Militia rule in retreat? Gheniwa’s death sparks a new security equation in western Libya

Recurring clashes in Tripoli

On 12 May 2025, Tripoli was rocked by violent clashes following the assassination of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, widely known as “Gheniwa,” commander of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). As one of the capital’s most powerful militia leaders, Gheniwa’s death marked a major turning point in Libya’s fragile security dynamics. His killing, which occurred during a security meeting at Al-Takbali camp, triggered immediate street battles in southern Tripoli. In response, the Government of National Unity (GNU) imposed a full lockdown on the city and urged residents to remain indoors. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) called on all factions to cease hostilities and protect civilians.

Since taking power in early 2021, the GNU has presided over multiple waves of militia violence, exposing the persistent weaknesses of Libya’s western security apparatus. A key episode occurred in August 2022 during an escalation of tensions between GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and rival Fathi Bashagha. Armed groups loyal to Bashagha advanced toward Tripoli, sparking fierce battles in neighborhoods like Abu Salim. The fighting resulted in at least 32 deaths and 159 injuries, over half of whom were civilians. The violence only ceased after Bashagha’s forces withdrew, but the underlying political and military rivalries remained unresolved.

In August 2023, conflict erupted again between two of Tripoli’s most powerful armed factions: the Special Deterrence Force (RADA) and the 444th Brigade. A dispute over the arrest of 444th commander Mahmoud Hamza at Mitiga Airport quickly spiraled into open conflict, shutting down the airport and endangering thousands of residents. After 24 hours of fighting and 55 fatalities, RADA handed Hamza over to neutral custody, temporarily ending the standoff. However, this clash illustrated how personal rivalries among militia leaders could still destabilise Tripoli, undermining the GNU’s authority.

By May 2025, the same cycle was repeated. Gheniwa was killed during a high-level meeting reportedly attended by military figures from Tripoli and Misrata, including representatives from the 444th and 111th Brigades. Clashes erupted shortly after negotiations collapsed, killing several guards and three soldiers. Gheniwa’s death not only removed a key power broker but also disrupted the informal balance of power among western Libyan militias.

Who Are the Gheniwa Networks?

Abdul Ghani al-Kikli rose to prominence in Tripoli’s post-2011 security environment, using his command of the SSA to build a personal power network. Established in 2021 by decree from the Presidential Council, the SSA was intended to stabilise Tripoli but instead became a tool for Gheniwa’s domination. Since 2014, he had consolidated control over the Bouslim area, and the SSA under his leadership was widely implicated in extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced labor, operating with near-total impunity.

Gheniwa embedded loyalists throughout Libya’s security and civilian sectors to secure his influence. His nephew, Saif al-Kikli, and 555th Brigade commander Mohammed al-Gharari were appointed to key military roles. They were used to suppress rivals like the 444th Brigade in Gharyan, further entrenching Gheniwa’s hold over Tripoli’s militia landscape.

He also inserted allies into civilian institutions. In 2022, Prime Minister Dbeibeh appointed Gheniwa’s associate Mohammed al-Mashay as head of Libya’s General Electricity Company, a move believed to be in exchange for political support. Under al-Mashay, the company became a source of patronage and faced numerous corruption allegations. Another loyalist, Osama al-Tleesh, was appointed to lead the Facilities Security Apparatus, turning it into a militia guarding government properties and foreign contractors.

Even the Internal Security Apparatus was under Gheniwa’s control, led by his former deputy Lotfi al-Harari. Though officially a state body, it functioned as an SSA extension and was linked to widespread human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances. The swift collapse of this network following Gheniwa’s death—evidenced by figures like al-Harari and al-Tleesh fleeing Tripoli—highlighted its dependence on his leadership and the parallel governance system he built within the state framework.

The US’s Role in the New Arrangements in Tripoli

In early 2025, the new U.S. administration under President Trump increased its engagement with Libya. In April 2025, a U.S. Navy vessel docked in Tripoli and Benghazi, marking the first such visits in over 50 years. American officers held talks with Libyan officials to further military cooperation and support efforts to unify Libya’s armed forces.

In February, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. John W. Brennan visited Libya alongside Brig. Gen. Rose Keravouri. They met with leaders in both eastern and western Libya, including Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi and Prime Minister Dbeibeh, Defense Minister al-Haddad, and military officials in Tripoli. Notably, they also held talks with 444th Brigade commander Mahmoud Hamza and other militia-turned-military figures.

These discussions emphasized “professionalizing the Libyan military” and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation. U.S. officials presented this as part of efforts to unify Libya’s military under a central command. Brennan publicly stated the U.S. intended to act as a catalyst for state-building and the defeat of malign actors in Libya.

Hamza had long been a favored partner of the U.S., attending multiple AFRICOM meetings and a 2024 intelligence conference in Tanzania. In February 2024, a Pentagon delegation visited the 444th Brigade base in Tripoli to coordinate training. Simultaneously, U.S. private contractor Amentum began training select GNU-aligned brigades—including the 444th, 111th, and 166th—aiming to forge them into a cohesive force capable of handling tasks such as border security and disarmament.

The Security Sector Scenario in Western Libya

Gheniwa’s death and the coordinated U.S. intervention signal a broader transformation in western Libya’s security environment. Washington and the GNU appear to be promoting the 444th and 111th Brigades as the foundation of a future national army, gradually absorbing or sidelining rival factions. This restructuring is reflected in the U.S. training programs and the May 2025 offensive against SSA forces, eliminating a key obstacle to security sector reform.

However, this strategy carries significant risks. Many militia leaders are unlikely to relinquish power voluntarily, and efforts to consolidate the military could provoke new conflicts. Still, the swift removal of a figure as entrenched as Gheniwa shows that some warlords can be neutralized without a drawn-out campaign.

Less than 24 hours after Gheniwa’s assassination, the GNU moved swiftly to reassert state authority. Prime Minister Dbeibeh announced a series of decisions aimed at centralizing control over Libya’s security institutions. Among these was the dismissal of Lotfi al-Harari and his replacement by Mustafa al-Wuheishi as head of the Internal Security Apparatus. The Facilities and Installations Security Agency was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, and the Operations and Judicial Security Department within the Judicial Police was dissolved, affirming that all security tasks would be handled solely by state institutions.

The Illegal Immigration Control Agency was also disbanded and replaced by a new General Department for Immigration Control under the Interior Ministry. A committee led by Interior Minister Imad Trabelsi was formed to inspect prison and detention conditions. The committee, which includes representatives from the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council, was granted full access to detention facilities and tasked with reporting on cases of unlawful imprisonment or violations of judicial orders.

These steps aim to dismantle the parallel security structures that had operated beyond state control. Tripoli now stands at a decisive crossroads. The emerging strategy seeks to marginalise ungovernable militias not only within the capital but also in surrounding areas. Factions in Zawiya, such as Al-Far, and in Warshafana , like Muammar Al-Dawi, are increasingly under scrutiny. Even powerful groups like RADA in Souq Al-Jumaa and Al-Baqara in Tajoura may find themselves vulnerable in this new security climate. Gheniwa’s elimination has sent a clear message: no militia leader is immune, and the era of unchecked militia dominance in western Libya may be nearing its end.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.