US predicted Israel would use nuclear weapons against Iraq during Kuwait liberation war, British documents reveal

United States predicted Israel might use nuclear weapons against Iraq during the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, newly declassified British documents reveal.

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. After Iraq refused to withdraw despite global condemnation, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm on 17 January 1991 to expel the Iraqi military. Several Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, joined the coalition.

In response to the coalition’s air campaign, Iraq launched Scud missile attacks targeting both Israel and coalition forces stationed in Saudi Arabia.

According to records from the UK Cabinet Office, two weeks after the war began, US intelligence assessed that Iraq was likely to use chemical weapons “quite soon,” possibly against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or both.

US Vice President Dan Quayle told British Prime Minister John Major that American reports “regarded it as certain” that Iraq would use chemical weapons. He assured Major that the US and its allies would respond with “an overwhelming conventional response” to any such attack.

During their meeting in London, the two leaders also discussed Israel’s stance. Asked whether Israel would continue showing restraint, Major said he believed it would “for the time being,” as this earned Israel international approval. Still, he expected Israel would eventually retaliate.

Quayle agreed, but warned of a “real problem” if Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Israel. “At worst, and if there were thousands of casualties, the Israeli response could even be nuclear,” he told Major.

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Further concerns were fueled by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Nearly three weeks into the air campaign, Mubarak warned Major that Saddam was becoming more boxed and might resort to chemical weapons “once he saw no way out.” He advised the coalition to take all necessary precautions.

Two weeks later, Mubarak issued another warning to Washington. In a call with Major, US National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft confirmed that the US was doing everything possible to deter Iraq from using chemical weapons. He added that Mubarak had expressed “full support” for President George H W Bush’s position, cautioning that “we must not let ourselves be duped by the Iraqis.”

At the time, the UK was uncertain whether Iraq had the capability to deliver chemical weapons over long distances. Major told King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that if Iraq had this capacity, it was surprising they hadn’t used it. Still, he believed Iraq could deliver such weapons over shorter ranges and warned that the coalition should prepare for their possible use in land battles. He reassured the king that coalition forces were well-prepared and “would retaliate very severely indeed.” Major also revealed that British intelligence was “dubious” about Iraq’s ability to deliver biological weapons.

Israel, for its part, insisted on the right to retaliate against the missile attacks. Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens told President Bush that it was “very difficult” for Israel to remain restrained. In a meeting at the White House, Arens said Iraqi attacks had caused “extensive damage” in Israel.

Later, Bush relayed to Major in a phone conversation that Arens was “quite demanding.” Major questioned whether the Israelis were serious about retaliation or just trying to “turn the screw to secure funds”. Bush replied that Arens had not proposed “any specific price tag,” but believed that Israel was indeed seeking substantial extra US financial support.

British documents also reveal that pro-Israel lobbying groups pressured both the US and European governments to classify Israel as a “front-line state” in the Gulf crisis—a designation that would qualify it for financial assistance.

US Secretary of State James Baker praised Israel’s restraint two weeks into the campaign. He told UK Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd that the US would support any effort to treat Israel as a front-line state, arguing that the Zionist state “had sustained war-related damage” and “incurred financial costs due to its restraint.

Meanwhile, the UK was spearheading “burden-sharing” efforts, seeking to secure a portion of financial contributions from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Japan to fund the war effort.

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In Europe, the European Community (now the EU) foreign ministers also agreed to extend financial aid to Israel.

Despite these efforts, US and UK military and intelligence assessments concluded that Israel was already well protected. During a visit to London three weeks into the war, the Italian Defence Minister was briefed on extensive coalition efforts to intercept Iraqi SCUD attacks. UK Defence Secretary acknowledged that not all missiles had been intercepted but expressed confidence that Iraq “was no longer capable of” launching a large-scale missile attack on Israel. The British believed this situation helped the US persuade Israel to leave military operations to the coalition, thereby preserving the unity of the coalition.

Shortly afterward, the Pentagon downplayed the threat of missile attacks on Israel. In a Washington briefing, the Pentagon’s Crisis Management Group reassured a UK military delegation that 94 Patriot missile launchers were in place across Israel—60 around Tel Aviv (36 US-operated, 24 Israeli-operated) and 34 defending Haifa. At that point, 50 Iraqi missiles had landed most of them in open areas in Israel.

As the war progressed, disagreements emerged between the UK and France over post-war weapons restrictions in the region. During a February visit to London, Pierre Morel, French President Mitterrand’s diplomatic adviser, insisted that Israel should be subject to any future regional constraints on weapons, including nuclear, biological, and chemical arms.

In a meeting with Charles Powell, Prime Minister Major’s Chief of Staff, Morel emphasised that progress on post-war settlement would require Israeli compliance. Powell, however, argued that the major powers needed to distinguish between strict restrictions on Iraq—as the aggressor on Kuwait —and broader, looser arms controls that might apply to the entire region. In his report, Powell noted that Morel “had little idea” how these constraints could be enforced if Israel “just dug in their heels” during the Kuwait liberation war.

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