Why India and Taliban broke their diplomatic Ice

Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India from 9 to 16 October 2025. This was the first high-level visit by a Taliban minister since the group took power after the US withdrawal in 2021. During his weeklong stay in New Delhi, the minister met key Indian officials, including the External Affairs Minister, National Security Advisor, and senior officers from the Ministries of Commerce and External Affairs.

Mr. Muttaqi also met Indian business leaders in a roundtable organized by FICCI (Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry), attended a discussion hosted by the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF), and interacted with Afghan civil society members, including Afghan Hindus, Sikhs, diaspora representatives, and traders. He held two press briefings in New Delhi and visited Darul Uloom Deoband, a prominent Islamic seminary located about 190 km from Delhi. During talks Muttaqi also requested India to open the Wagha border for trade and coordinate with Iran on Chabahar port to ease the economic hardship of ordinary Afghans.

Though India has not officially recognized the Taliban government, both sides agreed to upgrade their engagement. India will raise its Technical Mission in Kabul to the level of an embassy and allow the Taliban to post diplomats in their embassy in New Delhi. India has also permitted Taliban consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad and continues to issue visas to prominent Afghan leaders.

One of the key outcomes of Muttaqi’s visit was the signing of a “Joint Declaration”, which is likely to serve as the future roadmap for India–Afghanistan relations.

READ: India’s changing Middle East policy

What the Taliban Wanted from the Visit

The Taliban government in Kabul, led by the Kandahar group under Haibatullah Akhundzada, came to power in August 2021. Four years have passed, yet except for Russia, no other country has recognized it so far. The regime remains politically isolated and under heavy economic pressure to meet the country’s growing needs, as no major assistance has come forward. It also faces criticism for ideological reasons, especially for its policies toward women and for running a non-inclusive government representing only a few of Afghanistan’s 20 tribal and ethnic groups. The Taliban administration remains under UN sanctions, while the US has frozen about USD 9 billion of its assets.

The main objective of Muttaqi’s visit was to seek India’s political recognition, request economic and humanitarian assistance, push for the resumption of development and infrastructure projects, and secure cooperation in health and education—such as medical visas for Afghans and scholarships for Afghan students.

New Delhi’s Response

The joint declaration signed by both sides covered most of these requests, except the formal recognition of the Taliban government. This was a tactical decision by India, as it does not want to upset the US or violate UN sanctions. Still, New Delhi has shown notable flexibility. Within a week of Muttaqi’s visit, India upgraded its Technical Mission in Kabul to a full-fledged embassy and allowed the Taliban to post diplomats in their embassy in New Delhi. India had already permitted the Taliban to open consulates in Mumbai and Hyderabad and continues to issue visas to senior Afghan figures.

India has, in fact, done a major favour to the isolated Taliban regime. It assured economic support, agreed to resume development projects, continue humanitarian aid, and issue visas for medical treatment. India also promised to supply 20 ambulances, of which five have already been delivered. India’s actions speak louder than words. New Delhi has shown it through deeds, while others are still making empty promises and playing the “Good Taliban, Bad Taliban” game.

Decoding Muttaqi’s Visit to Darul Uloom Deoband

Muttaqi’s first stop was Darul Uloom Deoband, one of South Asia’s oldest and most respected Islamic seminaries that has deeply influenced Afghan scholars. Its branch, Darul Uloom Haqqania, was founded by Abdul Haq Akorwi in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He was a scholar trained in Deoband. His son, Samiul Haq (1937–2018), known as the “Father of the Taliban”, mobilised students from this seminary to fight against the Soviets and later the US in Afghanistan. The visit to Deoband carried deep symbolism and was quite unexpected under a hardline BJP government at the Centre.

For the Taliban, the visit was both political and religious. Many Afghan factions, particularly those aligned with the Haqqani network, remain cautious about India. Visiting Deoband allowed Muttaqi to show respect for Islamic traditions, calm conservative opinion at home, and still push forward his diplomatic outreach.

For India, the visit served a clear strategic purpose. It helped weaken Pakistan’s influence over regional Islamic networks. By engaging religious institutions beyond Islamabad’s control, New Delhi aimed to balance Pakistan’s political and ideological leverage in Afghanistan and the broader South Asian region.

Two Press Conferences: Balancing Messages

Muttaqi held two press conferences in New Delhi. The first was limited to male journalists, drawing criticism from opposition political parties and women journalists. The second included both men and women. This sequence sent a dual message: to Afghan conservatives, he upheld Islamic norms; to India, he showed respect for local practices and inclusivity.

Displaying Bamiyan in the background during his meetings at the Afghan Embassy in New Delhi was another symbolic gesture to project a softer, more moderate image of the Taliban 2.0 government. The Taliban 1.0 destroyed the Buddha statute in 2001.

India’s Strategic Interests in Afghanistan

India’s engagement with Afghanistan is driven by a mix of strategic depth, connectivity, mineral diplomacy, and geopolitical presence.

1. Strategic Depth: India aims to pressure Pakistan from both east and west, reducing cross-border terrorism and limiting Islamabad’s leverage in Kashmir. Afghanistan’s long and mountainous 2,600 km border with Pakistan provides space for groups like the TTP and BLA, which threaten both Pakistan and regional stability. A friendly Kabul helps India contain extremist networks and secure its western flank.

2. Connectivity and Mineral Diplomacy: Worth around USD 1 trillion mineral resources, Afghanistan is rich in lithium, iron, copper, and rare earth minerals, and serves as a gateway to Central Asia. India developed the Chabahar Port in Iran and the 218 km Zaranj–Delaram Highway to bypass Pakistan. These routes enable India to transport minerals and goods, strengthen trade links, and counter China’s growing influence through the Belt and Road Initiative.

3. Geopolitical Presence: Groups like the TTP, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS–Khorasan make Afghanistan a critical security concern for India. Engaging the Taliban ensures India maintains regional presence, shapes outcomes in Kabul, and prevents Pakistan or other powers from dominating Afghan politics.

4. Limits on Engagement: India cannot fully follow Israel’s aggressive agenda to destabilize Pakistan or Central Asia. Deep involvement could provoke China, Russia, and Iran, leaving India to bear the brunt of conflict. New Delhi prefers a balanced approach, maintaining influence without being drawn into wars led by others.

Return of Great Game in Afghanistan

Late poet Muhammad Iqbal once said that Afghanistan is the “heart of Asia.” Any disturbance there directly affects not just South Asia but also Central, West, and East Asia. After more than four decades of conflict, the current calm in Kabul looks more like a pause than lasting peace. The situation remains fragile and on the verge of renewed chaos. Almost all major regional and global powers are closely watching and positioning themselves. The reasons are clear: Afghanistan’s complex ethnic and tribal loyalties, its vast untapped mineral wealth, and the potential ideological spillover across its borders. The presence of half a dozen extremists and secessionist groups such as Al Qaida, ISIS-K (Korasan), Tahreek-i-Taliban (TTP), Baloch Liberation Front (BLA) further deteriorate the environment.

U.S. and Israeli Interests in Afghanistan

The U.S. has long viewed Afghanistan as a key geopolitical outpost. President Trump once linked the Bagram Air Base to monitoring China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site, just 1,200 miles away. After the U.S. withdrawal, Washington lost its only resident military base in the region, limiting its capacity to monitor South Asia, Central Asia, Iran, India, and even parts of Russia.

Israel, on the other hand, has strategic interests tied to weakening Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and destabilise the Islamic government in Iran. Initially, it explored coordination with India, but New Delhi remained cautious. Tel Aviv then shifted its focus to Afghanistan, trying to build informal networks among Afghan tribes. However, its influence remains limited, as Afghan society follows the traditional Jirga/ Shura systems, and foreign actors are often viewed as U.S. proxies.

Recently, Israel has encouraged the UAE to work on its agenda in Kabul, a pattern similar to its actions in Sudan: using petrodollars to divide tribal societies, exploit mineral resources, and push ideological narratives.

Regional Reactions and Peace Efforts

Muttaqi’s visit triggered strong reactions in Pakistan, China, Russia, and Iran. Beijing and Moscow urged both sides to look at the “larger picture,” hinting that external powers might be fuelling instability. Iran offered to mediate. Eventually, both Afghanistan and Pakistan realized the cost of their confrontation and agreed to sit for third round of talk, a move that surprised many, including India.

Still, tensions at the border and militant attacks are likely to continue. Pakistan wants the Taliban to stop the use of Afghan soil by TTP and BLA. Kabul, in turn, seeks better border management, refugee protection, and trade access. The Taliban also demand that Pakistan stop providing its bases for drone operations targeting Afghanistan.

How far India can go in this war of creating influence

India navigates carefully, aligning where its interests match with the US or Israel, while avoiding overreach and staying resident-power focused in Afghanistan. New Delhi is also aware of the risks of Taliban’s blowback and the growing stakes of China in Kabul.

Conclusion

Muttaqi’s visit reflects the complex mix of politics, ideology, religion, and strategy in Afghanistan. For the Taliban, it is about domestic legitimacy and balancing conservative factions. For India, it is about strategic depth, connectivity, mineral access, and regional influence, while avoiding entanglement in great-power rivalries.

In a volatile region, every visit, every press conference, and every meeting carries multiple messages for multiple audiences. India’s engagement with the Taliban shows a ‘shift from idealism to strategic pragmatism’, aiming to protect national interests while carefully navigating the competing agendas of Pakistan, China, Russia, and the US-Israel axis.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.