The future of Iran’s relations with its regional allies

The antecedents of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regional network of allies can be traced to the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The revolution provided the ideological impetus for supporting groups opposed to Israel and Western influence in the region. The war encouraged Tehran to adopt a strategy aimed at preventing future conflicts from reaching Iranian territory by confronting adversaries beyond its borders through allied groups, a strategy referred to as ‘forward defence.’ In the subsequent years and decades, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and militias in Iraq and Syria, all of which had originated under distinct national circumstances, emerged as Iran’s key regional partners. Each received varying degrees of Iranian support while preserving different levels of autonomy, with Hezbollah regarded as Iran’s closest ally and the Houthis the most autonomous.

The strategy provided Tehran with strategic depth and enhanced its regional influence. By 2024, however, its core assumption had begun to unravel. In the aftermath of Hamas’ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in October 2023, initiated in response to decades of Israeli occupation and violence against Palestinians, Israel not only unleashed a genocidal campaign in Gaza but also increased its operations against Iranian targets in Syria. The turning point came in April 2024 when Iran’s consular annexe in Damascus was targeted in an attack widely attributed to Israel. Following Tel Aviv’s escalation against an official Iranian state facility, Tehran responded by launching direct strikes on Israeli territory. The episode effectively lowered the threshold for conflict between the two states, followed by a series of subsequent escalations in October 2024, June 2025, and February 2026.

However, although the strategy’s core assumption no longer held, the 2026 United States-Israeli war against Iran demonstrated that Tehran still considered its regional partners as strategically significant assets.

These included Hezbollah, the Houthis, and militias in Iraq, although reports suggest that the militias involved may not necessarily be the well-known groups. The other two regional partners, including Hamas and militias in Syria, had considerably weakened amid the Israeli genocidal campaign in Gaza and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Although Hezbollah also suffered massive losses from Israeli military actions following its demonstration of solidarity with the Gazans, Iran helped rearm the group and rebuild its military command structure, preparing it for a future conflict. With the fall of the Assad regime weakening the traditional logistical corridor to Lebanon via Syria, Tehran increasingly relied on third-country routes, including a few neighbouring countries, and maritime channels.

The Wartime Roles of Iran’s Regional Allies

As early as the third day of the 2026 war, Hezbollah officially joined in by launching attacks towards northern Israel. By early April, it had carried out over 50 attacks against Israeli territory involving unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rockets, and missiles. Hezbollah’s direct involvement was interpreted as intended to divide Israel’s attention across multiple fronts, deplete its defensive arsenal, and intensify psychological pressure on Israelis. However, this soon created a strategic dilemma for Iran. Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel provided the latter with an opportune moment to advance its expansionist agenda while generating political pressure from residents in northern Israel to take tougher action against the group. Israel’s resultant continued attacks in southern Lebanon increased the number of variables for Iran at the negotiating table, and in early June, Tehran found itself politically compelled to protect Hezbollah at the cost of attacks on its own territory.

As for the Houthis, their principal leverage lies in their ability to disrupt maritime activity in the Red Sea, which remains a partial but primary alternative for carrying regional trade flows, especially Saudi oil, disrupted by the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. During the escalation in March and early April, Houthi officials and Iranian commanders repeatedly warned that the group could potentially disrupt maritime activity in the Red Sea; however, the warnings did not translate into action. This restraint could have resulted either from the group’s own cost-benefit calculations or Iranian considerations to prevent a wider regional escalation.

Although the restraint has now ended, with Houthis declaring a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on 20 July, the move has been described as a response to Riyadh’s alleged attack on Sanaa airport a week earlier and years of restrictions on Houthi-controlled ports and airports rather than directed by Iran. However, the timing is important, as the move has come amid reports that Tehran had asked the Houthis to stand ready to close the route if the US targeted Iranian power infrastructure. At the same time, several global demand- and supply-side shock absorbers were already reducing the impact of the Hormuz closure. These factors suggest that the decision is a result of a shared strategic interest between the two.

On 27 July, the Saudi Ministry of Defence also blamed Iranian-backed militias in Iraq for attempted attacks against petroleum facilities in the Eastern Province and Riyadh. The attacks appeared intended to further constrain the Kingdom’s ability to export oil, particularly amid the increasing rerouting of oil shipments through the Suez Canal, and give Tehran the ability to maintain plausible deniability. Earlier, during the first 40 days of the war as well, the Iraqi-based militias were blamed for attacks both against US facilities in Iraq and other Gulf nations.

Likely Future Trajectory of the Relationship

What, then, does all of this mean for the future of Iran’s relations with its regional allies?

The case of Hezbollah highlighted the political liabilities that its employment can generate for Tehran. However, while this could potentially compel Tehran to employ it in a more calibrated manner in the future, given the ideological affinity between the two, Iranian support for the group is likely to remain among its policy priorities.

This intent has been echoed in the Iranian Supreme Leader’s most recent reaffirmation of Iran’s support for Hezbollah as a strategic mandate.

As for the Houthis and militias in Iraq, the attacks allegedly launched from Iraqi territory, along with Iran’s earlier warnings that the Houthis could disrupt the Red Sea route and the subsequent materialisation of those warnings, suggest that the war has reinforced their strategic value for Tehran. While Iran may continue to expand its indigenous strike capabilities, these cannot fully substitute for the advantages provided by regional partners, which allow Tehran to extend pressure across multiple theatres and maintain plausible deniability, thus providing more options to impose costs and manage escalation.

Iran may therefore seek to ensure that the interests of these groups become an integral component of any peace agreement and broader regional negotiations. This would not only demonstrate Iran’s continued commitment to its regional partners but also minimise the potential political consequences of supporting them.

Beyond this also lies a deeper consideration. Tehran is unlikely to succumb to pressure, as it seeks to redefine the regional strategic balance in its favour and emerge from the war in a stronger position. A stronger Iranian standing would bode well for its regional partners and potentially embolden them politically, while raising their expectations of greater Iranian support. Additionally, in the past, Iran’s financial vulnerabilities have been cited as a primary constraint on its ability to expand material and financial support for these groups. A change in Iran’s pre-war economic status quo could also enable Tehran to enhance financial and material assistance to its partners over the medium to long term, potentially binding them further together in the post-war environment.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.