What's gone wrong with the Turkey-Kurdish peace process?

On 20 July, a deadly suicide bombing, plotted by Daesh according to Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, killed 32 and wounded more than 100 in the south-east border town of Suruc in Turkey. Suruc is around 8 miles from the Syrian town of Kobani where heavy clashes have taken place between Kurdish and Daesh fighters over the past year or so. Those who were killed in the bombing were mostly university students who were ready and willing to deliver humanitarian aid to Kobani.

In the aftermath of the Suruc bombing, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) killed two Turkish policemen as a response, allegedly because the Turkish government has turned a blind eye to Daesh and directed it against the PKK. These two incidents have so far led to a wave of violence by Turkey and the PKK which halted the already fragile peace process between them. However, the increase in violence should be seen more as an outcome, rather than a cause, of the peace freeze. It is an outcome due to the decline in mutual trust between the two over the past year for which there are domestic and external reasons.

Externally, the fight between Daesh and the pro-PKK Democratic Union Party (PYD) in northern Syria since the 2014 siege of Kobani has made the PYD the primary ally of the United States and the anti-Daesh coalition on the ground. Despite the peace process with the PKK at home, the Turkish government has always been concerned and sceptical about the empowerment of a pro-PKK group in northern Syria, especially as a major Western ally. Since then, Turkish foreign policy has hesitated about how to approach this new reality. At times, Turkey has seemed to be engaging in strategic partnership with the PYD, as seen in the relocation of the tomb of Suleyman Sah (the grandfather of the Ottoman founder) in Syria to protect it from potential attacks by Daesh. At other times, Turkey has seemed to be turning a blind eye to Daesh in order to curb the territorial expansion of the PYD in northern Syria, especially in its loose border control policy which many Daesh fighters are known to have exploited. When the Daesh-controlled Tel Abyad was taken over by the PYD in June 2015, Turkey’s fear of Kurdish autonomy in Syria peaked on the grounds that the pro-PKK PYD would seek a Kurdish corridor from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Mediterranean.

Thus, a paradox has come into being: while Turkey has carried a peace process with the PKK at home, it has developed a hostile discourse toward the PYD in Syria. At the same time, Daesh has never been the primary target for Turkey. However, what Turkey has neglected consistently are the shared hearts and minds between many Kurds in Turkey and Syria across borders. This paradox has increased the PKK’s mistrust of Turkey’s commitment to the peace process.

Domestically, the Turkish government has been criticised heavily by the opposition nationalists because the PKK has increased its territorial control in south-eastern Turkey due of the peace process. Based on this view, it is believed that the Turkish state has lost its authority in eastern and south-eastern Kurdish regions and the PKK has been using the process to its own advantage. Although the pro-Kurdish HDP political party and the governing AK Party officials reached an agreement for the roadmap of the PKK’s disarmament in late February, known as the Dolmabahce Declaration, President Erdogan later renounced this under the pressure of criticisms by security-minded nationalists.

This renouncement is believed to be based on the decline in the AKP’s nationalist votes before the 7 June elections. A monitoring committee was going to be established which would put the peace process on a stronger foundation unless Erdogan renounced the Dolmabahce statement. Today, Erdogan is also accused of ending the peace process with recent heavy military action against the PKK in order to consolidate the ruling AKP’s power in a potential early election after the party lost its single-party rule in June. Thus, the pro-Kurdish HDP, which received around 6 million votes in the recent election and gained 80 of the 550 seats in the Turkish parliament, has become the main target of the AKP on the basis of its close ties with the PKK. Even the possibility of the closure of the HDP has been uttered recently.

In the short-term, what is crucial in the re-establishment of mutual trust and peace talks could be to turn Daesh into the common enemy. The crisis can become an opportunity for Turkish-Kurdish cooperation and strategic partnership in the region.

Turkey has recently opened its Incirlik air base to the US-led coalition in the fight against Daesh. Although this is a sign that the government in Ankara is likely to take a more active role in the coalition, most of the recent Turkish air strikes have focused on the PKK camps in northern Iraq. As the Kurds are a significant Western ally on the ground in Syria, the United States and Europe have warned Turkey about starting a new war with the PKK. Thus, the reality on the ground pushes Turkey and the pro-PKK PYD in Syria to be more cooperative. If this can be established strongly, it is likely to have a healing effect in the damaged relations between the PKK and Turkey on the domestic front.

Overall, such internal and external dimensions have led gradually to the serious mutual distrust between the actors and surfaced in the recent escalation of violence between Turkey and the PKK. Both have their own “good reasons” for putting the brakes on the peace process. The question of whether it can be put back on track depends on the sincerity of Ankara and the Kurdish group, although we should note that there is strong public support for the re-establishment of the peace and truce. This is not a straightforward and easy process as the Turks and the Kurds have their own reservations, but this is the inevitable nature of the conflict-resolution process. The time-scale may be decades long and the process will be prone to the escalation of violence. Moreover, the Turkish government could not institutionalise the peace process beyond the short-sighted political gains. A more systematic, organised and multilateral establishment of this process under the supervision of the Turkish parliament is a must.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.