Why europe finds it easier to punish israeli settlers than to pressure israel

For decades, the European Union has said that its relationship with Israel is built not only on trade, science and security cooperation, but also on human rights and international law.

This is not just political language. Article 2 of the EU-Israel Association Agreement says clearly that relations between the two sides are based on respect for human rights and democratic principles. These are described as an “essential element” of the agreement.

But Gaza has exposed the weakness of this language.

Europe is now more willing to sanction individual Israelis linked to extremist settler violence than to use its real economic leverage against the Israeli state itself. This difference is important. It shows that the EU’s problem is not simply that it lacks tools. The tools exist. The question is whether European governments are politically ready to use them.

Europe has principles — but avoids consequences

Europe’s official position on Palestine has not changed much over the years. In 1980, the Venice Declaration recognized the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, called for the Palestine Liberation Organization to be involved in negotiations, and declared Israeli settlements in the occupied territories illegal under international law.

More than forty years later, Europe still says it opposes settlements, rejects annexation, supports a two-state solution, and respects international law.

So the problem is not the absence of principles. The problem is that Europe often refuses to attach real consequences to those principles.

This is not a new failure. For years, scholars and analysts have noted the same gap: Europe has clear positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it rarely turns those positions into real pressure. Gaza did not create this credibility gap. It simply made it impossible to hide.

Article 2 was supposed to matter

The war in Gaza forced European governments to face a difficult question: can Israel continue to enjoy the full benefits of its privileged relationship with the EU while being accused of serious violations of international law and human rights?

In 2025, the EU agreed to review Israel’s compliance with the human-rights obligations in Article 2. The review found indications that Israel was breaching those obligations.

This should have been a major political moment.

For once, Europe was not only expressing “concern”. Its own institutional process had connected Israel’s conduct on the ground to the legal foundation of the EU-Israel relationship.

The real test was simple: if human rights are an “essential element” of the agreement, does violating them carry a cost?

Here, Europe hesitated.

READ: Norway moves to criminalising trade with Israeli settlements, other Western countries consider similar steps

Settlers are easier targets

This hesitation becomes clearer when compared with Europe’s willingness to impose targeted measures on extremist settlers and organizations linked to settlement violence.

At first, this may appear surprising. EU sanctions usually require unanimity, and one member state can block collective action. European officials often use this as an explanation for inaction.

But targeted measures against settlers show that unanimity is not the whole story.

The real difference is political.

Sanctioning a violent settler, an extremist activist, or a group linked to settlement expansion is easier. It can be presented as a narrow measure against the “extremes”. A European government can support it while still saying that its strategic relationship with Israel remains unchanged.

But restricting the benefits Israel receives under the Association Agreement is different. That would move the debate from the actions of a few extremists to the conduct of the Israeli state itself.

This is where Europe becomes cautious.

Symbolic accountability is not enough

This is the heart of the issue.

Europe is more comfortable with symbolic and individual accountability than with structural pressure.

Targeted sanctions may be useful. They can punish some individuals involved in violence. They can send a political message. They can show that Europe is not completely silent.

But they do not address the system that allows settlement expansion and violence to continue.

The EU-Israel relationship is not small. It includes trade, research, technology, political dialogue and economic cooperation. These are powerful forms of leverage. If Europe chose to connect them seriously to human-rights obligations, the cost for Israel would be much higher.

That is exactly why Europe avoids doing it.

Sanctioning settlers allows Europe to condemn the margins of Israeli policy. Economic conditionality would force Europe to confront the center of Israeli policy.

Europe is divided — but this is not the full excuse

Of course, European governments do not all think the same way.

Spain and Ireland have pushed for stronger action and greater use of international law. Germany approaches Israel through a different historical and political framework. Hungary has often used the EU’s unanimity rules to block or weaken common foreign-policy decisions.

These differences matter.

But saying “Europe is divided” does not explain everything. The same Europe that struggles to pressure Israel as a state can still find ways to punish selected settlers. This means the issue is not only institutional. It is also about political will.

Different tools create different political costs. Sanctioning settlers is relatively safe. Pressuring the Israeli state is not. It makes accusations of hostility to Israel, creates tension with Washington, and forces European governments to confront their own contradictions.

READ: EU foreign policy chief backs ‘principled’ trade ban on illegal Israeli settlements

The EU has power — but fears using it

Europe often presents itself as weak in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is misleading.

The EU may not have America’s military dominance, but it has something Israel values deeply: access to one of the world’s largest markets, scientific cooperation, research funding, and a long institutional relationship.

This is real leverage.

The question is not whether Europe has power. The question is whether Europe is willing to use power when the price becomes politically uncomfortable.

The comparison with Russia is unavoidable. When Russia violated international law in Ukraine, Europe did not limit itself to statements or symbolic measures. Economic relations themselves became part of the pressure.

With Israel, Europe often separates criticism from consequences. It condemns violations but protects the relationship. It speaks of human rights but hesitates to touch trade. It opposes settlements but avoids challenging the state structures that sustain them.

Europe has made a choice

Europe’s failure is not only paralysis. It is also choice.

European governments have shown that they can act when the target is narrow and the political cost is controlled. They can sanction settlers. They can condemn extremist groups. They can issue statements about international law.

But Article 2 asks a harder question: can Israel continue to receive the benefits of a privileged European relationship when the EU itself finds serious human-rights concerns under the clause that legally supports that relationship?

Until Europe answers this through policy, not words, its approach will remain limited.

Sanctioning settlers matters. But it is not enough.

It may punish some people involved in abuse. It may protect Europe from the accusation of doing nothing. But it will not change the structures that allow settlement expansion, occupation and violence to continue.

That is why the real test of European policy is no longer whether Brussels can find another settler to sanction.

The real test is whether Europe is ready to use the leverage it already has.

So far, Europe has preferred the easier path: punish the settler, protect the relationship, and avoid confronting the state.

But if human rights are truly an “essential element” of the EU-Israel relationship, then Europe must prove that the phrase still means something.

OPINION: Has Hamas ended?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.