Fourteen years after NATO helped destroy Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, Libya remains fractured, ungovernable, and exposed. Over the years, the once stable and peaceful country has become a battleground for regional powers, often tacitly encouraged by superpowers, including Washington and Moscow — with the former increasingly ceding the lead or remaining absent from the political wrangling over Libya’s strategic position. NATO, initially led by France and later the U.S., dismantled the regime but paralysed the country, and after an eight-month bombing campaign, withdrew simply because it had no workable plan for the day after and state building is not within its long terms strategy— a failure many Western leaders and Gaddafi haters would later regret. Neither democracy nor civilian protection, offered as the pretext for the 2011 intervention, has been achieved, and the ensuing Libyan crisis is no longer a priority for the West, despite the devastating toll of the campaign on civilians.
Since his appointment as a senior US adviser on African, Arab, and Middle Eastern affairs, Massad Boulos has largely reiterated that Washington will support the UN roadmap for Libya — a plan being pushed forward despite little prospect of meaningful success. His colleague and US Representative to the UN Security Council, Dorothy Shea, however has only expressed broad support to “bring Libyans together to reflect the realities on the ground.” she appears to be putting some conditions on such support because this is neither unwavering nor unconditional support in any meaningful way that might help UN Envoy Hannah Tetteh mobilise the organisation behind its plan — the United States, after all, holds veto power and bears a moral responsibility given its role in dismantling Libya.
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump has yet to address Libya in any substantive manner even ten months into his presidency. Boulos, reflecting the administration’s approach, prioritises transactional and strategic interests over consistent principles, stability, or long-term governance. In practice, this leaves the United States largely absent from the critical negotiations and power struggles that continue to define Libya’s fractured political landscape.
In the vacuum left by Washington, regional powers have stepped decisively into Libya’s fractured political and military landscape. Turkey has backed the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) with military and logistical support, securing influence along the coast and in the capital. Ankara has become the central hub for Libyan affairs, with President Erdoğan wielding considerable political clout and Turkey’s intelligence services involved in major GNU decisions. As recently as July 2025, Turkey was accepted as a trusted grantor for a locally brokered ceasefire between the GNU and the Radaa militia, which controls key areas of Tripoli, including the airport. Turkey’s troops, supported by Syrian mercenaries, operate with near impunity in Libya. At the same time, Ankara is cautiously opening channels with its former adversary, General Khalifa Haftar, long backed by Abu Dhabi and Cairo. This recalibration reflects Ankara’s strategic flexibility and growing dominance in Libyan politics after a decade of military and political intervention. Still Washinton is nowhere to be seen despite the fact that Mr Boulos has visited Ankara a couple of times
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Meanwhile, in eastern and southern Libya, the UAE and Egypt have consistently backed General Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army. Abu Dhabi has supplied drones, artillery, and intelligence, while Cairo has provided military advisors, training, and cross-border coordination. Russia has emerged as Haftar’s most influential backer, deploying its state-controlled paramilitary apparatus (formerly operating under the Wagner Group) to bolster his campaigns. These interventions, driven by strategic ambition rather than Libya’s stability, have deepened fragmentation, reinforced militia control, and left the UN roadmap struggling to gain traction. The absence of sustained US engagement has allowed these powers to shape Libya’s political and military calculus with near impunity.
Even when Washington does show up, its intervention in Libya rarely advances the stated goal of a stable, unified state. The postponed December 2021 elections are a telling case in point: envisioned as the transition’s climax, they collapsed amid disputes over eligibility rules, constitutional frameworks and power-sharing, as Libya’s institutions remained hollow. Former UN envoy to Libya, Stephanie Williams, warns that “we could not begin to tackle the divisions inside Libya until, and if, there was some semblance of cohesion on the international front”. She argues that the international community, especially the US, treated Libya as “a secondary element within broader strategic relationships” rather than as a priority in its own right. The result: a country where democratic process is deferred and legitimacy is borrowed rather than built — even when Western capitals formally support the roadmap, their commitment rarely goes beyond statements and photo-ops. Washington in particular stands out in this regard and Trump’s lack of Libya policy is a good example here.
Many observers believe that Washington played a key role in the collapse of Libya’s planned presidential elections in December 2021, fearing that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was poised to win. US envoy Richard Norland appeared to suggest that Gaddafi’s candidacy was unacceptable, emphasising that the elections must produce a leader “who can unify the country and engage credibly with the international community” — language widely interpreted as a diplomatic rejection of Saif’s return to power. That episode, however, belonged to the Biden era. Under President Trump, Washington is not just absent from Libya’s affairs; it is largely disengaged from all UN-led or independent efforts to resolve the conflict.
This prolonged absence has only emboldened regional powers to act without restraint, intervening militarily and politically while disregarding international commitments. The result is a steady erosion of the UN arms embargo on Libya, first established under Security Council Resolution 1970, which prohibits all weapons transfers to the country. Despite repeated violations — by Turkey, the UAE, Egypt, and others — Washington’s silence signals that accountability is optional, further undermining the prospects for any genuine stabilization effort.
This prolonged absence has only left regional powers to act with impunity, intervening militarily and politically while disregarding international commitments. The result is a steady erosion of the UN arms embargo on Libya, first established under Security Council Resolution 1970, which prohibits all weapons transfers to the country. Despite repeated violations — by Turkey, the UAE, Egypt, and others — Washington’s lack of action signals that accountability is optional, further undermining the prospects for any genuine stabilization effort.
Ironically, peace in Libya would hardly register as an achievement on President Trump’s long and often self-promoted road to the Nobel Prize — one he pursues with a mix of fact, fiction, and bravado. For reasons both political and personal, Libya just isn’t on that map.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.








