Beyond a ‘Muslim NATO’: Pakistan and the Middle East’s Emerging Security Order

For decades, I watched Pakistan’s military relationship with the Middle East unfold largely away from the headlines. Pakistani officers trained Gulf forces, pilots joined joint exercises, advisers worked alongside Arab governments, and troops were periodically stationed in Saudi Arabia. Islamabad was an important security partner—but rarely the centrepiece of the region’s defence architecture.

That may now be changing.

The Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on September 17, 2025, marked a real departure from that older, informal cooperation. It established that aggression against either country would be treated as aggression against both—bringing the language of collective defence into Pakistan’s relationship with the Arab world for the first time.

Since then, I’ve noticed interest in Pakistan as a defence partner spreading. Kuwait has explored an expanded arrangement involving troops, aircraft, drones and air-defence capabilities. Bahrain has reportedly shown similar interest, Jordan has discussed weapons and training, and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye have prepared a draft trilateral defence agreement, though consensus still isn’t there.

All of this raises an obvious question: is a “Muslim NATO” beginning to emerge? My answer is no, not yet—but something strategically significant is clearly taking shape.

From military cooperation to mutual defence

The Saudi agreement matters because it turned a historic partnership into a formal strategic commitment.

Before 2025, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Pakistani military personnel were already stationed in Saudi Arabia in operational, technical and training roles. The agreement was then put into practice: Pakistani forces arrived at King Abdulaziz Air Base in April 2026, and later reporting confirmed Pakistani troops and combat aircraft deployed in the kingdom.

Other Gulf states took notice. Kuwait already had a 2023 defence-cooperation agreement with Pakistan, but discussions reported in July 2026 went considerably further—Kuwait reportedly seeking thousands of Pakistani troops, fighter aircraft, drones and air-defence systems, though Pakistani officials cautioned combat deployments weren’t under consideration.

I think the distinction here really matters: training agreements are common; a commitment to deploy forces and air-defence systems during a regional confrontation is something closer to an alliance.

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The Pakistan-Saudi-Turkiye triangle

The possible trilateral arrangement could prove even more consequential. Pakistan’s defence-production minister confirmed in January 2026 that a draft agreement existed after roughly ten months of talks. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan acknowledged the discussions but said no agreement had been signed, calling instead for a broader regional security platform.

Each country would bring something different to the table: Saudi Arabia’s financial resources and energy influence; Turkiye’s sophisticated defence industry in drones, armour and naval platforms; and Pakistan’s battle-experienced military, its expanding defence-industrial base, and the Muslim world’s only declared nuclear-weapons capability. Pakistan fields roughly 660,000 active personnel, more than 420 combat-capable aircraft, and an estimated 170 nuclear warheads—plus a JF-17 programme that lets it offer hardware without total dependence on Western suppliers.

Together, the three could form the core of a genuinely powerful security network—but I’d caution against reading too much into that. A powerful network isn’t automatically an alliance, and an alliance isn’t automatically NATO.

Egypt’s position in the emerging structure

Egypt is increasingly connected to this alignment, though there’s no publicly confirmed Pakistan–Egypt mutual-defence treaty. The two militaries conducted a joint special-forces exercise in Pakistan in April 2026, and Egypt has joined Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye in a four-country consultation mechanism—sometimes called the R4—that met during the Iran conflict to discuss de-escalation. This grouping remains diplomatic, not military, but it brings together four of the largest Muslim-majority states outside Iran.

I expect Cairo to move cautiously here, given its competing priorities in Gaza, Libya, Sudan, the Red Sea, and its long relationship with Washington. For now, I’d view Egypt as part of an emerging consultation circle—not yet a confirmed alliance member.

A Muslim alliance already exists—but not this kind

The Muslim world already has a multinational military body: the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, established in 2015 and headquartered in Riyadh, with 43 member states and former Pakistani army chief General Raheel Sharif as commander-in-chief since 2017. Its work spans counterterrorism coordination, intelligence-sharing, training and countering extremist financing.

But it has no Article 5 equivalent, no integrated multinational force, and no unified command that responds automatically when a member is attacked. Members participate according to their own capabilities, without giving up sovereignty. NATO’s strength rests on formal collective-defence commitments, integrated planning, common standards, and decades of joint exercises—none of which the emerging Pakistan-centred arrangements have yet built.

What is actually emerging?

I think the more likely outcome is a layered, hub-and-spoke network: the Pakistan–Saudi agreement at the centre, the Saudi-Turkiye trilateral around it, and specialised arrangements with Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar and potentially Egypt developing further out. Some countries may want Pakistani troops; others may prioritise training, intelligence or maritime security.

This model is more flexible than NATO precisely because Middle Eastern states don’t share a single definition of the enemy. Some worry primarily about Iran; others about Israel’s reach. Turkiye’s priorities lie in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean; Egypt’s in Gaza and the Red Sea; Pakistan’s in India, while also managing Afghanistan and its own sensitive border with Iran.

A single automatic-defence commitment covering all of these disputes at once would be extraordinarily hard to negotiate—so I suspect the region will develop several overlapping arrangements rather than one bloc.

The nuclear question

Pakistan’s nuclear capability is one reason its strategic value has risen, but this is a point I want to handle carefully rather than speculate on. After the Saudi agreement was signed, a senior Saudi official told Reuters it covered “all military means.” Pakistan’s defence minister said nuclear weapons were “not on the radar” of the pact. The published announcement made no explicit reference to nuclear deterrence or sharing—so claims of a formal Pakistani nuclear umbrella over the Gulf remain, as far as I can tell, unverified.

Pakistan’s doctrine has historically been built to deter India. Extending it to the Middle East raises hard questions I don’t think anyone has fully answered: who would control the weapons, what would trigger a response, and would it cover state, non-state or proxy attacks? Strategic ambiguity can strengthen deterrence, but too much ambiguity risks dangerous miscalculation. I’d argue Islamabad must not let political statements create nuclear obligations that were never publicly debated or institutionally defined.

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Pakistan’s opportunity—and its danger

I see a genuine opportunity here for Pakistan to expand defence exports, secure energy arrangements, and grow its diplomatic influence—Kuwait’s interest in linking defence cooperation to energy security is one example of that. But I also see a real risk of overextension.

In 2015, Pakistan’s parliament refused Saudi Arabia’s request for ships, aircraft and troops in the Yemen war, choosing neutrality instead to preserve its mediating role. That same tension persists today: Islamabad wants to protect Saudi Arabia without becoming a combatant in every Saudi–Iranian confrontation. The 2025 agreement makes that harder—during the 2026 escalation, officials acknowledged the pact could force a choice between the Saudi commitment and mediating with Iran.

Pakistan has been here before. It joined the Baghdad Pact—later CENTO—during the Cold War, but the alliance never addressed its central concern, India, and Pakistan withdrew in 1979. The lesson I take from that: treaty language doesn’t guarantee useful security. Alliances only hold up when members actually agree on threats, responsibilities and the conditions for using force.

A bridge or a frontline?

I think Pakistan should welcome deeper security cooperation, but it needs to set clear limits for itself. Future agreements should define aggression, distinguish defensive from expeditionary operations, and require civilian and parliamentary oversight. Conventional cooperation—air defence, counter-drone technology, maritime security, training—should stay separate from any implied nuclear commitment. Pakistan must also protect its relationship with Iran; an architecture designed to encircle Tehran would turn its western border into a permanent front and end its ability to mediate.

The most effective arrangement, in my view, would be defensive, transparent, and inclusive enough to avoid becoming a sectarian coalition—focused on protecting territory and infrastructure, not regime-change campaigns.

A Muslim NATO is not yet being established. What’s emerging is more flexible but also more uncertain: a network of pacts, deployments and diplomatic mechanisms, with Pakistan becoming one of its principal centres.

Handled carefully, I believe this could give Islamabad greater strategic influence and help Gulf states reduce their dependence on outside powers. Handled recklessly, it could turn Pakistan from a regional bridge into a frontline state in conflicts it cannot control.

So the real question, to me, isn’t whether Pakistan will help build a Muslim NATO. It’s whether Pakistan can build this new security role without sacrificing the strategic independence that makes it valuable in the first place.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.