The Gulf states are building a regional order, and Syria is its first benefactor

Following the toppling of Syria’s late and long-entrenched Assad regime on 8 December 2024 at the hands of a rapid rebel advance, there emerged a flurry of speculation, predictions, and analyses regarding not only the causes and factors contributing to the dramatic development, but also regarding the embattled country’s future.

One strong possibility predicted by many was the involvement of Arab Gulf states in boosting and revitalising Syria’s economy and diplomatic standing, with a prominent question being to what extent the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) would play an influential role in the new Syria.

In subsequent months, further evidence of that was seen as some of those states – namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – have increasingly endeared themselves to the plight of the new Syrian government, offering it a series of unprecedented opportunities in the form of economic assistance, debt elimination, diplomatic support, and energy guarantees.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, jointly paid off all of Syria’s debts and pledged to fund the country’s state salaries. To a lesser extent, the UAE has signalled pledges of significant investment in Syria, extending to the development of the port in Tartous worth $800 million and with prominent Emirati business figures exploring further investment opportunities within the country.

A tremendous benefit to such opportunities has, of course, been the United States’ and European nations’ revocation of debilitating sanctions on Syria that were imposed over the wartime years, enabling unfettered access to and development of the Syrian market and industries without the threat of those measures.

Amid such developments, the Gulf states headed by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha seem to be aligning their mutual interests and aims for the region, despite their competing and differing national interests that have long led to tensions and disagreements in foreign policy goals in previous years.

A regional void

In the post-colonial era of the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the regional order throughout the Middle East and North Africa may have been the dominant ideology of pan-Arabism, as the pro-Nasserist and semi-socialist movements and officer revolutions swept across tArab world. With that came an era of anti-western and anti-Israel fervour, recurring coups, massive militarisation, and lengthy authoritarian rule.

It put monarchies in the Gulf and in Jordan on the back foot, forcing them to actively resist such influence on their own terrains.

Then came the Arab Spring years from 2011, which saw a wave of rage and resistance against regimes across the region. In countries in which uprisings did succeed, divisions and the lack of leadership caused most of the revolutionary movements and new democratically elected governments to eventually collapse.

The potential new regional order of electoral systems and Muslim Brotherhood-linked leadership failed to take root, and even the likes of Turkiye and Qatar were forced to abandon their open support for opposition groups in the region.

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Now, there remains a void in the region’s leadership and hegemonic reality, particularly amid the recent ‘12-day war’ between Israel and Iran. According to Dr Andreas Krieg, a Gulf political risk analyst and lecturer at King’s College London, that escalation “starkly revealed the strategic vacuum that Gulf states must now choose either to fill or be engulfed by.”

That comes especially as the current Israeli government “pursues a maximalist approach” and eyes regime change in Iran, weakening the Iranian state and its leadership through a campaign of decimation and attrition. That reality, Krieg asserted, risks the Gulf monarchies “being left with a fractured neighbour and a landscape littered with uncontrollable armed networks” and would result in those states “inheriting the instability and volatility that come with a weakened, porous Iran — a neighbour that is neither wholly governed nor fully governable.”

A new order amid competing hegemons

In what he referred to as “shaping up to be a Gulf moment 2.0”, he noted that “the Gulf states, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia and increasingly the UAE, are rallying around to offer an alternative pole of power and stability, distinct from both Iran’s revolutionary model and Israel’s coercive, expansionist approach. Qatar and Oman have already shown their value as diplomatic brokers, translating chaotic impulses in Washington into structured negotiations and striving to salvage nuclear talks despite deep Israeli scepticism.”

Dr Bader Al-Saif, assistant professor of history at Kuwait University and associate fellow at Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme, stated that “the Gulf States found themselves in this leadership position by default, when the traditional centers of Arab power have either weakened or got mired into internal conflicts.”

Although that regional leadership was at times taken up “subconsciously without being aware that they are in this position”, there has in recent years “been a more conscious effort of leading a change that not only sees their countries protected, secure, stable, but that that extends beyond the Gulf States.” Noting that “their notion of security and stability extends beyond their immediate turfs”, Al-Saif said they “need to see that happen in the region as a whole for them to be able to manage their ambitious plans, because they are all acting on a post-oil trajectory.”

Recalling the events of 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, he highlighted that Iran was the regional actor who quickly reacted and stepped up while the Gulf states largely took a back seat. The region witnessed a drastic shift in December 2024, however, when the former Assad regime’s collapse ushered in the  new Syrian government and opened the way for significant investment and support from the Gulf states.

“You saw the very quick turnaround in which the Gulf States were engaging with Syria, regardless of their competition, competing interests, and different views on matters” that had hindered cooperation previously. The contrast between those moments “show you the maturity of the Gulf approach and to show you the awareness that they need to now not be a recipient of an order, but that they need to be shapers of an order”, Dr Al-Saif asserted. 

The Gulf regional order, if it can be called that, has apparently been years in the making, and was formulated from “a confluence of factors – the domestic, the regional, and the global”.

Firstly, the Gulf states have themselves become “a success story for regional talent, so you find this brewing into something that’s been conductive, forceful, beneficial to the Gulf region.”

Their governments also “have better laws and less bureaucracy, less red tape to absorb a lot of the things that they want to attract in terms of new tech technology, future-facing elements.” Notably, they are aware “that they cannot remain simple producers of oil, and the biggest loss would be if they do not benefit from their oil wealth to develop industries.”

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The monarchies’ surroundings are also a primary cause for such cooperation, as “the region isn’t doing well where we’re surrounded by civil wars, by failing states, by blood, and above all of that, by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And Israel’s very risky behavior, which is not something that’s conducive to stability in the region”, Al-Saif pointed out. “So that’s why there needs to be another alternative to such a scenario.”

On a global level, the Gulf states have largely come to feel abandoned by their long-time hegemon and ‘guarantor’, the US. Amid the “growing perception that they’re not playing that role” in recent years, GCC leaders have been pushed to diversify their global interdependence, strengthening ties with American competitors and adversaries including China and Russia.

Syria as a blueprint

Far from being merely theoretical, the effectiveness of the Gulf regional order and its potential operating model can be seen in its approach towards the developments in Syria. The steps those states took in support of and assistance to the new Syrian government are initial signs of that, and they are predicated on the Gulf states’ trust in the Syrian authorities as a viable and stable authority – something unique particularly after a successful revolution and years of instability.

The Gulf’s Syrian file is “a live case study that’s ongoing as we speak”, as Al-Saif put it. “We’re talking seven months since December, and there were many milestones that were ticked in Syria that were not even there for other post-conflict spaces in the Middle East in the past few years.” He highlighted that “Syria is an important case study that we need to have success metrics in, not only to learn from, but to then also apply to other spaces.”

The Gulf’s support should not be seen in monetary terms, however, “and the Gulf States certainly don’t see themselves in that manner as well. They don’t see themselves as cash dispensers. They are there to also provide support and services, to plan things together, to collaborate, to integrate talent. That’s the mindset.”

“And to me, what’s exciting is it’s a file that’s uniting us in the Gulf”, he said. Despite the various rivalries and competition between those states, according to Al-Saif, “when push comes to shove, those Gulf States will fight for one another.”

The convergence of largely unforeseen regional developments, coupled with the mutual concerns and needs of the oft-competing Gulf states, has made the emergence of this Gulf regional order a somewhat inevitable reality. It is an order that, while seemingly undemocratic to many due to the nature of the region’s monarchical governments, aims to strive toward a more unified, interdependent, and less volatile neighbourhood.

Any threats to this are met with a united front of condemnation from the leading Gulf states, and despite their extensive engagement with foreign powers and brokers, they vehemently stress national sovereignty and territorial integrity throughout the region, often working within a diplomatic framework to oppose threats to regional stability and cohesion – including Israel’s destabilising aggression.

“With the region at a crossroads, they have the tools and opportunity to turn their entanglements — economic, political and security-based — into genuine leverage”, said Dr Andreas Krieg. “If they can move beyond transactional hedging and instead build a cohesive, multipolar strategy that draws in actors like China and Russia while anchoring American engagement, they could shape a regional order rooted in integration and pragmatic interdependence.”

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.