Control of Sana’a does not mean control over Yemen

Today, another Arab country, Yemen, is at risk of division as its society is fragmented. The country seems vulnerable to foreign intervention. It is an example of yet another Arab government standing by in silence, not reacting to what is going on apart from emotional statements.

In fact, the events that rocked Yemen and led to Houthi control over the capital Sana’a have confirmed the flaws of societal and state structures in the Arab world. This has also been experienced in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon and Sudan. The evidence can be seen in the fragility of Arab societies, which appear as self-centred social units based on identity, ethnicity, religion, tribe or region. There is a lack of social integration, not least because the states are rarely built upon institutions, the rule of law and citizens who are equal and free.

As such, when these societies are exposed to challenges, external shocks or internal unrest, all of which have occurred in Arab counties, we see them split into fragmented social blocs.

There is no doubt that the reality represented by the absence of genuine citizenship, the rule of law and institutions impedes the development of civil society; individuals therein are helpless in the face of tyrannical, dictatorial, ethnic, tribal and regional groups and gangs. The latter turn easily into localised militias capable of imposing their dominance over specific areas, especially when encouraged and given resources by internal or external forces. It is obvious that when these groups grow stronger, they seek to expand their influence at the expense of groups in other areas by violent means; the centralised state power suffers as a result.

Looking at the experiences of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen we can see that most of the Arab regimes were founded on the basis of their role providing security in the region, concerned mainly with maximising their moral and material resources and expanding their ability to reproduce themselves. It is also obvious that this is only possible by reducing or minimising the moral resources of individual citizens and communities.

This not only weakens societies and individuals, however, but also the state because it limits its political, economic and social functions, and focuses on the development of its authority. This only makes it strong internally, but keeps it fragile and weak against external challenges. This is possibly the result of the rule of families in Arab countries, which explains the collapse of the state and societies in the aforementioned countries over the past few years. This has left Arab states exposed to external interference primarily because regimes have focused on maintaining control over their citizens; they have not prepared them to face cross border threats.

Thus, we witnessed the break-up of the once solid Iraqi regime, despite its strength and power, in a matter of three weeks during the US invasion of 2003; in 2011 we witnessed the similar collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. Accordingly, it is evident that regional counties such as Israel, Iran and Turkey seem more effective and capable of addressing issues within the Arab world, more than any Arab country. This is truer with regards to the interventions of the global superpowers, especially the United States.

It is worth noting that what occurred in Yemen did not happen overnight; it came through a series of events witnessed by the Arab world and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but they did nothing about them. This is what they did to the Lebanese, Palestinians, Iraqis and Syrians; they left them alone to deal with their own problems.

This can be considered one of the most important developments in the Arab region over the past four years, as it means that the Gulf States are in direct contact with the challenge posed by Iran to the Arab world, governments and communities. It also means that Iran is getting closer to controlling the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and consequently, the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb. In other words, Iran is now posing a strategic challenge to Egypt as well.

It is also worth noting in this context that some Iranian leaders have not bothered to hide their pleasure with what is occurring in Yemen nor have they refrained from expressing their ambitions, given that their country is now controlling four Arab capitals in Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and Sana’a. They have even gone as far as to gloat that their regional influence now extends from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea.

The GCC was satisfied by issuing a statement condemning the “coup” staged by the Houthis in Yemen, describing it as “a dangerous escalation that is completely unacceptable [which] blatantly contradicts the approach of pluralism and coexistence, for which Yemen was known.” This, continued the GCC, “puts Yemen’s security, stability, sovereignty and unity at risk.” The Gulf organisation also said that the “Constitutional Declaration” issued by the Houthis is “a complete annihilation of the peaceful political process in which all of the Yemeni political forces were involved”, and a disregard for the national, regional and international efforts that sought to preserve Yemen’s security, stability and unity necessary to fulfil the aspirations of the Yemeni people.

From this we conclude that the problem is with the Houthis. There are certainly Houthis who are an element of the Yemini people, who are neither doctrinal nor sectarian and do not promote their own demands. These can be summed up as their commitment to Iran’s regional project, which is a blatant attempt to reproduce the Lebanese and Iraqi experience; and their deliberate use of brute force to impose their own agenda. It is worth noting that the Yemenis amazed the world with the organisation of the popular bloc in the demonstrations held in most of Yemen’s public squares four years ago.

To be more specific, this development in the Arabian Peninsula can be considered a direct blow to the Gulf States and an unprecedented threat to the region’s security and stability. It can also be seen as an insult to the efforts made by the GCC to resolve the Yemeni crisis by easing the stepping down of the former president and the establishment of a transitional phase.

In this context, and in the face of this grave situation, it is perhaps worth talking frankly, even if it is painful, about the policy pursued by the Gulf States in Yemen. In particular, we must look at the policy of neglect and marginalisation through rejecting Yemen as a member of the GCC, which has put at least some of the responsibility for what has happened in Yemen on the Gulf States.

It is well-known that we are referring to countries which account for 60 per cent of the Arab GNP (Saudi Arabia alone accounts for 25 per cent), while noting that the population of GCC states only accounts for 14 per cent of the total population across the Arab world. This means that they possess the economic and financial capabilities to mitigate the problems experienced by Yemen, at least in terms of the theory of regional security.

A GCC embrace of Yemen would have protected the country from Iran’s interference and strengthened its stability. At the same time, the Gulf would have added Yemen as a force working in favour of the GCC to face the challenges posed by Iran.

In an attempt to deduce the prospects of the Yemeni situation, we need to consider the possible division of Yemen into more than one state. The most likely scenario in this regard is the return of what was known as South Yemen along with a possible third state in the provinces beyond the influence of the Houthis. This appears to be on the agenda for discussion by tribal leaders in the provinces of Marib, Al-Jawf and Al-Bayda’ in response to the coup and as a reaction to the Houthis’ control of Sana’a.

Such a scenario may be the simplest when compared with the potential for armed conflict across Yemen. That would be even more uncontrollable, with foreign interventions and the country flooded with arms. There is no doubt that foreign interventions, especially from Iran, could promote such a possibility. It is obvious that the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, as well as, perhaps, Egypt, who stand to be damaged by any expansion of Iranian influence in Yemen, would not stand idly by as they have done in the past.

There is also a third scenario which involves some Arab countries moving towards their own military intervention in Yemen, similar to what happened in Bahrain, in order to restore stability and preserve Yemen’s unity. However, this is unlikely and can probably be ruled out given that it would achieve little and may pose a significant risk to the countries concerned, based on their earlier experiences in Yemen.

A fourth possibility is the revival of the Yemeni revolution which so influenced the youth of the country four years ago. The world was amazed by its organisation, peaceful nature, patience and persistence; this may allow Yemen to overcome this latest ordeal and restore the unity of Yemen’s land, people and institutions.

Whatever happens, it does not seem that the story in Yemen will end the way that it stands at the moment, not least because it is a country that has demonstrated throughout history that it does not submit to external control and cannot be governed by force. Yemenis will rebel against the Houthis and anyone who follows them, just as they have done in the past against others. Control over Sana’a does not mean control over Yemen or the Yemenis.

Translated from Al Jazeera net, 22 February, 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.