Palestine’s energy sovereignty: Who controls the switch?

In Gaza, keeping a medical device running can depend on access to engine oil. A Reuters report published on 10 September 2026 describes shortages of lubricants, spare parts and fuel threatening generators serving hospitals and residential neighbourhoods. Equipment designed for emergencies carries the burden of everyday electricity supply, without assured maintenance.

This raises a fundamental question for Palestinian reconstruction: who controls whether infrastructure keeps working? Financing power plants and purchasing generators are essential. But energy security requires Palestinians to make decisions about supplying, repairing and expanding their electricity system. The central problem is the gap between owning equipment and controlling its use.

Resources offshore, dependence onshore

Gaza Marine illustrates this gap. With estimated reserves exceeding one trillion cubic feet, the offshore gas field offers a potential source of fuel and Palestinian revenue. Yet its development has faced political disputes, conflict with Israel and economic obstacles. Even Israel’s preliminary approval in June 2023 was conditional on its security and diplomatic requirements.

Gas beneath the sea does not automatically become electricity in a hospital. Development requires capital, infrastructure and workable agreements. When progress depends on decisions beyond the resource owners’ control, energy sovereignty remains constrained.

Gaza Marine belongs in a longer-term strategy. Promises of future gas revenue cannot substitute for admitting equipment and restoring essential services today.

Two territories, a shared constraint

In Gaza, infrastructure destruction and restrictions on essential supplies threaten basic services. In the West Bank, import dependence, access to land and the ability to expand the grid are central concerns. These differences require distinct responses, but both reflect limited Palestinian control over essential infrastructure.

A 2017 World Bank assessment identified heavy dependence on imported Israeli electricity and constraints on access to Area C as obstacles to domestic energy development. This historical diagnosis matters: Palestinian electricity shortages were tied to restrictions on building local capacity long before the latest destruction.

Today, the consequences extend beyond electricity. OCHA’s 4 September report states that all six wastewater treatment plants in Gaza were non-operational, alongside 70 per cent of sewage pumping stations. Reliable power, repairs and safe access are necessary for restoring these services. Energy insecurity becomes a water and public health crisis.

When electricity dependence reaches the budget

The financial relationship is equally important. Israel collects revenues on behalf of the Palestinian Authority and controls their transfer. Palestinian electricity distributors’ debts to the Israel Electric Corporation intersect with this arrangement.

In January 2025, Reuters reported plans to use withheld Palestinian tax revenues to settle electricity debt. The report also carried the Palestinian finance ministry’s explanation of an agreement to use some funds for fuel purchases and electricity payments.

The utility’s claims, Israeli government decisions and settlement arrangements must be distinguished. Nevertheless, electricity dependence intersects with a revenue system Palestinians do not fully control, constraining budgetary choices.

READ: Gaza hospital generators stop operating amid shortages of fuel, oil: Health Ministry

Even solar power needs access

Solar generation with battery storage could reduce essential services’ daily dependence on fuel. But this option also relies on equipment entering the territory. OCHA identifies solar systems among supplies whose classification as “dual-use” goods restricts their entry into Gaza.

This cannot be treated as an ordinary procurement difficulty. Restrictions that obstruct both existing electricity supplies and the construction of alternatives narrow economic choices. Their effect is to weaken the capacity for independent development and perpetuate dependence.

Solar programmes should prioritise hospitals, water facilities and public services. Funding must cover maintenance, training and battery replacement. Reliance on private purchases alone risks excluding households unable to afford the initial investment.

Regional connections and Palestinian control

Cooperation with Egypt and Jordan could support diversification. The World Bank’s earlier roadmap identified expanded imports from both countries as an option requiring political and technical action. That possibility should not be confused with capacity available for immediate use.

The value of interconnection depends on its operating conditions. Additional suppliers create meaningful choice only when transmission routes are usable, repair responsibilities are clear and a shared bottleneck cannot disable every alternative. Agreements must specify payment rules, technical access, disruption management and dispute resolution.

Immediate diplomacy should secure regular entry of essential supplies and safe access for repair teams. Grid reconstruction, domestic generation and new interconnections belong to subsequent stages. Keeping these timelines distinct prevents long-term projects from displacing urgent action.

Reconstruction must expand control

Emergency assistance saves lives and cannot await a final political settlement. Donors must nevertheless move beyond a cycle in which infrastructure is repaired, damaged again and submitted for another round of funding. Reconstruction needs protection for facilities, the removal of access restrictions and stronger Palestinian management.

Installed capacity alone is an inadequate measure of success. Reliable hospital operating hours, repair times, spare-parts availability and household affordability offer better tests. Transparent contracts, lower network losses and accountable Palestinian institutions are essential to sustaining progress.

Internal reform cannot compensate for blocked equipment or inaccessible infrastructure. Both administrative capacity and the conditions for exercising it must improve.

Energy sovereignty does not require producing every kilowatt-hour domestically. It means having choices and the ability to sustain services. Every reconstruction project should therefore answer one question: does it increase Palestinian control?

Without a clear answer, new equipment may reproduce old dependence. Palestine’s energy future will change when control over the switch moves closer to Palestinian people and institutions.

OPINION: Israel’s energy paradox: Regional influence, strategic vulnerability

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.