The Syria Option: Rethinking Middle Eastern Oil Exports Beyond Hormuz

President Donald Trump’s endorsement of Syria as a possible alternative to the Strait of Hormuz has pushed an old energy-security problem back to the center of Middle Eastern strategy. On September 3, Trump reacted positively to a Washington Post report describing Syria’s effort to market itself as an overland corridor from Iraq to the Mediterranean. The interest is understandable. Before the 2026 conflict, crude oil and petroleum liquids moving through Hormuz averaged 21.6 million barrels per day (mbpd) in the fourth quarter of 2025. By the second quarter of 2026, flows had fallen to 4.9 mbpd as conflict sharply constrained shipping. The episode showed how quickly dependence on one narrow waterway can become a problem for producers, importers and the wider global economy.

The point, however, is not that pipelines can replace Hormuz. They cannot. Maritime trade remains cheaper, more flexible and able to move volumes that no current overland network can match.

The more realistic objective is redundancy: creating enough alternative capacity to keep a meaningful share of exports moving when the strait is disrupted. Saudi Arabia and the UAE already have that flexibility to a degree. Iraq, Syria, Türkiye and Jordan could broaden it further, but only if proposed projects move beyond announcements and feasibility studies.

Existing Bypass Routes: Useful, but Limited

Saudi Arabia has the region’s strongest operational alternative. Aramco’s East-West Pipeline carries crude from the kingdom’s eastern fields to Yanbu on the Red Sea and can handle about 7 mbpd. During the 2026 crisis, the system was pushed to full capacity, with roughly 5 mbpd exported through Yanbu. That helped Saudi Arabia maintain access to international markets while Hormuz was severely constrained. Yet the route does not remove maritime risk. Oil leaving Yanbu still depends on Red Sea security, and the EIA notes that alternatives involving Suez and the SUMED pipeline are longer, more expensive and limited in capacity.

The UAE has its own strategic hedge through the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline to Fujairah, outside Hormuz. The line can carry about 1.8 mbpd. Together, Saudi and Emirati bypass infrastructure provides a significant cushion, but nowhere near enough to reproduce normal Hormuz flows. The distinction between nameplate and spare capacity matters here.

Pipelines already used in normal conditions cannot suddenly offer their full rated capacity during a crisis. This is why existing routes should be viewed as shock absorbers rather than substitutes for the strait.

The New Pipeline Push: Iraq and Syria

The war has strengthened the case for expansion. Saudi Arabia is considering adding another 1–2 mbpd to the East-West Pipeline and has discussed possible arrangements with Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, which have fewer options for avoiding Hormuz. Reuters reports that the Saudi system currently carries up to 7 mbpd, of which around 5 mbpd can be exported from Yanbu. Expanding that system is relatively straightforward politically because most of the infrastructure would remain under Saudi control. It would also give neighboring producers a possible outlet during future disruptions.

Iraq could change the regional map more dramatically. Most Iraqi crude is produced in the south and normally exported through Gulf terminals, leaving the country highly exposed to instability around Hormuz. Baghdad has therefore revived plans for a westward and northward pipeline network linking Basra to Haditha and then potentially to Ceyhan in Türkiye or Baniyas in Syria. In July 2026, Iraq approved preliminary agreements for feasibility studies involving those routes. The proposals matter because they would connect southern Iraqi production to Mediterranean outlets on a large scale, but they remain proposals rather than operating capacity.

Syria is the most politically visible part of this strategy. The Washington Post reported U.S. support for a Chevron-led pipeline that could carry around 2 mbpd from Basra to Baniyas. The proposed line would follow broadly the same corridor now used by tanker trucks moving Iraqi oil across Syria. The Post cited a cost of about $5.7 billion and a construction period of at least two and a half years. Reuters later reported a much higher estimate of at least $15 billion and around four years, noting that the project would require almost entirely new infrastructure rather than simple rehabilitation of the old Iraq-Syria system. The gap between those estimates is a reminder that the project is still at an early stage.

For Syria, the opportunity goes beyond transit fees. After years of war and sanctions, becoming a corridor between the Gulf and the Mediterranean could attract investment into ports, roads, storage and energy infrastructure while giving Damascus a new role in regional trade. The existing truck route has already demonstrated the geography: the Washington Post reported about 5,000 oil trucks a day moving from Iraq toward Baniyas. But trucking also shows the limits of the current arrangement. It is expensive, difficult to scale and vulnerable to disruption. A permanent pipeline could transform the corridor, but only if security, financing and political agreements prove durable.

Opportunities and Vulnerabilities

For Iraq, new corridors would reduce dependence on southern terminals and create more flexibility in selling crude to Europe and other markets. Syria, Türkiye and potentially Jordan could gain transit revenue and infrastructure investment. Saudi Arabia and the UAE would gain additional resilience, while importers would benefit from a lower risk of abrupt supply losses.

The logic is not to eliminate price shocks but to reduce their severity by ensuring that more barrels remain connected to export markets during a crisis.

The problem is that alternative corridors do not eliminate geopolitical risk. They move it. Saudi crude redirected to Yanbu avoids Hormuz but still faces risks in the Red Sea and around Bab el-Mandeb. A Basra-Baniyas pipeline would cross western Iraq and large areas of Syria, where physical security remains uneven. The Washington Post noted continuing Islamic State activity and the presence of Iran-backed militias along parts of the proposed route. A pipeline expected to operate for decades therefore needs credible protection, insurance and political guarantees, not simply an engineering plan.

Economics may be just as difficult as security. Strategic pipelines are a form of insurance and may run below capacity in normal periods. Cross-border projects also require pumping stations, storage tanks, export terminals and agreements on tariffs, ownership and dispute settlement. Reuters’ estimate that the Iraq-Syria project could cost at least $15 billion illustrates the scale of the commitment. Governments should therefore avoid counting announced capacity as if it already existed. A proposed 2 mbpd line contributes nothing to resilience until it is financed, built, connected to terminals and able to operate under stress.

Policy Priority: Redundancy, Not Replacement

Regional governments and their international partners should prioritize alternative corridors, but selectively. The strongest near-term projects are those that add meaningful capacity without creating excessive new political exposure: expanding Saudi westward capacity, strengthening UAE access to Fujairah and building Iraq’s Basra-Haditha backbone. Cross-border extensions through Syria, Türkiye and Jordan deserve support where commercial terms, security arrangements and financing are credible. Syria should be treated as a serious long-term option, but not yet as a ready-made substitute for Hormuz.

The policy goal should therefore be a more resilient export network rather than a “Hormuz-free” Gulf. Hormuz will remain indispensable because of its scale and the importance of Asian markets to Gulf producers. But the 2026 crisis has shown the cost of relying too heavily on one maritime gateway. The key policy question is how much governments should invest in alternative corridors as strategic insurance, and which routes offer enough security value to justify their financial and geopolitical costs.

The answer is not to build every pipeline on the drawing board. It is to invest in a smaller number of scalable, secure routes that can keep oil moving when the next disruption comes.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.