clear

Creating new perspectives since 2009

Syria beyond the House of Assad: Reconstruction and challenges

January 20, 2025 at 2:00 pm

A view of the military barracks stationed by the Republican Guard, responsible for securing the area at the foot of Mount Qasioun in Damascus, following the fall of the Baath regime in Syria, on January 4, 2025. [Emin Sansar – Anadolu Agency]

It is a little over a month after the Al-Assad regime was finally deposed after 54 years of rule in Syria. The days after 8 December, when Bashar Al-Assad fled to Moscow, witnessed joy and celebration on the streets of Syrian cities and beyond, a joy unparalleled since the state’s independence from France in 1946. The country has been running on adrenaline in the days and weeks since, but the removal of Al-Assad sheds light on a number of challenges when rebuilding the new Syrian state. History tells us that revolutions are not linear, and there will be difficult days ahead for post-Assad Syria.

The opposition group that was ultimately successful in overthrowing the Assad regime, Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), is currently running a caretaker government where its leader, Ahmad Al-Sharaa, is also the de facto leader of Syria whilst the presidency is formally vacant. Al-Sharaa has appointed a new prime minister for the transitional government, Mohammed Al-Bashir, who in turn has appointed the same figures from the Salvation Government in Idlib to the new transitional government in Damascus. For a transitional government that, according to Al-Bashir, should only last until 1 March, it makes sense to scale up the previous Salvation Government, but there will be a lot of angst if there is no clear roadmap to a more comprehensive and inclusive body before the scheduling of elections. HTS was formerly affiliated with Al-Qaeda and broke off in 2016 with figures within the group keen to stress that it is inclusive and respects and values Syrians from all backgrounds. And whilst Al-Sharaa has said that the group will now disband, trust must be built between him and the Syrian people. For a population that for decades was told any “Islamist group” is synonymous with “terrorism”, this is not a straightforward task. Their record in Idlib is mixed, with the generally competent rule of the Salvation Government being tempered with, at times, authoritarian tendencies by HTS. So far, the signs are positive, but popularity for spearheading the overthrow of Al-Assad is not the same as legitimacy. There will be a challenge to convincing the international community of this, too, but a technocratic-style administration similar to that of Idlib is a good way to start.

Read: The new Syria, as Israel wants it

With regard to the international community, the incursion of Israeli forces poses an immediate threat to Syria’s territorial integrity. The Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights is deemed illegal under international law, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s comments that they will remain “part of Israel for eternity” are deeply concerning. Moreover, the military strikes aimed at Syria post-Assad are, in many ways, unsurprising. Whilst Israel and Al-Assad wouldn’t broadcast this, there was a tacit acceptance within Israel that the Assad regime was always preferable to any other alternative. A state that was nominally part of the “axis of resistance”, its bark was worse than its bite, and it could be relied upon to provide the West’s favourite word in relation to the Middle East: stability. The fact that this incursion and extended military airstrikes took place post-Assad demonstrates how fearful Israel is of this change.

Another threat to Syria’s territorial integrity lies in the East, the breakaway region run by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF worked with the Assad regime over the last few years with the understanding that the region would be run by the former with assistance from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Tukey. With the fall of Al-Assad, the East cannot maintain its status quo under the regime of being a quasi-autonomous region without any engagement with the local community, especially as their rule over the past few years has not been universally popular, with many Arabs and even Sunni Kurds at odds with their socialist ideology. The SDF controls a large area, the main source of oil in Syria, and oversees most of the land and agriculture known to support the Syrian national income through grain and cotton.

Furthermore, whilst the international community has generally welcomed the fall of the Assad regime, the rhetoric towards the transitional government has been noticeably cool. HTS is still formally designated a terrorist group by the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the US and the UK, and steps towards de-listing it have been vague. The German and French foreign ministers recently visited Syria, and it was grating to hear both states essentially lecture Syria on its relationship with minority groups. The Syrian region has existed as a patchwork of identities, sects and religions that have lived in relative harmony for over millennia, and it was the Assad regime that weaponised them by playing divide and conquer and bred mistrust in recent years. To be lectured on this by one of Syria’s previous occupiers post-World War I was particularly galling and radiated colonial undertones. Sections of the media seem to share this mindset, too. Respected BBC journalist Jeremy Bowen was granted an exclusive interview with Al-Sharaa days after Al-Assad’s fall and proceeded to ask him if alcohol sales would be banned in Syria. Out of all the questions that could be posed to the de facto leader of Syria, its reconstruction, its relationships with its neighbours and transitional justice, it can confidently be stated that this was a waste of a question that also demonstrated a Western-centric viewpoint on what an “acceptable” Syria would look like.

Syria was one of the original states that participated in the Arab Spring protests in 2011. It is the only state from that group which is on a path (albeit in its very early stages) to becoming a democracy as forces from the counter-revolution proved to be the undoing of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. Some pro-Assad militias on the coast still have access to weapons and there have already been clashes between them and government-aligned forces. Whilst these pro-Assad militias (mainly in the Syrian coastal region) were deeply disappointed with Al-Assad’s manner of departure and his lack of care towards the tens of thousands of loyalists who died in his name, they know that with his fall, they lose their patronage. Some are worried about a “Sunni state”, and Iran will likely capitalise on their fears. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will be particularly concerned about a democratic Syria that may be led by political “Islamists”, and it is notable that the UAE was one of the final Arab states still trying to throw Al-Assad a lifeline in the final 24 hours of his rule. Any counter-revolutionary efforts will likely come in the form of funded groups or parties as opposed to direct intervention from said states. Syria must be wary of this.

Economically, to say that Syria is in a challenging situation would be an understatement. For years, the Assad regime depended on the Captagon trade to keep money flowing in, resulting in what has essentially become a narco-economy. Years of financial mismanagement due to government corruption have left the transitional government with a disastrous inheritance. Sanctions were understandably placed on regime figures by the US and EU, but these sanctions have yet to be removed. And whilst the US has eased certain restrictions on humanitarian aid and temporary licences for energy sales, the sanctions themselves are still in place. EU states have made clear that the route to sanctions removal is tied to good governance, but this misses the point of the sanctions’ existence. If the idea was to ensure that the Assad regime would be affected economically, then with his overthrow, surely their existence now is moot. A Syria without sanctions would be able to start the necessary reconstruction and less likely to be at risk of further political strife.

A view of the destruction caused by attacks from Bashar al-Assad's regime forces, which targeted sacred sites among other structures in the Cobar neighborhood of Eastern Ghouta, Damascus, on December 31, 2024, following the fall of the Ba'ath regime on December 8. [Hişam Hac Ömer - Anadolu Agency]

A view of the destruction caused by attacks from Bashar al-Assad’s regime forces, which targeted sacred sites among other structures in the Cobar neighborhood of Eastern Ghouta, Damascus, on December 31, 2024, following the fall of the Ba’ath regime on December 8. [Hişam Hac Ömer – Anadolu Agency]

Linked to the economic situation, the challenge of the Syrian state in providing basic services is worth mentioning. Electricity, water, petrol and basic foodstuffs were scarce and rationed during the last few years of Al-Assad’s rule. The transitional government faces a formidable task of ensuring that all citizens have access to these. Syria has been a failed state for a decade; the entire economy was directed by the Assad regime to support the criminal war against the uprising of the Syrian people. Turning this around domestically is not an overnight job.

Arguably, the biggest challenge is internal and relates to the mindset and cultural shift that will need to be taken by the Syrian people. Living under half a century of despotic rule has its own consequences. There was a common saying in Al-Assad’s Syria: “The walls have ears.” An environment of mistrust was encouraged, akin to that of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, where any whiff of dissent against the ruling regime should be reported. When citizens have been actively told to report against one another, and society has shifted towards a more individualist mindset as people put their heads down and try to quietly get by, developing a mindset that places pluralism, the rule of law and democracy at the heart of a system is not simple. Beyond creating institutions, which the transitional government has been clear is a priority, the development of solidarity from citizen to citizen is crucial. Civic society groups have a role to play here, and the early days of the revolution and that sense that the uprising was about something bigger than individuals must be harnessed in the new Syria.

A national dialogue conference is planned to bring Syrians from across the country to discuss and shape the state’s future. There is a consensus that this cannot be rushed, should be done properly, and should not be treated merely as a tick-box exercise. The drafting of a new constitution will need to be arranged, and elections will need to be scheduled, though Al-Sharaa has said it could be up to four years before they take place. This is not necessarily a bad thing as a rush to the ballot box amongst a population who, unless born pre-1945, have probably never voted. Voting is not a harbinger of immediate democracy. After all, democracy extends beyond the ballot box, and a proper citizen assembly style of national dialogue is a solid first step. At the same time, elections will need to be held, and a wait of longer than three or four years will have people thinking that the current transitional government are essentially monopolising power, akin to the Ba’athists and the Assad regime before them. Furthermore, before these elections are held, the issue of the millions displaced – externally and internally – needs to be solved, as the elections cannot be valid if these people with no fixed address cannot vote. A proper census needs to be established to count who Syrian citizens are and ensure they can vote.

Egypt and the new Syria: Concerns about the spread of revolution

Another challenge and key priority for Syria is the move towards legal accountability, bringing regime war criminals to justice, especially after it was established that there are over a hundred thousand missing prisoners in Assad regime jails (including the infamous Sednaya Prison) and mass graves have been recently discovered. Small steps have been taken in other states to prosecute and bring to justice low-level regime officials, but Al-Assad and his senior associates need to face accountability.

As far back as 2018, commentators and politicians were claiming that Al-Assad won the war and that a shift towards normalisation should take place; sentiments that only increased post-Covid. Western states were beginning to tacitly engage with or at least lobby on behalf of the Assad regime. If these states were willing to do so with a government that committed war crimes and crimes against humanity and kept tens of thousands of political prisoners in unimaginable conditions, it would be fair to assume that these states engage with this new transitional government, too.

Syria faces a plethora of challenges as it begins to build itself without Al-Assad’s shadow looming large. Regional actors and the international community must play their part in helping this flower of the Arab Spring bear fruit.

Oppression is not eternal; there is cross-border solidarity between the Palestinian people in Gaza and the Syrian people. Gaza’s inspiration and resilience proved that no oppressor is too great to resist. The 11 days it took for the Assad regime to fall (after 14 years of the uprising) is a testament to that, and news of a ceasefire deal in Gaza is being celebrated in Syria in the same way that the overthrow of Al-Assad was celebrated in Gaza.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.