Bashar’s fate following the nuclear deal

Before the Iranian nuclear deal, the situation in the Middle East was completely different than it is after it. Although it has only been weeks since the nuclear deal was signed, and it still has not been finalised by Washington and Tehran, it is clear that all parties involved are aiming to utilise the deal to expand their influence or improve their situation. This is especially true in light of the impasse with regards to the most troubled areas of the region during the later stages of negotiations. The first issue that embodies this radical change in the balance of power in the region is the Syrian question. Although it seems to be the most complicated issue, it is also the most prone to development and change; it is also the most important issue as a result of its potential impact on the general regional situation.

Although there isn’t much that is new on the ground in Syria, the past few days have witnessed intensified and synchronised movements from various concerned parties. The common denominator amongst all of these movements is their desire to resolve the crisis or to find a peaceful way out. States currently supporting Bashar’s regime believe that the solution involves keeping Bashar and his regime in place for the short-to-medium-term. This means that they will go along with parties calling for reform and change and pretend that change must occur in the presence of Bashar and with his participation. This is the logic of Bashar’s camp and his supporters as well as anyone who calls for preserving the Syrian state from collapse and dismantlement.

What these people do not say is that this within this logic lies a contradiction between acknowledging the need for reform and for more power to the Syrian people, and attempting to achieve this on the basis of preserving the main person responsible for everything currently happening to Syria and Syrians. What is being overlooked in this context is the fact that if the ultimate goal is to eliminate a “regime” and its people, institutions, mechanisms and policies, then it cannot be achieved within the context of the same regime and under the direct supervision of its leadership.

This contradictory equation is the bedrock underlying every failed attempt to find a political solution in Syria for the past four years. Since the Geneva I understandings issued on 29 June, 2012, along with ongoing communications, we have seen that the situation is being resolved in favour of one side of the equation. Although it is logical for Tehran, Moscow and some Arab capitals to indicate their belief that Bashar should remain, and that he should lead the transitional phase (the details of which still remain vague), we question the fluid position of Washington, openly and publically rejecting the Bashar on the one hand, but hesitating to take any action to overthrow him on the other. There is an implicit invitation to those supporting Bashar to be more firm and to arrange their affairs in a manner serving the future purposes and interests of the regime members.

While Washington “talks”, Moscow is deciding to transport aircraft to be stationed in Syrian territories in coordination with Damascus and Tehran. This is a move that indicates that the political path Moscow pretends to support is not the ceiling of Syrian-Iranian-Russian ambitions. This also indicates that the alleged political solution is not actually being upheld by these three parties and their allies. Instead, they are preparing for future military battles that may require direct Russian military interference, as well as the Iranian intervention that has already occurred.

The Iranian-Western deal has started to manifest in Syria. American fluidity and European silence is only the beginning of more disappointment and the exposure of political positions that since the crisis began four years ago have amounted to nothing more than verbal statements – simply hot air.

Translated from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed on 6 September 2015.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.