Game changers in Syria signal new strategy

Recent developments in Syria have hinted at a possible shift to a much more conservative defense-focused strategy on the part of the Syrian government and its allies. The deterioration of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), Hezbollah’s possible withdrawal to defensive lines, and increased Russian support are all signs of a new approach in the Russia-Iran-Syria camp, perhaps even favoring the temporary de facto partition of the country.

The fall of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

The SAA, and larger Syrian government, has seen dangerous internal division this year resulting in the effective takeover of wartime decision-making by Iran via the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Damascus in an effort to keep the Syrian government afloat.

Pro-government forces have launched few offensives in recent months and have instead been forced to focus on repelling the numerous attacks on its territory. The government faces pressure on various fronts: from Daesh forces in central Syria and Hasakeh, Jabhat al-Nusra and allies near Latakia and in Aleppo and continued efforts by the Southern Front to encroach on Damascus and Deraa. Assad’s forces also lost a second provincial capital in March of this year when Jabhat al-Nusra and other jihadist fighters overran the city of Idleb.

This succession of defeats and military pressure has allowed public opinion in government areas to decline, as well and likewise military morale and capability. SAA forces struggle to defend non-contiguous areas of control and have faced a number of recent military defeats. The month of August even saw reports of protests in pro-government areas over the performance of the army and the failure to oust opposition forces that continue to besiege government towns. The crippling of the Syrian army the war’s extended stagnation has seen an increase in the use of Hezbollah forces and other non-SAA fighters.

The future role of Hezbollah in Syria

Rumors have been circulating on the future role of Hezbollah in the conflict, as well as a revealing public address by leader Hassan Nasrallah in which he expressed concern of overextending in Syria.

On 22 September, the Daily Star, a Lebanese daily newspaper published an article citing an anonymous Hezbollah diplomatic source who said that following the fall of Zabadani, expected to happen soon, Hezbollah would be limited to defending their positions and would not take part in any assaults on rebels inside Syria.

The article was quickly taken down – possibly for accuracy or verification – possibly for the potential political and military repercussions. Whether accurate or not, the statement poses an important question – what would happen on the ground if Hezbollah did withdraw to defensive positions and cease further assaults?

With the decay of the SAA, Hezbollah has stepped up in Syria as the primary pro-government fighting force. The Lebanese group has an estimated 6,000-8,000 fighters with operations expanding outside of the Qalamoun region on the Syria-Lebanon border to most theaters of combat in the country. Analysts agree that Hezbollah’s extensive efforts in Syria have cost the group dearly in lives and resources.

On 25 September, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said that the group’s truce with Syrian opposition forces reached in Zabadani was not due to the group’s military impotence, but rather to accomplish other objectives – the transfer of Shia populations under siege in Foua and Kefraya. When Nasrallah was asked on Hezbollah’s continued commitment in Syria, he responded that he, “wished [that] the war in Syria didn’t happen and the youth weren’t exploited…We would rather be confronting Israel instead.”

As of now Hezbollah has two options in Syria: to push deeper or cling to their spoils. Based on Nasrallah’s statements, the latter appears more likely. With the possibility of yet another war with Israel on the horizon, the group will be looking to reorganize and redistribute resources away from further expansion in Syria. Deeper entrenchment in the chaos in Syria shows little opportunity with substantial risks. With Qalamoun secured and supply lines to Damascus and Homs open, retaining territory will be the main objective. Russian and Syrian fighter jets can continue the war with fewer costs while more ground resources are focused on holding defensive lines.

There is little doubt that Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria played a vital role in prolonging Assad’s survival this long. If Hezbollah is considering halting offensive operations, it means that: 1.) There must be an effective plan in play led by Moscow to prop up Assad or 2.) The war is shifting in favor of Assad. Most analysts have dismissed the second option. Therefore, the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces from the front offensive lines would signal a potential strategy overhaul in the Damascus command center between Russian, Iranian, and Syrian military leaders. A new strategy based on holding territory, stabilizing areas of control, and renewed diplomatic efforts.

Renewed Russian interest

This month intelligence and news reports revealed a significant uptick in Russian involvement in the conflict, both in terms of military hardware and advisors (some claim even fighters). An air force base is being developed in Latakia for Russian use and advanced weaponry including tanks, APC’s, and fighter jets have been shipped. Reports indicate daily shipments of supplies arriving at Syrian government air bases.

If Hezbollah does plan to shift focus to defense, it would be counter-intuitive to assume that such a major decision was coordinated without the input of Russia and Iran. Russia’s increase in support to Assad would likely be to compensate for a less active role by Hezbollah.

As a subtle division appears in European policy towards the conflict, namely the fact that leaders David Cameron and Angela Merkel spoke of the possibility of Assad remaining in power, Russia has a window of diplomatic opportunity to bolster Assad’s role as a leader in the fight against terrorism.

One of Assad’s first acts after the uprising began was to release radical jihadists and ideologues from prisons to flood the opposition. The rise of Daesh and other salafi jihadist groups played into Assad’s plan to position himself as the stable alternative to radical Islamists. Putin took to the international stage this week to reiterate this and paint Assad as the necessary partner for combatting Daesh, “We believe it’s a huge mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian authorities, with the government forces, those who are bravely fighting terror face-to-face.”

Russia’s objectives in Syria are clear. But with a severely weakened SAA, a likely less active Hezbollah, and a seemingly stagnant conflict with little chance of territorial advances on the ground, Russia is seeking to improve conditions in the realm of international diplomacy to defend her interests, namely acceptance and support of her strongman in Syria. Meanwhile, Russian equipment will try to outdo American anti-ISIS efforts, while at the same time weakening areas of opposition without overextending Assad’s strained ground forces.

These rapid and sudden developments in Syria suggest that major strategic changes are in the making. Given recent setbacks, it is in Assad’s interest to switch to a defense-focused strategy aimed at holding territory and continuing to weaken the enemy from afar. Losing territory and fighting on multiple fronts is no longer sustainable. The government cannot afford to overextend forces as the conflict’s balance continues to slip against Assad. Leaders in Moscow and Tehran need Assad to remain in power and Russia’s new boldness in the region (increasing cooperation with Iraq as well) may well change the game.

John Yager is the co-founder and director of humanitarian projects for Global Crisis Relief, a newly formed NGO dedicated to serving Syrian refugees in the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.