What does Erdogan the tactician have in mind for reconciliation with Syria?

Turkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has long been known as a seasoned tactician who, like few leaders on the world stage, is able to confuse his observers, critics and supporters alike on a frequent basis. One year opposed to interest rates, the next in support of them; one year railing aggressively against his regional neighbours, the next charming them into deals and assurances; and even one year expressing a desire to overthrow dictators before the next day seeking to restore ties.

So when Erdogan revived and accelerated efforts to restore diplomatic ties with Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad regime earlier this month, cementing earlier and more vague comments over the past year in that regard, confusion at the move abounded online and on the ground. Protests erupted throughout northern Syria against the Turkish military presence in the opposition-held areas.

The Turkish president’s reasons for reconciling with the Assad regime are the obvious ones that have been espoused by his Turkish opposition and many who are pro-Assad over the years, the most prominent of which is that the regime is not going anywhere, anytime soon. After over a decade of civil war in Syria, the regime has managed not only to survive, but also to thrive and recapture much of its territory.

Although its allies Russia and Iran are largely to thank for that due to their military interventions in Syria, the fact remains that the regime remains firmly entrenched in the country with growing international support. The chances are ever-dwindling of the Syrian opposition groups turning the tide of the conflict and overthrowing the Assad dynasty.

Moreover, Ankara has its own Turkiye-centric interests in normalising ties with Damascus.

The most pressing of these is to boost cooperation in the fight against Kurdish militias in north-east Syria. This is a mission in which Erdogan hopes Assad can assist him.

Another national interest that could apparently be achieved in restoring ties with Syria is a deal to return refugees from Turkiye and other countries. This, in particular, would assuage the ultranationalists in Turkiye who are increasingly frustrated with the refugees’ presence.

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There may be another, more prescient reason for Erdogan’s efforts to reconcile with Assad, however, which many overlook. It lies in the interests of Erdogan himself, his Justice and Development Party (AKP), and potentially even Syrian opposition groups.

In Turkiye’s presidential election last year, Erdogan announced — or according to some of his critics, claimed — that it would be his last term in office before retiring, marking an apparent end to an illustrious and controversial political career. If that is indeed the case, then the AKP is, so far, left without an heir apparent, leaving the party vulnerable at the polls with the opposition snapping at its heels.

It can be safely presumed that if the Turkish opposition were to come to power in 2028 and a new president was elected from outside the AKP and its allies, that the new government would finally restore ties with Syria’s regime.

This would not, however, be on Turkiye’s terms, but rather on terms set by the Syrian dictator.

In such a scenario, Ankara would withdraw its military from Syria with some basic counter-terrorism agreements; abandon the Syrian opposition with little apart from assurances of diplomatic support; and force the exodus of Syrian refugees from Turkiye, regardless of whether they resettle in regime-controlled areas or what is left of opposition-held territory.

Ultimately, in the eyes of Erdogan and the AKP, it could risk overturning the chessboard on Turkiye’s Syrian front and spoiling the gains his government has made over the past eight years.

If Erdogan recognises and achieves the “inevitable” before his political rivals, however, he could possibly succeed in striking more effective anti-terrorism agreements and assurances, maintaining a military presence in Syria in some capacity or another, and – most importantly in terms of humanitarian concerns – prevent the forced return of Syrian refugees en masse. He could also aim to secure a workable political resolution which would include the Syrian opposition, or perhaps even the creation of a “safe zone”, the like of which it has long been trying to obtain.

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Rumblings from the Turkish opposition are already emerging in expressions of confusion at Erdogan’s push to reconcile with Assad, of course, especially as much of the opposition has long called for such a policy. At the IYI Party’s group meeting at the Grand National Assembly of Turkiye (TBMM) this month, party chairman Musavat Dervisoglu criticised the president for having resisted reconciliation for years and for refusing to heed the opposition’s warnings; he accused the government of having no actual strategy to restore ties with the Syrian regime.

“The three cents that the Europeans gave for the refugees must have been sweet because you turned Turkiye into a trench country for Europe by ignoring the threats,” said Dervisoglu. “Now you are saying, ‘I can meet with Assad.’ Mr Erdogan, if you were going to meet, why did you make the Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkiye suffer this burden?”

He asked Erdogan’s government further: “Do you have a strategy, a plan to reach an agreement with Assad?… do you have a real state policy? Of course, we know the answer: no. Our expectation from the current government is that they do not insist on wrongdoings and come up with a concrete action plan in the meeting with Assad.”

If the Turkish president does have a plan and a clear strategy, then he has not yet revealed it, nor can he be expected to reveal it if he is holding his cards close to his chest. Like his shift in policy over the past few years with regard to restoring and repairing ties with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, Erdogan seeks to achieve what he believes is best for Turkiye’s national security.

With Syria, that may come at a price, not only because reconciliation efforts have already sparked numerous mass protests across rebel-held areas in northern and north-west Syria — many Syrians in that territory and within Turkiye itself fear that Ankara will abandon them to Assad — but also because Syria under the current regime will disappoint both as a diplomatic partner and as a military ally.

Just as the Arab states in the region are finding out after reconciling with Damascus, the Syrian regime will not – or perhaps cannot – crack down on its drug smuggling gangs, more than a year after Syria was readmitted at the Arab League. Turkiye may well experience the same disappointment if, or when, it succeeds in reconciling with Syria.

Regardless of the risks resulting from reconciliation, Erdogan sees ties with Assad as being in the greater national interest, and possibly in the interests of his party, his own personal beliefs and of Syrians themselves. Such a strategy is yet to be seen or verified, but it would behove the Turkish president to use any reconciliation with the Syrian regime – if it is indeed necessary or inevitable – as an opportunity to secure greater advantages in addition to Turkiye’s national security.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.