political dimension. The Iranian political system is a theocratic one; a trans-border doctrinal system. The concept of the authority of the jurist upon which it hinges is the Shia political contrast to the Sunni concept of the Caliphate. Neither of them will be complete, and neither will gain full legitimacy, despite the doctrinal and jurisprudential differences between them, without seizing control of Makkah.

In its preamble, the Iranian constitution states: “Noting the Islamic substance of the Iranian revolution… the constitution provides a ground for the perpetuation of this revolution within as well as without the homeland… toward building the one global Ummah (community)…” As for what this constitution calls the ideological army, it states that the armed forces and the revolutionary guards “do not only shoulder the responsibility of protecting and guarding the borders, but they also undertake to carry an ideological mission, that is Jihad in the Cause of Allah and a struggle for the sake of expanding the authority of Allah’s law all over the world.”

Of course, Iran is not expected to disclose its ultimate goal. However, such texts, as well as others, have been translated practically so far into what is called “shifting the lines of defence” to Iraq and Syria and the deployment of the militias. Iran calls that the export of the revolution, though it is not. It is simply reactionary, a retreat to the caves of religious narrow-mindedness and a return to sectarian mobilisation and alliances.

This warrants a call for frankness and for a confrontation that may be long overdue. Maybe this has been a calculated and justified delay. Yet, what the Saudi deputy crown prince said in a quite unprecedented way expresses a brave stance that requires more honesty and face to face talking. It requires the proposing of a project for the region that is based on the state instead of the sect; the homeland instead of the doctrine; and the space of freedom as opposed to narrow sectarianism.

The statement made by Muhammad Bin Salman does not necessarily imply a rejection of dialogue in as much as it provides conditions that make it a genuine dialogue and not just a cover for implementing destructive projects as we have been seeing in Iraq and Syria. Or, for that matter, the imposition of new realities on the ground as we have seen in other places. As expected, Iran has protested against his statement and has insisted on the idea of dialogue, although it has added nothing new, which means that dialogue will have no meaning and will be of no use for Saudi Arabia or the region.

Translated from Al Hayat, 7 May 2017

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.