Does Iran plan to ignite Bahrain and mobilise the Shia of Saudi Arabia?

Lebanese Hezbollah circles are preoccupied with following the news of the advance of the Houthis towards Aden and the prospects of their control over the south of Yemen. Such circles are also preoccupied with monitoring the Saudi and Gulf reactions to the latest developments and whether they will progress in the manner witnessed in Bahrain, with external military intervention by the “Peninsula Shield Forces” or direct Saudi involvement.

A source with links to the upper echelons of Hezbollah has told Arabi21 that the pleasure expressed within the spheres of Iranian influence by the advance of the Houthis does not conceal the huge concern about what is going on in Yemen. The party’s leadership understands that possible repercussions, including interventions, will increase the sectarian polarisation across the region. There is also concern about the potential for expanding the number of conflicts in which Iran is already embroiled at one level or another; they coincide with a considerable economic crisis in Tehran due to the reduction in oil prices. The situation may even lead to Iran signing a nuclear agreement, despite the unwillingness of the Revolutionary Guards, as one way to get sanctions lifted and improve the state’s financial situation.

It is claimed that Hezbollah’s leaders can see the Iranian crisis forcing more serious decisions to be made in the face of ever more flashpoints in the Middle East. According to them, Tehran believes that Saudi Arabia may not hold back from extending support to the “Takfiri” groups of militant Sunnis in response to the Houthis taking over in Yemen. Such groups could then be empowered to tackle Shia militias in much the same way that they do in Iraq.

Hezbollah is worried that Tehran may open a new front in an effort to exhaust the Saudi and Gulf efforts. This may take place in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, where Shia are in the majority; the Iranians could provide arms to mobilise Shia groups in both countries. Many young Bahraini Shia have received military training in Iran and Lebanon, so this is not a far-fetched possibility.

However, it will not be so easy for the Shia in Saudi Arabia, which has a strong government and a population that is already opposed to them. This would guarantee popular support for any government steps to suppress the Shia, even if their mobilisation is limited to peaceful demonstrations.

The leadership of Hezbollah has nothing to offer apart from advice. The final say will be with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, especially for Major-General Qasem Suleimani. It appears that the head of the guards’ Quds Force is already looking at the situation through the lens of martyrdom. He has been seen travelling between the war fronts in Iraq and Syria despite the extreme difficulties that this involves and the fact that so little has been accomplished. This is what prompted him to lift the veto on asking for assistance from the US-led coalition to settle the battle for Takrit, which he had promised to decide weeks ago without success.

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