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Haftar the gambler gambles again

August 21, 2025 at 8:29 am

Libya’s eastern military chief Khalifa Haftar in the eastern city of Benghazi on 16 November 2021 [ABDULLAH DOMA/AFP via Getty Images]

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Haftar is known for his courage, which some describe as bordering on recklessness at times. This trait has been with him since his days under his former boss, friend, and comrade, the late Muammar Gaddafi, whom he helped bring to power in the 1969 coup. Sources and Haftar’s own interviews, after 2011, show that he highly admired Gaddafi for many years. Their bond, based on shared pan-Arabist ideals rather than tribal loyalty (as they belonged to different tribes), was a valuable currency in Gaddafi’s Libya. Both men were young admirers of then-Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the iconic figure of the pan-Arab movement.

This shared ideology was a foundation for their early military cooperation. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, for instance, Libya provided crucial aid to Egypt in the form of military jets, missiles, oil, and cash. Haftar himself was a commander in the Libyan contingent that supported the Egyptian forces in their successful crossing of the Suez Canal.

A suicidal mission: With such a personality, it was perhaps not unusual—yet still surprising—when General Khalifa Haftar launched his Operation Dignity in May 2014. At the time, Benghazi and most other cities in Eastern Libya were already in the grip of terror groups, including  Al-Qaeda (AQ), ISIS, and the newly emerging Ansar al-Sharia. Derna, for example, had a major jihadist presence through the Derna Mujahideen Shura Council, and a year later, ISIS fully seized control of Sirte in the center of the country.

Daily assassinations of military officers, security personnel, and activists had become routine. People were killed leaving mosques, on their way to work, or simply after posting something on social media. What Haftar embarked on was a seemingly suicidal mission. He had no more than an estimated 150 men, mostly former Gaddafi-era officers. He was outnumbered, outgunned, and out-financed. Yet, he stood in front of his house and announced his determination to “liberate” Libya. Not many people took him seriously; even those who joined him had doubts, but they had no other option.

The foundations of his power: This reputation for calculated risk and personal courage is the very foundation of Haftar’s power. For many in Eastern and Southern Libya, his actions were not a political power grab but a heroic crusade to save the country from chaos. They credit him with leading the bloody and protracted fight to expel extremists, culminating in the LNA’s formal liberation  of Benghazi in 2017 and Derna in 2018. It is a narrative that has resonated deeply with a population exhausted by years of violence and instability.

In this light, his supporters argue that he has not only saved the areas he controls but has also embarked on a huge rebuilding project. They contend that his administration has rebuilt war-devastated cities, with Derna, despite the recent floods, having been almost entirely transformed into a more modern city than it used to be. Benghazi is now a completely new city with new roads, bridges, and housing units, and its university, the oldest in Libya, has been completely renovated.

A CIA asset or a revolutionary?  Those who believe in him are also prepared to forgive his history as a CIA asset, often justifying his actions during his years of exile as being his only option. His ultimate aim, they contend, was to end Gaddafi’s rule. This goal was fuelled by a personal grudge, but it was also made possible by NATO’s military intervention in 2011, which provided crucial air power to the rebels on the ground. NATO’s Operation Unified Protector provided a no-fly zone and conducted air and naval strikes against Gaddafi’s forces, effectively destroying his military capabilities. This allowed the rebel forces, who were otherwise outgunned, to advance and secure their victory. This confluence of forces — Haftar’s personal ambition and NATO’s intervention — ultimately paved the way for his later rise to power in the eastern region.

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The dynastic gamble: Yet, this legacy of liberation is now being tested by his latest gamble: the appointment of his sons, Saddam and Khaled, to key military positions. While his supporters view this as part of his recently unveiled “Vision 2030” to modernise the LNA, many in Western Libya see it as a political manoeuvre that jeopardises the country’s fragile unity and all efforts to build a national army. The Tripoli-based Presidential Council (PC) has already formally rejected the move, calling it a direct violation of the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement and its authority over the armed forces. This decision only deepens the political and military chasm between the country’s east and west. It has already begun to undermine a decade of UN-backed unification talks and raises the spectre of formal partition, as Haftar solidifies a family-controlled military in the east.

The betrayal of a revolution: Furthermore, these appointments could weaken Haftar’s support in areas of Western Libya where he still enjoys some backing, however muted. His allies there often do so out of a shared opposition to Islamist factions and the militias still dominating their lives. But they are also committed to the principles of the 2011 revolution that ended Gaddafi’s government seen by many as one-family rule. Haftar’s move towards a hereditary succession could be viewed as a betrayal of these principles, threatening the fragile trust he has built.

His adversaries also point to his dismal human rights record. They argue that the so-called “Libyan Revolution” of 2011 was more about freedom and dignified living than about replacing one strongman with another. The revolt was fundamentally a protest against the very security grip Gaddafi harshly exercised in his final years in power. As such, they contend that the assassinations of activists, including women like Hanan al-Barassi, and the disappearance of members of parliament, such as Seham Sergewa, prove Haftar is continuing the oppressive system they fought to dismantle.

The last gamble: In the end, while Haftar’s initial gamble to liberate Eastern Libya paid off, this latest bet on his sons’ appointments is far more dangerous. It is not against terror groups, but against  the very idea of a unified Libyan state. It remains to be seen whether he has gambled his way to a new dynasty or simply gambled away the last hope for a single Libya.

Some observers argue that Haftar, now in his early eighties and with a history of health issues, has abandoned his ambitions to become president. They contend that his current focus is to ensure his family and their interests survive once he is gone.

This latest development has put the international community in a difficult position. The UN mission is yet to comment on the issue of the sons, and its head, Hanna Tetteh, is expected to brief the Security Council on Thursday, 21 August. While she cannot ignore the issue, it will be interesting to see what she has to say about the Haftars.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.