The Knesset election and the prospect of meaningful Palestinian political participation

Could this election usher in a new era of meaningful Palestinian political participation?

Tuesday’s election took place amid deep polarisation in Israeli society between those seeking to keep Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in power and those determined to remove him. This divide may make little difference to Palestinians on fundamental issues concerning the future of their cause, but it could bring immediate changes to their living conditions, both within the Green Line – the 1949 armistice line separating Israel from the territories it occupied in 1967 – and beyond it. These changes chiefly concern a reduction in the current escalation, which Netanyahu’s government has fuelled since taking office in 2022, particularly following the events of 7 October the following year.

What could mark the beginning of a more profound change, however, is the scale of Palestinian participation in this election. Preliminary estimates put Palestinian turnout at around 80 per cent; between 1999 and 2022, it ranged from a high of approximately 75 per cent in 1999 to a low of 44.6 per cent in 2021. What prompted Palestinian citizens of Israel to turn out in such large numbers? Did elites play a role in the success of this mobilisation? More importantly, what role might the Palestinian vote play in future decision-making within a state where Palestinians constitute roughly one-fifth of the population, yet which makes no attempt to conceal its drive to entrench religious purity?

A study examining Palestinian towns within the Green Line suggests that Palestinian voter turnout in Knesset elections is closely linked to political considerations. It found a substantial decline in turnout in the elections following the Al-Aqsa Intifada at the beginning of this century, attributing the decline to political exclusion and the repercussions of the events of October 2000, when Israeli police killed 13 Palestinian protesters, for relations between Palestinians and the state.

By contrast, Arab turnout rose markedly in the first election after the Oslo Accords, held on 29 May, 1996, reaching approximately 77 per cent, compared with 69.7 per cent in 1992, an increase of 7.3 percentage points. Palestinian participation in the current Knesset election is being described as historic, with preliminary turnout figures reaching 80 per cent.

Palestinian citizens of Israel have faced worsening challenges under Netanyahu’s current government compared with previous periods, including personal security, civil liberties, development budgets and housing. These problems did not begin with this government. Long-standing social and economic disparities between Arab and Jewish communities were already evident in educational and employment opportunities, infrastructure and public services, alongside an intractable and escalating crisis of violence and crime within Palestinian society.

Personal security has become the most pressing of these challenges. Figures documented by The Abraham Initiatives, an Arab-Jewish civil society organisation, show that the number of Palestinian victims of violence and crime rose from 116 in 2022 to 244 in 2023, followed by 230 in 2024 and 252 in 2025, more than double the figure recorded before the current government took office. This escalation has not been accompanied by effective accountability. The Times of Israel reported that Israeli police solved only around 10 per cent of murders within the Palestinian community in 2025. A 2024 opinion poll identified violence and crime as the greatest challenge facing Palestinian society within the Green Line.

Alongside the deterioration in personal security, Palestinian citizens of Israel have faced increasing restrictions on freedom of opinion, expression and protest under Netanyahu’s current government, particularly since 7 October, 2023. Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has documented investigations, arrests and legal proceedings arising from social media posts and online protest activities, including statements falling within the scope of freedom of expression, such as opposition to the targeting of civilians and solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. These restrictions have extended beyond the online sphere to include sweeping limitations on organising anti-war demonstrations and the use of measures to silence Palestinian criticism.

These challenges extend to education, employment, infrastructure and the capacity of local authorities to provide services in Palestinian communities. A report published by the Knesset Research and Information Center in March 2026 documented a decline in both funding allocations and the implementation of development programmes for Palestinian towns between 2022 and 2024. Press reports revealed that in December 2025 the government approved the transfer of approximately 220 million shekels ($68 million) from a civilian development plan to the police and the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security agency, diverting resources partly earmarked for building classrooms and supporting cultural institutions and youth centres in Palestinian towns. Human rights organisations and the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities also filed a petition with the High Court challenging the government’s decision in July to reallocate 496.9 million shekels ($162 million) from the five-year development plan (Government Resolution 550) to the police and the Shin Bet.

These pressures also extend to escalating demolitions and displacement in the Negev, where the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, an Arab-Jewish rights group, documented 5,187 demolitions of buildings and structures in 2024, an increase of 58 per cent over the previous year. Among the most prominent cases was the demolition of dozens of homes in the village of Wadi Al-Khalil, leaving hundreds of Palestinians homeless. These policies pursued by Netanyahu’s government against Palestinians within the Green Line intersect with even harsher and more complex policies targeting Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, which explains the anxiety and mounting fears surrounding the government’s intentions.

These factors, together with Palestinian party elites’ awareness of them, may have played a significant role in guiding, mobilising and encouraging the public to vote in this election. The two Palestinian electoral lists, the Joint List and the United Arab List (Ra’am), conducted campaigns relatively free of mutual attacks compared with previous campaigns. They emphasised that strengthening the lists’ electoral position would make it harder to form a new government including extremist ministers.

Activists and community leaders also played a role in encouraging different segments of society to vote and avoid provocations that could obstruct access to polling stations. The electoral messaging of some of these elites reflected a political evolution that had unfolded over the years and matured in response to the Netanyahu government’s policies targeting Palestinians.

The significance of Palestinian participation in Knesset elections lies in its ability to tip the political balance, as Palestinian seats in the Knesset can help determine whether a government is formed or remains in power. Following the withdrawal of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party from Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s government in 1993, the government remained in office despite its parliamentary support falling to 56 seats, relying on outside backing from five Knesset members belonging to factions representing Palestinian society.

In 2021, the participation of Ra’am in the coalition led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid helped form the government that replaced Netanyahu’s. The influence of Palestinian parliamentary factions also extends to the passage of legislation and budgets benefiting Palestinian communities within the Green Line. Palestinian parties, working alongside local authority leaders and civil society organisations, have helped advance government plans to narrow disparities between Jewish and Palestinian communities. Palestinian representation in the Knesset has also enabled issues affecting Palestinians to be placed on the parliamentary agenda and referred to its committees, including the demolition of homes in Qalansawe, which was brought before the Interior Committee, and the issue of Palestinian workers’ wages, which was raised before the Labour Committee.

Broader Palestinian representation could place Palestinian parties among the larger forces in the Knesset and enable them to influence decision-making to a limited extent. As past experience suggests, however, an increase in seats does not automatically translate into substantive influence over decisions or a change in political direction. Such influence remains confined to the avenues outlined above, particularly when it comes to decisions affecting the fate of Palestinians. It is therefore necessary not only to sustain and organise greater Palestinian electoral participation, but also to draw on left-wing and centrist voices within the Green Line, particularly those sympathetic to Palestinian rights and the justice of their cause, both in the Knesset and on the streets. These voices should be supported, both to strengthen their standing and to invest in partnership with them.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.