The architect of Iraq’s destruction

The reintroduction of Nouri al-Maliki as Iraq’s prime ministerial candidate is not just a symbolic setback; it is a pathological symptom of the system itself. Politically, Maliki has long since become irrelevant, yet failing systems do not base their decisions on public approval; they base them on their ability to manage fear.

Maliki is not returning because he is strong; he is returning because he is perfect for a system in crisis, capable of controlling the situation without any surprises.

Failed systems rarely seek the living; they summon the dead who are fit for reuse. In Iraq, figures are not chosen for their competence, but for their ability to faithfully embody ruin. In this sense, Maliki is not a choice; he is shorthand: shorthand for short memories, shorthand for fear, shorthand for a system that can only govern by invoking its worst self.

Since 2003, Iraq has not followed a political trajectory; it has been a series of failed loans from the future. Every government labelled ‘transitional’ has invariably led to worse outcomes.

The world knows Maliki well; Iraqis know him better. He has transformed sectarianism from a mere electoral tool into a method of governance, from populist speeches to security apparatuses and from social fear to secret prisons. In this sense, Maliki was the architect of Iraq’s destruction.

When he uttered the infamous phrase “Hussein’s Army and Yazid’s Army”, it was no fleeting outburst. It was a divisive declaration: the state no longer held authority, and sectarian history became the true constitution.

From this perspective, Maliki did not rule Iraq during his two terms; he ruled his diseased vision of Iraq: a country under siege, with Ba’athists lurking behind every bush, Sunnis being suspected without reason, and a society to be controlled, not represented.

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Former US Ambassador Ryan Crocker described Maliki as seeing a Ba’athist behind every bush; however, leaked recordings later revealed that he actually saw ideological enemies. WikiLeaks cables showed that Maliki had established his own army and secret prisons for Sunni detainees, as well as a team of loyal investigators — a level of political paranoia that verged on cognitive collapse in his later years.

Even the Western press agrees: His repressive policies towards Sunnis directly contributed to the rise of ISIS, while his backing by Iran was part of a complex Washington–Tehran dynamic that sustained a fragile, controllable system rather than building a state.

Studies from the Washington Institute show that Maliki created a shadow government, where personal loyalties took precedence over institutions, militias took precedence over the army and fear took precedence over law. This politicisation of the state apparatus turned Iraq into a tool wielded by its leader, not its citizens.

This is why Maliki is the problem, not the solution. His proposed return is not reform; it is a repeat of failure. The system cannot produce national leadership or translate disputes into political projects. It chooses a man who has lived through the crisis to remain in power rather than closing the chapter.

Maliki knows deep down that the public no longer trusts him. His name has become synonymous with identity-based killings, leaked recordings and public disdain.

He is in a growing psychological crisis, evident in his political ramblings and in images of him holding a rifle inside the Green Zone — a defeated soldier awaiting what he refuses to name.

Since Mosul fell to ISIS, Maliki has never accepted defeat; he has merely postponed acknowledging it. Today, he seems to be wearing a ‘bell of punishment’ around his neck and sees enemies behind every bush, while the United States watches the high-drama, low-comedy political theatre he is orchestrating in the confined space of the Green Zone.

Maliki is not an individual problem; he is a symptom of the system’s flaws. His return does not represent a return to the past, but rather an acknowledgement that politics in Iraq are driven by sectarian fear rather than law and citizenship.

All the Western evidence and analyses make clear that recalling Maliki today is not merely a domestic manoeuvre, but a global symbol of systemic failure. Bringing back the man who engineered division, endured crisis and ran the state from the margins means that Iraq will remain a prisoner of its past and incapable of forging a future.

Therefore, reappointing — or even considering — Maliki is not a political option. It is an admission of despair. When despair is institutionalised, it produces nations that are governed by memory and ruled by fear, burying their future with full consciousness.

Maliki is not just a sectarian politician; he is a reflection of a failed Iraq, choosing death over life.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.