From war to statehood: A roadmap to ending the Yemeni conflict

The Yemeni crisis is no longer simply a war between two sides, nor merely a political dispute that can be resolved through the signing of a temporary agreement. More than a decade of conflict has left behind a fragmented state, a devastated economy, weakened institutions, and a society bearing the heavy cost of a conflict that ordinary citizens can no longer endure.

Today, as military risks re-emerge and the possibility of escalation grows, the question becomes increasingly urgent: How can Yemen move from a country governed by the language of weapons to one governed by the language of the state?

The United Nations has warned in September 2026 of the risk of a return to widespread fighting and has called on the parties to keep channels of dialogue open, protect civilians, and preserve a political process capable of addressing Yemen’s political, security and economic challenges.

But any genuine roadmap for ending the conflict should not begin with the question: Who will win? It should begin with a more fundamental question: How can the war end without allowing it to start again?

First: Ending the war does not mean ending the conflict

A ceasefire is a necessary step, but it is not a final solution. Yemen needs an agreement that makes a truce the beginning of an integrated political, economic and security process, rather than merely a temporary pause during which the parties prepare for another round of fighting.

For this reason, the United Nations has emphasised interconnected tracks involving military de-escalation, economic measures and the launch of an inclusive political process. Real peace is not simply the postponement of war. It is the reduction of the conditions and incentives that could lead to its return.

Second: The state must be the destination

Yemen will not be able to overcome its crisis as long as weapons remain outside state institutions or institutions remain divided among competing forces. The concept of the state does not mean excluding any particular political actor. Rather, it requires one principle to apply to everyone:

There can be no functioning state while multiple centers of armed power remain outside unified state authority. A state capable of protecting its citizens, managing its resources, paying public-sector salaries, operating its institutions, securing roads, and protecting its ports and airports is the only framework capable of transforming peace from a political agreement into a daily reality.

Therefore, any sustainable settlement will require clear arrangements concerning the future of military and armed formations, placing them within a coherent security framework under state institutions, with mutually agreed guarantees.

Third: The Houthis and the choice of statehood

The Houthi movement, Ansar Allah, has become a major party to the Yemeni conflict, and any serious effort to end the war must address its political and military position in Yemen’s future. The question is not simply: Should the Houthis participate in politics?

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The deeper question is: Can a force that emerged during wartime transform itself into a political actor operating within the institutions of the state? If the objective is to end the war, the path forward must involve transforming armed confrontation into peaceful political competition, with all parties committed to the rules of the state and the law.

This requires clear arrangements concerning weapons, security and military institutions, as well as political guarantees designed to prevent the use of force to impose political outcomes.

Fourth: The southern issue is a central part of the solution

A lasting peace in Yemen cannot be built by ignoring the Southern Issue or reducing it to temporary political arrangements. The South has its own political cause, political forces, society and aspirations. Any comprehensive political process must provide southerners with a genuine space to express their vision for their future.

A peace process that excludes a fundamental Yemeni issue may succeed in producing an agreement on paper, but it will remain vulnerable to the realities on the ground.

Therefore, the future structure of the state, the relationship between the center and the regions, the distribution of power and wealth, and political guarantees for different components must be subjects of genuine political discussion rather than issues indefinitely postponed.

Fifth: The economy is part of peace

Citizens cannot live on political agreements alone. If the fighting ends while electricity remains unreliable, salaries remain unpaid, the currency remains weak and essential services continue to deteriorate, peace will remain, for ordinary Yemenis, little more than a political slogan.

Paying salaries, reopening roads, facilitating trade, restoring basic services and reforming economic institutions are therefore not secondary issues. They are part of the process of building peace itself.

The UN Special Envoy also emphasised in August 2026 the importance of economic stability, the free movement of people and goods, the payment of public-sector salaries, and the restoration of basic services as part of the broader process of ending the conflict.

Sixth: There can be no peace without guarantees

Previous experiences have demonstrated that agreements alone are not enough. Yemen needs local, regional and international guarantees capable of supporting the implementation of any agreement and preventing the parties from returning to war at the first major political crisis.

The role of the United Nations, regional states and the international community should not be to determine Yemen’s future on behalf of Yemenis. Rather, their role should be to help create an environment in which Yemenis themselves can reach an agreement that is realistic, enforceable and sustainable.

Seventh: Moving beyond the logic of victory and defeat

Perhaps the greatest challenge facing any Yemeni settlement is abandoning the idea that peace must mean the victory of one side and the defeat of another. After years of war, continued efforts to produce a military victor may simply prolong the conflict itself.

The state, by contrast, should be the project that transcends all political forces. Political parties may differ. Political projects may compete. Visions for the future shape of the state may vary. But these disagreements must move from battlefields to institutions, from weapons to the ballot box, and from imposing facts on the ground to negotiation.

The road to the future

A possible Yemeni roadmap could be structured in several stages:

Phase One:

Ending escalation, stopping attacks and protecting civilians.

Phase Two:

Implementing urgent economic and humanitarian measures, including the payment of salaries, restoration of basic services, reopening roads and crossings, and addressing humanitarian issues.

Phase Three:

Establishing clear security and military arrangements designed to prevent a return to war and place weapons and security institutions within a coherent state framework.

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Phase Four:

Launching an inclusive political dialogue involving Yemen’s various stakeholders, including the Southern Transitional Council, other southern forces and components, as well as political and social actors.

Phase Five:

Reaching agreement on the structure of the state, the distribution of political power and wealth, and guarantees for political participation.

Phase Six:

Establishing a transitional phase that ultimately leads to agreed political and constitutional arrangements, followed by elections when the necessary conditions are in place.

This is not a magic formula. But it reflects the fundamental idea Yemen needs: a political settlement must be a bridge to statehood, not a bridge to another war.

In conclusion

Yemen does not need another war to prove who possesses greater power. It needs a settlement capable of demonstrating that the state can become stronger than the weapons.

The Houthis, the internationally recognised government, southern forces and the rest of Yemen’s political and social components face a historic test: Will Yemen continue producing war, or will it begin producing a state?

Ending the war does not mean erasing any political actor from the map. It means ending the ability of weapons to determine the country’s future.

If Yemenis can move their disagreements from battlefields to institutions, from guns to ballot boxes, and from the logic of domination to the logic of partnership, then perhaps the long war will have produced its most important lesson: A nation does not win when it defeats another side. It wins when the state becomes stronger than everyone.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.