The scenario of the city of Mosul falling into the hands of ISIS is being repeated in the fall of Ramadi in Al-Anbar governorate and the group’s seizure of military equipment and heavy weapons following the Iraqi government forces’ retreat. ISIS succeeded in spreading its influence over large areas in a matter of hours. All of this raises a number of questions and doubts regarding the ability of the Iraqi government, headed by religious parties affiliated with Iran, to lead the country and unite all of the people of Iraq – Shia, Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities included.
This latest ISIS success and military setback for the Iraqi army comes despite the fact that large sums of money have been spent on rebuilding the armed forces in the country since 2003 and the political and military dependency on the West. This was evident in the US-NATO strategy against ISIS and the air strikes aimed at stopping its expansion within Iraq. The fall of Ramadi, not far from the capital, Baghdad, is confirmation of the difficulty yet to come with regards to liberating Mosul in the far north.
It has become apparent that Ramadi’s loss has put a halt to the arrangements for liberating Mosul; this is complicated further by the fact that Sunnis no longer have influence within the Iraqi government, which is led by Shia religious parties. Moreover, the involvement of the armed Iranian Popular Mobilisation Forces and the tendency of the ruling parties to take action towards doctrinal entrenchment seem to suggest that they will try to save face in order to ensure that Baghdad continues to govern Iraq. In addition, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps have been allowed to establish footholds on the borders with Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, in line with Tehran’s regional conflict and its involvement by proxy in sectarian wars, as in Yemen. This heralds the probability of a Shia-Sunni collision on the ground in Iraq; like it or not, the victims of the bloodbath that will occur in the city of Ramadi will be us, the Iraqis.
ISIS control of Ramadi not only reflects the failure of the strategy adopted by Haider Al-Abadi’s government against the Sunnis, but also reveals how unclear the US strategy is in Iraq and its ambiguous role in maintaining the country’s unity. The fall of Ramadi to ISIS will give renewed momentum to the ethnic extremism equation and to the escalation and agitation of the sectarian war. This is especially true because 25,000 residents of Ramadi were recently displaced from their city, and thousands are sleeping out in the open. At the same time, the Iraqi government and its religious backers are rejecting the US draft resolution which provides for the arming of the Sunnis and Kurds in Iraq, and are continuing to support the Shia militias.
What kind of legitimacy does a state have which is governed by factional parties that do not represent the entire spectrum of Iraqi society? Is there legitimacy for a state that does not have a national army capable of protecting the unity of the country and its land? Is there legitimacy in a state that resorts to the protection of the Iranian Popular Mobilisation Forces and prevents other factions from possessing arms under the pretext of the state’s control of arms and the prevention of them spreading beyond the scope of the government? Baghdad sees the arming of the Sunni Arabs and Kurds merely as an American plot to divide Iraq and end its sectarian government loyal to Iran.
The intensity of the recent statements made by the head of the government in rejecting the US project to arm the Kurds and Sunni Arabs in order to face the danger posed by ISIS, and the government’s accusation that America (which put it into power in the first place) is working to divide Iraq, prove the religious parties’ intentions to tip the current sectarian scale in favour of doctrinal extremism. The warning issued by the head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, Ammar Al-Hakim, regarding the danger of division was no more realistic than any of the other statements made. While the ruling religious parties are competing to express their loyalty to Iran and lend it a helping hand in its occupation of Iraq, and while Iraqis are being displaced and prevented from entering the Iraqi capital for security and safety, the official discourse of the Iraqi government, including its warnings against the division of Iraq, is entirely false and is not conducive to a comprehensive and unifying national project that guarantees all citizens their rights. Instead, it is a sectarian discourse reinforced by its factional nature, and which considers its loyalty to Iran and sectarianism as top priority.
If Ramadi falls completely under ISIS control and suffers the same fate as Mosul, God forbid, millions of Iraqis will see it as another conspiracy. It will be a fatal blow to the religious factional parties affiliated with Iran and will lead to the decline of its failed sectarian project, the responsibly for which lies on the shoulders of the doctrinal parties. This led to the loss and division of Iraq amongst the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds. This can all be traced back to these parties’ insistence on governing the Iraqis in a sectarian tyrannical manner with blind dependency on the mullahs and Tehran.
Translated from Al Quds Al Arabi 27 May, 2015
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