El-Sisi pushes ahead with Egypt’s militarisation

The militarisation of the Egyptian state has accelerated significantly under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who came to power through a military coup that marked its 13th anniversary earlier this month.

In a systematic process, military officers continue to be appointed to ministerial positions, generals are gaining greater influence over provincial governors’ appointments, the army-affiliated Mostaqbal Misr (Future of Egypt) Agency is being granted sweeping economic powers, and the appointment of judges, imams, teachers and civil servants is increasingly tied to prior approval from the Egyptian Military Academy.

El-Sisi ousted the country’s first democratically elected civilian president, the late Mohamed Morsi, on 3rd July 2013. Since then, he has steadily accelerated efforts to embed the military throughout the institutions of government and the economy.

A new phase of militarisation

Egypt is witnessing an unprecedented phase in the militarisation of the state, reflected in a series of recent presidential, legislative and executive decisions.

Days ago, Egypt’s House of Representatives approved a bill to reorganise the work of the Future of Egypt Agency for Sustainable Development, an entity that is primarily affiliated with the Egyptian Air Force. The agency has broad powers covering planning and regulation, issuing licences, managing assets, investment and borrowing.

The full scale of the projects managed by the sovereign agency—which reports directly to the president—remains unknown. Its financial records and accounts are not subject to public audit, while state land and major development projects continue to be allocated to it through direct award rather than competitive tender.

Under the headline “Hands Off Mostaqbal Misr”, the independent news outlet Mada Masr reported that Cairo University political science professor Mostafa Kamel El-Sayed had been informed by the editor-in-chief of the privately owned Al-Shorouk newspaper that his article on the draft law would not be published because it addressed “sensitive issues related to the role of the armed forces in the economy—issues the media is now expected to avoid.”

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In the article, which was later published by the independent news platform Al-Manassa (article link: https://h1.nu/1u6FJ), El-Sayed argued that the proposed bill “would significantly expand the role of the Mostaqbal Misr Agency and extend its control over the state’s financial resources. In its new form, the agency would assume roles currently carried out by existing ministries, while wielding greater authority by virtue of being directly affiliated with the president.”

Earlier this month, El-Sisi also issued a presidential decree appointing Lieutenant General Mohamed Abdelrahman Bassiouni, head of the Armed Forces Operations Authority, as chairman of the National Crisis and Emergency Management Authority. The appointment reflects a broader pattern seen in recent years, with senior public posts increasingly going to former military officers and security officials.

The latest reshuffle of provincial governors, announced in February, saw 14 of Egypt’s 27 governors drawn from the ranks of retired major generals. In addition, every governorate now has a military adviser under Law No. 165 of 2020, which mandates the appointment of a military adviser to each province.

Appointments of imams, teachers and Judges

In a system headed by a former defence minister who exchanged his military uniform for a presidential suit, it may not be surprising that sensitive posts are entrusted to close allies with military and intelligence backgrounds. What is striking—and increasingly controversial— however, is the extension of the militarisation programme into civilian, religious and judicial institutions.

The Egyptian Ministry of Endowments has opened applications for a second group of imams to enrol in a training programme at the Egyptian Military Academy (https://h1.nu/1zEn8), according to an announcement featured on the ministry’s official website. Last June, the ministry also celebrated the graduation of around 259 imams and preachers from the academy, who took their oath before President El-Sisi, in what critics viewed as a sign of the militarisation of religious discourse and the transformation of mosque imams and preachers into government spokespersons.

According to statements by the Egyptian military spokesperson, the Military Academy also celebrated last year the graduation of employees and technical staff from the transport, finance and irrigation ministries, along with two new groups of teachers and school principals who completed training programmes at the academy.

Judges have also been drawn into the process. Last January, an official ceremony marked the graduation of the fourth group of judges after they completed a six-month training course at the Egyptian Military Academy. The programme included lectures on national security and military affairs, as well as weapons training and military drill, prompting widespread criticism from those who argued that it undermines judicial independence.

Criticism is expected to intensify following reports that 105 judges were excluded from completing the appointment process to judicial bodies after failing training courses and qualifying examinations conducted by the Military Academy, according to the independent investigative platform Matsada2sh (Don’t believe it).

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In a statement, the Cairo-based Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession said these practices “constitute an infringement on the judicial identity of members of the judiciary and directly affect their professional formation and future conduct in office. This approach also undermines the credibility and professional conduct of judges and others participating in these courses.”

Former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister and Ambassador Abdullah Al-Ashaal has also warned that “the militarisation of all state employees and civilians will deepen the divide between the state and society and further erode what remains of Egypt’s civilian institutions.”

Kayan and the Octagon

Egypt’s militarisation plans are being pursued simultaneously on multiple fronts. Days ago, authorities announced the launch of Kayan University of the Armed Forces, the first university to operate under the umbrella of the Egyptian Armed Forces.

Set to open in October, the university will initially comprise six faculties: medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, physical therapy, engineering, and computer science and artificial intelligence, according to Egyptian media reports.

On 4 July, President El-Sisi inaugurated the Strategic Command Headquarters in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital—known as the Octagon—while dressed in military uniform, marking his first appearance in military attire in nearly eight years. The symbolism of the event extended well beyond a ceremonial occasion, carrying both domestic and international political significance.

The Octagon, the new headquarters of Egypt’s Ministry of Defence, houses six key centres: the Unified Strategic Data Centre, which contains data from all state institutions; the Strategic Network Control Centre, which oversees the state’s administrative apparatus; the Government Facilities Management and Operations Centre, responsible for managing state infrastructure; the Communications Network Control Centre; the Emergency and Safety Centre; and the Meteorological Forecasting Centre.

According to political researcher Mohamed Gomaa, the inauguration ceremony of the Octagon and the remarks made during it reveal a complete political disconnect between the authorities and the public. He argues that Egypt’s generals are retreating into fortified strongholds they believe will protect them from popular anger in the future and help them avoid the fate of former President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, which was toppled in 2011.

El-Sisi has previously justified relocating state institutions from Cairo to the New Administrative Capital—around 50 kilometres east of the capital—by arguing that it would protect them from what he described as “evil forces”, referring to the siege of government and parliamentary buildings during the 25 January 2011 uprising.

Marginalising civilian institutions

The military’s expanding influence and its growing dominance over Egypt’s political and economic life may give those in power in the Arab world’s most populous country a false sense of control. However, according to political analyst Moataz Al-Masri, deeper militarisation, continued repression and the closure of political space will only increase the likelihood of failure. Combined with worsening economic conditions, rising living costs, growing poverty and unemployment, these policies could ultimately accelerate the regime’s collapse.

Speaking to Middle East Monitor, Al-Masri warned that the continued marginalisation of civilian institutions, the exclusion of civilians and their denial of any meaningful political or economic role are fuelling growing hostility towards Egypt’s military and security establishment.

El-Sisi hopes to build a comprehensive system of loyalty to what critics describe as the “Republic of Officers” by embedding a military ethos across every sphere of public life, thereby producing future generations loyal to his rule. Yet in doing so, he may also be stoking embers that could one day ignite public anger, alienate his own supporters and unite his opponents. If that happens, the old Arab proverb may well prove true: “The magic turned against the magician”, where the very system he has built turns against him.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.