Overland lifelines under pressure: Iran’s trade with its neighbours

Iran is turning to its land borders for ways to keep trade moving as the U.S. naval blockade constrains shipping. But these routes are best seen as a buffer, not a substitute for maritime trade. They can help move selected goods, give merchants more options, and support businesses in border regions. They cannot make up for lost oil revenue, and they depend on infrastructure and political cooperation that Iran cannot control alone. The recent suspension of trade at two crossings with Pakistan is a reminder that land routes, too, can be disrupted with little warning.

The blockade and the shift to land

The loss of crude exports is at the heart of the problem. Citing Vortexa, Reuters reported that Iran’s seaborne crude exports fell to zero in the second week of September 2026 and were still at zero in early October. Vortexa estimated that 43 million barrels of Iranian crude were trapped west of the Strait of Hormuz. This is more than a shipping setback: oil exports bring in foreign currency, which road and rail trade in food or machinery cannot replace. The figures refer to seaborne crude, however, and do not mean that every kind of Iranian trade has stopped.

Some petroleum products have still made it out. Reuters, drawing on shipping intelligence, reported that eight LPG tankers and one jet-fuel tanker had left the Gulf of Oman since the blockade was reimposed in July. UANI estimated the LPG cargoes at 4.1 million barrels. These shipments show that the restrictions are not an airtight seal, but they are limited and irregular. U.S. officials also cautioned that a ship passing through does not necessarily mean the blockade was breached; vessels are reviewed individually, and some may be allowed through. For now, these cargoes look like exceptions rather than a dependable route for Iran’s energy exports.

Iran’s push to move more goods by land is already straining key crossings. At Gürbulak, on the Turkey–Iran border, the Associated Press reported that truck numbers had risen from about 200 to 1,200.

Waits on the Iranian side reached 12 to 25 days, and an Iranian trade official said the destination side could not process that many vehicles. Trucks can carry food, machinery parts, chemicals, and other goods, but shifting cargo from ships to roads takes more than finding another route. It requires enough lanes, customs staff, scanners, storage, and coordination on both sides of the border.

Corridors: capacity, not just geography

ISNA’s report on the Maku Free Zone shows why it matters to distinguish planned capacity from actual throughput. The zone’s managing director said it could handle 700 to 1,000 trucks a day, while around 300 to 400 trucks were leaving through the Bazargan crossing at the time. Those numbers describe different things: the zone’s stated capacity is not the same as the number of trucks cleared across the border. Raising the latter would require coordination with Turkey and enough capacity at the crossing itself. The figures point to room for growth, but they do not mean trade can immediately increase by the same amount .

ISNA also reports on the proposed Sarakhs–Cheshmeh Sorayya railway. The project could take 12 to 18 months to build if funding is secured and a contractor is selected; its projected capacity is 15 to 20 million tonnes of freight in its first year. These are estimates, not cargo already moving on an operational line. A separate report describes the railway as part of a planned east–west corridor connecting Iran’s network with Turkey’s. If completed, it could offer another way to move goods across the country. Its usefulness will depend on the project being built, border connections working smoothly, and freight costs being competitive.

West Azerbaijan could also benefit from a broader view of Iran’s border network. IRNA highlights the province’s links with Turkey, Iraq, and Nakhchivan, arguing that its role goes beyond a single crossing. With reliable roads, customs facilities, storage, and logistics services, border areas can connect local businesses to several markets and support employment as well as transit.

But geography alone does not make a region a trade hub. Businesses need goods to move predictably, without delays that make the route too costly to use.

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Neighboring markets and political risk

Iraq shows both the promise of regional trade and its exposure to disruption. Reuters reported that Iran–Iraq trade exceeded $10 billion in 2025, driven largely by Iranian food, consumer goods, and other exports. Trade declined in 2026 as the conflict increased security risks, disrupted crossings, and raised transport costs. Iraq remains an important market, but it is not insulated from regional instability. Routes through the Caucasus and Central Asia could add options, though each has its own infrastructure and border constraints. Having more neighbors does not automatically mean Iran can redirect unlimited cargo to them.

The latest suspension of trade at Pakistan’s Gabd–Rimdan and Taftan crossings makes that point especially clear.

Dawn reported that Pakistan suspended commercial traffic through both crossings, with Balochistan officials citing security concerns, smuggling, and border management. Iran’s foreign ministry described the stoppage as temporary and technical and said talks were under way. Hundreds of trucks carrying LPG, rice, fruit, and other goods were reportedly stranded, although passenger traffic through Rimdan–Gabd continued.

The closure may be temporary, but even a short interruption can mean lost sales, delayed deliveries, and higher costs for traders.

Turkey’s incentives and constraints

Turkey has a clear commercial interest in keeping trade with Iran going, but the size and direction of that trade matter. Türkiye’s foreign ministry puts bilateral trade at $5.5 billion in 2025: Turkish exports to Iran were $3 billion, while imports from Iran were $2.5 billion. Turkish exports include machinery, plastics, chemicals, vehicles, and agricultural products; imports from Iran include natural gas, metals, and agricultural goods. The relationship is significant, but the figures show that the balance favors Turkey. Iranian customs figures may not match Turkish data because the two sides can use different periods, categories, and methods; those figures should not be combined as if they were directly comparable.

Turkey has good reasons to maintain commerce with Iran: Turkish firms gain access to a large neighboring market, and transit can bring further business. But commercial interest does not mean Ankara will accept any level of risk. In September 2026, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned a Turkey-based bank and subsidiaries, alleging that they facilitated transactions for Iranian entities. Later that month, Turkey’s banking regulator revoked the operating license of Iran’s Bank Mellat branch. Reuters noted that Turkey’s official notice did not explicitly link the decision to U.S. pressure. These actions do not show that Turkey is ending trade, but they help explain why banks and businesses may be reluctant to handle Iranian payments.

A buffer, not a substitute

The practical value of Iran’s regional corridors will depend on whether goods can move reliably, not simply on how many routes appear on a map. The Maku figures suggest unused capacity, while the railway remains a proposal with a conditional timeline. Keeping border procedures predictable, coordinating customs, improving transport links, and making payments possible are all necessary if trade is to grow. Otherwise, congestion or a temporary closure can erase the advantage of geographic proximity.

Trade with neighboring countries can keep some supply chains functioning and give merchants alternatives when one route is blocked. But it cannot replace seaborne energy exports or the hard currency they generate. Turkey is likely to remain commercially interested, yet any increase will depend on border capacity, payment access, and how much sanctions risk its firms are willing to take.

Iran’s land corridors can reduce dependence on any one crossing; they cannot, by themselves, offset the economic impact of the naval blockade.

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