The transcendence of religion over politics: Lessons from Egypt

I must begin by stating that any critical approach to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt must be accompanied by an important correction of the impression promoted by its opponents that suggest that the Brotherhood had been ruling Egypt since the days of Muhammad Ali, and that they had suppressed and silenced their opponents. This claim is false and intends to distort the facts on the ground. The accusation I direct at the Brotherhood is that they failed to protect, empower and defend democracy, while their opponents have in the past been, and still continue to be, promoters and supporters of dictatorship. As in the words of Imam Ali ibn Talib: “Those who seek the truth but fail are not like those who seek falsehood and realise it.”

I am also not arguing for the malignancy of the “revolution” staged against Morsi’s government because in truth, there was no such thing as “Morsi’s government” or the “Brotherhood’s government” to revolt against. What existed at the time was a democratic government that was subject to the rule of law and state institutions, so accusing Morsi and the Brotherhood of oppression and domination is false and wrong. Those who directed this accusation, such as his interior and defence ministers, publically stated that they did not obey him. So how can someone who is not being obeyed be controlling and oppressive? How could the Brotherhood have “Ikhwanified” the state and taken control of it if they were unable to defend their headquarters, which were burned down by the thugs who are now ruling Egypt? Also, how can Morsi and his government be accused of failing to resolve Egypt’s economic problems, or indeed any other of the country’s problems, if they were unable to rule or govern effectively?

The goal of undermining democracy has been admitted by the coup leaders and their supporters, and they have been eternally unable to lure the people to their side because those who are confident in themselves do not need to hide behind thugs and soldiers who betray the will and authority of the people. Perhaps the greatest evidence of this is their constant avoidance of holding parliamentary elections, which the Brotherhood has been banned from participating in. They even fear the Brotherhood while they are in prison!

Such clarifications are necessary in order for my criticisms of the Brotherhood not to be interpreted as agreement and approval of the slander being committed against them by liars. I am merely addressing the movement’s actions in the context of religion, and of course, all the while, I am assuming they had the best of intentions; there is no doubt about this. In a previous article, I have addressed some of the problems with modern Islamist movements in the Jordanian context – and the Brotherhood is considered by all to be the mother of Islamist movements and the origin of all. Despite the emergence of many other independent Islamist movements, the “Brotherhood model” has remained dominant in the Muslim arena in the Arab world, and this may, in fact, be the problem.

Islamist movements emerged to challenge what some described as the “alienation” of Islam and its isolation from modern societies, i.e. what is known as the secular phenomenon which first manifested in Western societies and resulted in the gradual removing of religious influences from daily life. There have been long discussions and debates regarding these definitions and what they entail, but there is no time for me to delve into such debates here. I will only point out that the manifestations of secularism in the Islamic world did not result from internal conflicts and religious and philosophical jurisprudence, as was the case in the West; it was imposed as a fait accompli by colonialism before being embraced by and promoted by certain sections of the elites. This contributed to the almost complete collapse of traditional religious institutions and their inability to face the challenges of modernity. When Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna and his generation rose up to confront these challenges, society in the Muslim world had already split into religious leaders who remained out of touch with the times and ineffective on the one side, and a dominant modern elite that abandoned religion and almost melted into Western culture on the other. At the same time, ordinary citizens found themselves drowning in ignorance and poverty and unable to exert any influence on either the religious or political establishment.

The emerging Islamist revival strategy revolved around building an alternative modernist elite committed to using religion and its development to keep up with the times; thus utilising modern means of reviving religious knowledge, and reviving the marginalised religious elements of society through education and awareness in order to overpower the dominating elite backed by the colonial system. This was a difficult task on all levels and by every standard, especially due to the fact that those who emerged at the forefront of this movement were mostly small groups with humble capabilities and knowledge. Al-Banna was a twenty-something schoolteacher when he stepped up to carry out this task, and he was joined by six other men who were not educated and needed to be taught the basics, beginning with how to perform ablution for prayer. Add to this the number of other supporters and followers, including a group of students, and you have only a small minority who were able to step up to the complicated civilizational task of re-introducing religion to society. This was simultaneously an intellectual task, in that it had a moral and spiritual aspect, a social task, as it required organisation, teaching, and training, and a political task requiring the challenging of dominant internal and external forces, as well as organising the ranks of the “resistance”.

What mostly fuelled these groups was their religious enthusiasm and intense dislike of the dominant secular system, which these groups viewed as the abandonment of religious and traditional values. However, they did not have the intellectual ammunition to challenge modernist thought, so they turned to Islamist intellectuals such as Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, and Bin Ashour. However, the thoughts and writings of such scholars were merely primary reflections and experimental attempts on the principles of adapting Islam to modernity, not practical guidelines. As such, the Islamist movements had to produce their ideology, so to speak, on the battlefield; and thus it was that Al-Banna and Al-Mawdudi’s ideas filled the gap.

These movements engaged in battles on several fronts: with traditional clerics, the dominating modernist elites, and of course with the rulers and authorities in the country, which were still firmly under the thumb of colonialism. This led to confrontations and setbacks that hampered the movements’ intellectual contributions and productions, especially since they had to work underground or from prison. The movements also joined a number of alliances that impacted them, especially the alliance with the Gulf countries and some of the more traditional parties in society, all of which came with a price.

This brings me back to the fundamental point of my argument: how to spare religious discourse from politicisation, i.e. away from desires or interests of political elites and players. First, the task of national indoctrination cannot be limited to a small number of men who mostly possessed limited knowledge and capabilities. Before all of this, we must take a critical look at the previous religious concessions and delusions taking place in the political market, which occurs in the midst of political alignments.

This, in turn, requires putting the conflicts in which the movement has been involved into its comprehensive framework. Not anyone who challenges or disagrees with the movement is opposed to the idea of Islamist revival, and not every one of its steps are successful or devoid of any vested interests; we all know that in this case, those who targeted the movement were wrong because by doing so they targeted democracy, the Egyptian people, and all sources of good in the country. However, this is still not the complete story.

I will hopefully continue it.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.