Gadi Eisenkot’s Coalition Challenge

Israel faces a defining political moment as Gadi Eisenkot attempts to assemble a new governing coalition. His four principles offer a framework for national renewal, but the arithmetic of the Knesset, ideological divisions and the question of Arab political participation threaten to complicate his ambitions.

Israel’s political landscape has entered another critical period. Following the October 27, 2026 general election, the country faces a familiar but increasingly urgent question: who can assemble a government capable of governing effectively, restoring public confidence and addressing the deep divisions within Israeli society?

At the centre of this political contest stands Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar party and former Israel Defense Forces chief of staff. Having campaigned on a promise to change the country’s political direction, Eisenkot now faces the difficult task of translating electoral support into a functioning parliamentary majority.

His approach is based on four principles which he says should form the foundation of any government he leads. He has declared that any member of the Knesset willing to accept these principles could become a potential partner.

It is an ambitious attempt to move beyond traditional political divisions. But the question remains whether the principles can provide a sufficiently broad basis for government without forcing Eisenkot and his prospective partners to abandon commitments made to voters during the election campaign.

The election arithmetic presents the first obstacle

Israel’s parliamentary system makes coalition-building essential. The Knesset has 120 members, meaning that a government generally needs the support of at least 61 legislators to command a majority.

The election results have produced a complicated situation.

Eisenkot’s Yashar party secured 21 seats, while the wider opposition bloc aligned against Benjamin Netanyahu won 48. Netanyahu’s Likud secured 27 seats, and his supporting political bloc reached 53.

The Arab parties won a combined 19 seats.

Neither principal political bloc has an outright majority.

This means that Eisenkot must find additional parliamentary support if he is to become prime minister and establish a stable administration.

The obvious mathematical possibility is cooperation with Arab parties. Together, the opposition bloc and the Arab parties could potentially command 67 seats.

However, political arithmetic is not the same as political agreement.

Several parties within Eisenkot’s prospective coalition have made strong campaign commitments against forming a government with Arab parties. Avigdor Liberman, leader of Yisrael Beytenu, has particularly clear reservations.

Eisenkot must therefore find a way to reconcile the parliamentary numbers with the political promises made to his supporters.

Four principles for a new Israel

Eisenkot’s proposed coalition is built around four fundamental commitments.

The first is recognition of Israel as a Jewish, democratic, liberal and egalitarian state.

The second is a commitment to the values expressed in Israel’s Declaration of Independence. These include equality, freedom, justice and the aspiration to build a society in which citizens enjoy equal rights irrespective of religion, ethnicity or background.

The third principle concerns national service. Eisenkot wants military, national or civilian service to become a universal obligation for Israeli citizens.

The fourth is recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organisation and a commitment to eliminating its military and governing capabilities in Gaza.

These principles are intended to provide a common political foundation for a broad government.

Eisenkot argues that the next administration should not simply represent one political camp defeating another. Instead, it should reflect a broader national consensus.

His invitation to any Knesset member willing to endorse these principles is politically significant. It potentially opens the door to legislators from outside his immediate political alliance.

Nevertheless, the principles also contain difficult questions.

For example, universal national service would require a fundamental change in the relationship between the state and communities that have historically received exemptions from military service.

Similarly, the commitment concerning Hamas raises questions about the future of Gaza, Israel’s security requirements and the long-term political arrangements necessary to prevent another cycle of violence.

The principles provide a starting point, but turning them into legislation and government policy will require detailed negotiations.

The Arab parties: The decisive political question

Perhaps the most controversial issue confronting Eisenkot is whether a government can be established with the support of Arab political parties.

The combined 19 seats held by Arab parties could provide the parliamentary support needed to establish an alternative government.

Yet the issue is deeply contentious within Israeli politics.

Eisenkot previously indicated that Arab parties did not meet his conditions for participation in his proposed government. His position has therefore created a difficult distinction between political cooperation and actual coalition membership.

There are several possible arrangements.

One would involve Arab parties joining the government as full coalition partners.

Another would involve an administration formed by Jewish-led parties but dependent on Arab parliamentary support from outside the government.

A third possibility would involve negotiating agreements on specific legislation, budgets and parliamentary confidence votes without establishing a formal coalition partnership.

Each arrangement has advantages and disadvantages.

Full participation could provide a stronger parliamentary majority, but it would encounter substantial resistance among sections of the Jewish electorate and within several opposition parties.

External support might be more politically acceptable to some coalition partners, but it could leave the government vulnerable to parliamentary instability.

The underlying question is whether Arab citizens, who are an integral part of Israel’s population, can participate meaningfully in determining the country’s political future.

A genuinely democratic system must recognise the political rights of all its citizens. At the same time, any government must negotiate a workable agreement on security, national identity and shared responsibilities.

The challenge is to move beyond political slogans and establish practical arrangements that command sufficient public and parliamentary support.

The ultra-Orthodox question cannot be avoided

Another major obstacle concerns the ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, parties. Shas and United Torah Judaism collectively hold 13 seats. Their support could potentially provide Eisenkot with another route towards a parliamentary majority.

But there is a substantial problem. The opposition parties campaigned on ending the longstanding exemptions that have allowed many ultra-Orthodox men to avoid compulsory military service.

Eisenkot has made universal national service one of his four central principles.

The Haredi parties, however, have traditionally defended arrangements allowing significant exemptions for their communities. Consequently, a coalition agreement with these parties would require difficult compromises.

Liberman has indicated that he would have no problem working with parties that accept his principles and support legislation requiring Haredi participation in national service. This suggests that the issue may not be an absolute refusal to negotiate, but rather the terms on which an agreement could be reached.

The question of military service has become particularly sensitive after years of conflict and growing pressure on Israel’s regular and reserve forces. Many Israeli families have experienced repeated military deployments. The demand for a fairer distribution of national responsibilities has consequently become a major political issue.

Eisenkot, with his military background, is particularly well placed to understand the operational and social consequences of this imbalance. However, he will need to establish a policy that is both fair and implementable. Liberman’s support strengthens Eisenkot’s position

One important development came on November 2, when Avigdor Liberman announced that Yisrael Beytenu would recommend Eisenkot to President Isaac Herzog as the candidate to form the next government. Liberman’s party has seven seats. His endorsement is significant because it strengthens Eisenkot’s claim to be the principal candidate of the opposition bloc.

Liberman has also ruled out joining a government led by Netanyahu or supporting a minority government dependent on Arab parties. He has, however, indicated greater flexibility concerning cooperation with ultra-Orthodox parties if they accept his principles and a law establishing compulsory service.

Meanwhile, former prime minister Naftali Bennett has also backed Eisenkot. The opposition leaders are expected to coordinate their efforts, with Yair Lapid receiving support from Liberman for the position of Knesset speaker. These developments suggest that the opposition is beginning to consolidate around Eisenkot’s leadership. Nevertheless, agreement on who should become prime minister does not automatically resolve the more difficult questions surrounding the composition and policies of the government.

Netanyahu remains a formidable obstacle

Although Netanyahu’s political bloc failed to secure a parliamentary majority, the prime minister remains a significant force. His Likud party won 27 seats, and his wider bloc secured 53.

The possibility of defections from either political camp could alter the parliamentary balance. Eisenkot has an incentive to attract individual legislators who might be prepared to support a new government, particularly if they believe that another election would be damaging to the country.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, has every reason to prevent the opposition from establishing a stable majority. The possibility of a national unity government has also been discussed, but it would involve a major political reversal.

Eisenkot, Bennett, Liberman and Golan have all campaigned against continuing under Netanyahu’s leadership. Joining a government headed by him would therefore carry a substantial political cost. For Eisenkot, the challenge is to demonstrate that his proposed alternative is viable without sacrificing the commitments that brought his supporters to the polls. Restoring public confidence must become a priority

Beyond the immediate parliamentary negotiations, Israel faces a much larger national challenge. The country has experienced years of political confrontation, security crises, social divisions and disagreements over the role of its democratic institutions.

The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and the subsequent wars have intensified public anxiety and exposed weaknesses in national preparedness. The next government will have to address questions of security, accountability, military preparedness, economic recovery and social cohesion.

Eisenkot has indicated that his priorities include establishing a state commission of inquiry, introducing universal national service, improving conditions for military personnel and reversing legislation associated with the judicial overhaul. These are substantial commitments.

A state commission of inquiry, in particular, could become an important instrument for restoring confidence in public institutions by examining failures and establishing accountability.

The judicial overhaul issue will also require careful handling. Israel needs institutions that are independent, effective and trusted across political divisions. Any reform should strengthen democratic accountability rather than simply transfer political power from one group to another.

Economic policy will be equally important. Israel must address the financial consequences of prolonged conflict, support businesses and households, maintain international confidence and ensure that the costs of national security are distributed fairly.

The real test of Eisenkot’s leadership

Eisenkot’s four principles provide a clear political framework. They also offer an opportunity to redefine the relationship between the state and its citizens. But a successful coalition requires more than a declaration of values. It requires a credible agreement on national service, security policy, relations with Arab citizens, religious institutions, economic priorities and the future of Israel’s democratic institutions.

The coming negotiations will reveal whether the opposition parties are prepared to place national objectives above their individual political interests. Eisenkot must demonstrate that he can negotiate without abandoning his central commitments. His prospective partners must also recognise that coalition government inevitably requires compromise. There is a danger that the parties will become so preoccupied with red lines and political calculations that they lose sight of the larger responsibility entrusted to them by voters.

Another election would prolong uncertainty and deepen public frustration. Israel needs a government capable of making difficult decisions, responding to security challenges and rebuilding confidence in its political system. The opportunity before Eisenkot is therefore considerable.

He has the support of important opposition leaders, a substantial parliamentary presence and a political programme built around national consensus. But he does not yet have the numbers required for a secure government.

Ultimately, his success will depend on whether he can transform four principles into a practical agreement that brings together enough legislators to govern. The central question is no longer simply whether Netanyahu can be replaced. It is whether Israel’s political leaders can construct a government that is more inclusive, more accountable and better equipped to meet the country’s extraordinary challenges.

That is the real test of Gadi Eisenkot’s leadership — and potentially a defining moment for Israel’s democratic future.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.