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It’s not about China or national security. It’s about which foreign entity is allowed to spy on Americans

November 19, 2026 at 1:21 pm

An Israeli woman uses her iPhone in front of the building housing the Israeli NSO group [JACK GUEZ/AFP/Getty Images]

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Washington has spent years warning that use of foreign technology can become a national-security threat. Chinese-made electric vehicles, telecommunications equipment, cameras, connected devices and even individual components have been scrutinised, restricted or banned because, US officials argue, technology embedded in everyday products could provide a foreign power with access to sensitive data.

The underlying logic is clear: if a foreign government can exert influence over its domestic companies, it could potentially exploit that leverage to manipulate technologies embedded in connected devices. The concern, therefore, is not merely who manufactures a device, but who can access, compromise, or exploit its underlying technology.

So why does this national-security logic suddenly stop when the foreign entity in question is a country whose companies and technologies have already been implicated in spying on Americans and others? Why should the same standard of scrutiny apply to one foreign power not apply to another?

That question becomes increasingly urgent as American technology companies such as Apple expand the role of their Israeli engineering operations in developing critical technologies embedded in iPhones.

If the national-security concern is the potential for foreign government access or influence, then the country involved should make no difference. The standard must be consistent, or it ceases to be a national security at all.

Unlike Apple’s reliance on low-cost manufacturing labor in China, where its devices are primarily assembled, the company has maintained advanced research and development centers in Israel for years. These facilities are staffed by Israeli engineers, many of whom serve in the country’s military reserves, work on developing critical technologies rather than simply assembling products. According to Apple Israel manager Rony Friedman, Israeli “teams are embedded in chips, cameras, modems, and AI at the heart of the company’s devices.”

Doesn’t the involvement of Israeli engineers in designing these critical components, with potential access to their underlying architecture and firmware, warrant the same national-security scrutiny Washington applies to Chinese technology? Engineers involved in developing these systems may have access to the very foundations of a device’s communications infrastructure.

If vulnerabilities or concealed access mechanisms were deliberately introduced during development, they could potentially compromise the privacy and security of millions of users.

This concern is not hypothetical. Israeli company NSO Group developed Pegasus, sophisticated spyware capable of remotely infiltrating smartphones. In July 2021, the Pegasus Project exposed the global use of NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware to infiltrate mobile phones worldwide. In September 2023, the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab uncovered BLASTPASS, a zero-click exploit chain attributed to NSO Group that could compromise fully updated iPhones running iOS 16.6 without any interaction from the victim. The Israeli intelligence-linked NSO Group’s spyware has been deployed against real targets, exploiting weaknesses in devices that millions of Americans trust with their most intimate communications and personal information.

The recent resignation of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang illustrates how quickly personal relationships can become a national security issue when it involves a Chinese American. Huang resigned on 12th November following revelations of multiple extramarital relationships, including one with Alice Huang, a Chinese businesswoman suspected of spying for Beijing. The espionage allegations have not been independently verified and China denies them.

Imagine the same controversy involving a Jewish American executive and an Israeli woman. Would anyone dare raise questions about Israeli espionage without immediately facing accusations of antisemitism?

This, despite documented cases of Jewish American Israeli spies operating inside the United States, including Jonathan Pollard and Pentagon official Lawrence Franklin, both of whom had access to highly sensitive government secrets.

The question is not about anyone’s ancestry or personal relationships. It is why scrutiny of potential foreign espionage becomes legitimate when a Chinses American is involved but politically taboo when pro-Israel Jewish-Americans are concerned.

Unlike the hypothesis of links between a Chinese citizen and a Chinese intelligence unit, NSO Group’s founders came from Israel’s military intelligence Unit 8200. Moreover, Pegasus spyware operations and exports were subject to direct Israeli government oversight requiring prior approval from Israel’s Ministry of War.

Speaking of Huang’s dethroning as head of the world’s largest AI company, in less than 24 hours, Israeli newspapers were already discussing or promoting three potential Israeli candidates being considered for the Nvidia CEO position. So soon it makes one wonder if this is merely a coincidence, or a calculated intelligence operation that exposed long-standing extramarital affairs only when the groomed replacement became ready?

The Commerce Department warned in early 2025 of foreign-controlled technology that could access sensitive personal information. The covered systems include cellular, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and satellite communications. The report mentions China and Russia, but not the proven Israeli spying companies.

If Washington considers Chinese technology a potential national-security threat because of the risk of foreign surveillance or exploitation, the same standard must apply to technology from a country whose companies have engaged in the very spying Washington fears China might conduct.

If a Chinese company develops a communications component, Washington asks who designed it, who controls the company, where the technology was developed, what data it can access, and whether the Chinese government could compel the company to cooperate.

These are legitimate national security questions. As such, they should apply equally to every foreign government with the ability to influence its companies or exploit the technologies they develop.

Indeed, the more intimate the technology, the more important the questions become. An electric vehicle can collect enormous amounts of information about where Americans travel. A smartphone can reveal something far more intimate: who we communicate with, where we sleep, whom we meet, what we photograph, what we search for and what we say.

Given Israel’s confirmed involvement in smartphone surveillance, why shouldn’t the participation of Israeli military reservists in designing critical American communications technology raise the same national-security red flags?

If Chinese technology warrants scrutiny to guard against surveillance, Israeli-linked technology deserves at least the same, if not greater, scrutiny, given its spying history. Otherwise, Washington’s national security policy risks becoming less about protecting the homeland and more about who is allowed to spy on Americans.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.