“A huge breakthrough,” Denmark’s Morten Bødskov declared, calling it “a new asylum system for the EU” that would not “reward the industry of human smugglers.” Germany’s Alexander Dobrindt presented the plan “a positive approach” for people “with no prospects in Europe” while Greece’s Thanos Plevris promised that the hubs would “ensure a reduction in illegal migration flows and an increase in returns”.
The proposed solution in Vienna was a so-called “return hub”, an “open and temporary facility” that five European governments are exploring with Rwanda for rejected asylum seekers. The pilot project would initially involve around 100 people who, in theory, would be permitted either to remain in the East African country or relocate elsewhere if they possess the necessary legal rights.
Invariably framed in familiar terms, in 2022, the United Kingdom announced a plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda for processing.
A year later, Britain’s Supreme Court ruled the scheme unlawful, finding that Rwanda not only could not be treated as a safe country due to institutional deficiencies but also because of past cases of refoulement and therefore could be wrongly sent onward to face persecution.
Italy’s experiment in Albania has fared no better, bogged down by operational failures and court rulings in 2024 that forced authorities to bring transferred migrants back to Italy. As the EU Agency for Asylum noted in its 2026 report, weakened judicial oversight and fundamental rights concerns remain central to these schemes, showing how quickly ambitious externalisation projects collide with legal reality. Αcross the Union, authorities issue far more deportation orders than they can actually enforce. In 2025, Eurostat recorded 491,950 orders to leave, yet only 135,460 people(roughly 29 percent, according to the European Commission) were actually returned. That gap has little to do with a lack of detention centres and everything to do with practical bottlenecks: missing travel documents, uncooperative countries of origin, consular delays, and legal protections against removal. To get around all this, the EU’ with its new Return Regulation provides a legal framework allowing member states to transfer rejected asylum seekers to non-EU countries as long as states respect international law.
Nevertheless, this is where the word “return” begins to stretch the truth. Returning someone means sending them back to where they came from and transferring someone to Rwanda, a country to which they have no connection, is simply a removal to a third party willing to take them.
If they cannot go home and do not want to stay in Rwanda, what happens next? How long are they kept there, and who ensures their rights exist in practice and not just on paper?
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Supporters of the deal point to Rwanda’s economic progress since the 1994 genocide and its ratification of international conventions, although signing treaties is a formal gesture rather than proof of institutional capacity or respect for human rights. Alongside the UK Supreme Court’s findings on Rwanda’s asylum system, organisations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have repeatedly documented abuses in custody. Moreover, a 2025 UN Security Council Group of Experts report found that Rwanda’s Defence Forces backed the M23 armed group in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, documenting serious violations in that conflict. For European leaders facing voters who view the asylum system as broken, flying people out of sight projects toughness and control.
Even so, behind the charitable vocabulary of offering a “second chance” or a “new beginning” lies a familiar political reflex: exporting a complex legal and humanitarian obligation to a third country rather than fixing asylum and integration systems at home.
As someone from Lesvos, I have always found it difficult to discuss migration solely in the language of policy. For more than a decade, the island, on Europe’s geographical frontier, has lived with the consequences in the flesh-in overcrowded detention camps, in years of suspended lives, in inadequate reception conditions, in the language of emergency that turns human beings into administrative categories through the expectation that a small community should absorb the failures of an entire continent. That experience also demonstrates the limits of externalisation, which often redirects migration through causing even more deaths by pushing people towards more dangerous alternatives.
From this perspective, the proposed Rwanda “return hub” looks tragically, like another attempt to move people further from rights and scrutiny, after Europe has already made the Aegean a laboratory for policies first imposed on those least able to resist them. Governments promise that such hubs will prevent “illegal migration” but, however much we may wish to deny it, we have already learned that, in the name of emergency rhetorics, bureaucracy and deterrence can replace the slower, harder work of protection. Unfortunately, distance may make this responsibility harder to see, especially from a European capital, but it does not make it disappear, and it must be clearly defined before the first person is put on a plane.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.







