British documents reveal King Abdullah’s “puzzling initiative” dreaming for Hashemite revival in Iraq ahead of invasion

The idea of offering Saddam Hussein exile to potentially avoid the 2003 invasion of Iraq originated with King Abdullah of Jordan, newly released British government documents reveal.

The King also expressed interest in extending his Hashemite dynasty’s influence to Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime, according to records from the UK Prime Minister’s Office released by the British National Archives.

In March 2003, the United States led a coalition to invade Iraq, aiming to oust Saddam and eliminate alleged weapons of mass destruction. Although the military campaign was swift, it sparked widespread international protests and opposition, and the ensuing occupation plunged Iraq into long-term instability from which the Iraqis still suffer today.

In the weeks leading up to the invasion, King Abdullah proposed an initiative to the US and UK in which Saddam would be offered exile. However, he insisted that the proposal should come from the Americans and the British, not from Jordan or other Arab states.

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During a meeting with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on 25 February 2003, the King sought to “clarify any confusion on his initiative.” According to the meeting notes, Abdullah argued that by making the offer, the US and UK would show they “wanted to give peace a chance.” He added that the proposal would increase the chances of Saddam being overthrown and “box in the Russians, French and Germans”—all of whom opposed military action without a UN resolution.

The King viewed the idea as a “useful backup” in case the UN Security Council did not adopt a resolution. He believed that if Saddam rejected the offer, it would expose him as someone “determined to take everyone down with him.”

“If he [Saddam] went or was overthrown, the allies should still enter Iraq but could do so without a shot being fired,” Abdullah argued.

Blair welcomed the suggestion and told the King that he had informed US President George W. Bush of the need to show that “we have done all we could to avoid war.” Blair added that if Saddam disarmed or accepted exile, the situation would change—though he doubted Saddam would agree. Abdullah agreed, but emphasised that the point of the offer was to weaken Saddam’s regime and shift public opinion against him.

The King also proposed that the US, UK, and Jordan work out the details of the plan in advance—including who would be eligible for exile and what pitfalls to expect.

Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff (and now UK National Security Advisor), said the British should raise the issue with the Americans. King Abdullah said he would also speak with director of US Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet and US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs William Burns.

At the time, the British government was aware of a similar Saudi initiative in which Arab states would urge Saddam to go into exile. However, King Abdullah dismissed the Saudi plan as “not credible,” suggesting that Arab public opinion would anyway assume it was US-inspired. He also warned that Saddam could turn the tables and “call the Arab governments of traitors”.

When asked about attitudes on the Arab street, the King said the general sentiment was, “Let’s get it over and done with.” He argued that the demonstrations in Jordan were not in support of Saddam, but rather driven by concern over the US agenda and the plight of the Palestinians.

The documents show that British officials found the King’s insistence that the exile proposal come from the US and UK to be “puzzling.” They had discussed the matter with the Saudis, who had argued that such an initiative should come from the Arab states. The British agreed with this logic.

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When the British later followed up with the US, they learnt the Jordanian officials told the Americans that the UK “was keen” the proposal to come from the Coalition or the UN Security Council. They even claimed the UK “needed it.” The British dismissed this as rumor, suspecting that Saad Khair, then head of Jordan’s intelligence agency and a participant in the Blair–Abdullah meeting, was behind it. According to British intelligence, Khair tried to get Burns and Tenet to travel to London supposedly to discuss the details of the plan.

US officials informed the British that they had received similar approaches from Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. However, Al-Faisal later told the UK ambassador to Riyadh that Saudi Arabia was no longer supporting the idea.

The Americans were hesitant to embrace the initiative, citing the need to “sort through the practicalities”. They also urged the Jordanians not to “run ahead too far with the notion.”

US and UK officials agreed that the following questions needed to be resolved:

• Who from Saddam’s circle was included on the list for exile?
• Where would they go, and under what terms?
• What restrictions would apply to their future travel, finances, and communications with Iraq?
• What role might the International Criminal Court (ICC) play?
• What immunities could be offered (to Saddam and others)?

British briefing notes advised Prime Minister Blair and other officials to stress to Arab counterparts that while the UK was open to the exile option, avoiding military action would depend on the new Iraqi leadership’s active, full and immediate compliance with disarmament obligations.

Abdullah did not give up. Another report revealed that he remained keenly interested in the idea. According to American officials, the King repeatedly “rehearsed” to the US ambassador in Amman what he saw as the tactical benefits of his initiative. These included:

• Boxing in the French and Germans if the exile/amnesty offer were incorporated into a UN resolution;
• Undermining Iraqi morale, triggering an assassination attempt on Saddam;
• Helping the coalition and Arab governments manage public opinion more effectively.

The report also confirmed that Khair was present at the meeting between the King and the US ambassador.

The documents also reveal that King Abdullah hoped to restore Hashemite rule in Iraq following Saddam’s fall. Blair was warned that Khair was encouraging the King to explore this possibility. Blair’s advisors expected the King might raise with him the idea of a Hashemite role in post-Saddam Iraq and noted that Prince Hassan, Abdullah’s uncle, was actively promoting himself in some circles as “the ideal candidate”.

However, the Americans made it clear that they had “no interest” in such a plan and that Prince Hassan “doesn’t figure in their planning.”

The late King Hussein of Jordan removed his brother, Prince Hassan, as heir to the throne shortly before his death in 1999. Hassan was replaced with Abdullah, the King’s son. This decision ended a long period where Hassan served as Crown Prince and effectively ruled Jordan during Hussein’s illnesses.

Although Abdullah appeared to accept the American stance as assurance, British officials believed he still hoped the US position didn’t exclude a “role for other Hashemites”.

Blair was advised to “firmly discourage” any Hashemite restoration, warning that such a move could backfire and destabilise Jordan. They emphasised that regardless of how attractive the model seemed to Jordan, it was up to the Iraqis to determine their own leadership, and that the era of installing or restoring monarchies was over.

More than two weeks after the invasion, Blair was advised to express appreciation to King Abdullah for his “staunch private support” of the military coalition, despite his public condemnations aimed at “appeasing” domestic opinion. British officials noted that the King’s most recent public rebuke of the US ambassador was “stage-managed,” and cautioned that after any private talks, Abdullah might again publicly call for an end to the fighting responding to domestic pressure.

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