Syria and federal talk

Ever since Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov dropped the bombshell regarding the possibility of establishing a federal state in Syria, and called on the parties at the negotiations to study the idea, there have been numerous reactions from Syrian factions. Some reject the notion, considering it the first step towards the break-up of the country, while those who support it see it as an appropriate approach to manage the country in the coming phase.

There is also a Turkish-Iranian fear of growing support for a federation in Syria and the impact that it would have on both countries. This is despite the fact that Ankara and Tehran agreed to the idea of a federation in Iraq after the occupation in 2003.

The federal idea

What makes the concept of a federation in our region so controversial are the different visions of the federal system. To us, a federation seems to be a strange western idea, because many view it as a US-Israeli way to divide the Middle East. Those who back a federation believe that there is a great deal of ignorance about the concept and its administration, governance and development, and its use for the resolution of state issues in multi-ethnic and multi-factional countries.

Supporters claim that a federation does not mean the division of a state as much as its unity based on new foundations. In their eyes, it is the best way to preserve geographic unity in a country after its provinces have separated themselves from the centre. They are bemused that people can only see “division” and overlook the benefits, believing that existing problems will continue as before, not least because the experiences of central governance in the Arab world have contributed to the development of tyrannies and dictatorships.

What is strange about the proposal for a federal Syria is that it did not come from Washington, but from Moscow, the ally of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Damascus. Hence, perhaps, the surprise and questions. There is a deep conviction that there is a secret agreement between the Russians and Americans regarding the federal proposal, especially since Rivkov’s comment was aligned with US statements, especially by Secretary of State John Kerry, regarding the possibility of dividing Syria, the Geneva settlement talks and the search for a formula for the transitional phase.

What will Russian gain from a federation? There are those who believe that there are real benefits for Moscow, such as preventing the establishment of a strong Sunni leadership that would oppose Russia’s interests, or establishing a Kurdish region that plays a strategic role by, for example, cutting the geographical link between Turkey and the Arab world. Other interests include preventing the possibility of extending Arab gas pipes through Turkish territory to Europe. The Russian approach, therefore, stems from strategic planning and has geo-political foundations.

The Kurds benefit the most

One does not need much effort to conclude that the Kurds will benefit the most from a Syrian federation; the idea had already been proposed as a way to fulfil their national aspirations, similar to what has been done for the Iraqi Kurds. This suggests that the main argument is going to be about the nature of the proposed federation, between those who see it going along national identity lines — such as the Kurds — and those who think that it should be an administrative tool and nothing more; a form of local rather than central government.

This can be understood from the statement of the coordinating body that called for a focus on starting negotiations based on the new constitution rather than the transitional government, on the grounds that the former guarantees the transition to a democratic political system. This is implicit support for a federation by determining the shape of the future state in Syria, whereas the majority of the Syrian opposition forces, especially the Islamic groups, reject federalism altogether. To them, a federation is a gateway to fragmentation, division and the weakening of the country in order to control it in the future.

The truth is that support for a Kurdish federation started on three levels: the National Kurdish Council, which welcomed the idea after a number of its parties proposed the federation in 2006; support from the Kurdistan regional government — regional President Massoud Barzani backs a federal government in Syria, similar to the Kurdistan regional model by means of a new constitution stipulating this; and the autonomous administration of the Democratic Union and the Democratic Movement Society.

These three parties that are close to the PKK speak positively about federal rule, contrary to their previous positions. It could be that this was encouraged by the fact that the proposal came from Russia, which opened a representative office for the Kurds in Moscow recently as a form of advance recognition of the federation.

Although the idea of a federation in Syria is still in its embryonic stage — not least because there are no clear geographical regions or even a clear administration at the moment — the discussions are opening the door. The Kurds believe that the developments on the ground make it feasible, as the Syrian Democratic Forces continue to achieve great progress against Daesh, as well as the other armed factions in northern Syria, with the support of the West and Russia.

Turkish and Iranian rejection

The sudden visit of Turkish Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoglu to Tehran on 4 March raised many questions about its timing, purpose and consequences, as well as whether it was related to joint efforts to oppose federation in Syria. The timing of the visit has been linked to Russia’s federal talk. The proposal was met with reservations from Ankara and Tehran, with a growing conviction that the US and Russia have agreed to divide the region. For Iran and Turkey, this means the establishment of a Kurdish region in north-east Syria, similar to the Kurdish region in Iraq.

Thus they believe that they will lose the most from federation in Syria because of their large Kurdish communities (20 million in Turkey and nearly 8 million in Iran), and they expect that their own Kurds will ultimately demand the same rights as those in Syria and Iraq, and maybe even an independent state in the future. Hence, Davutoglu and President Hassan Rouhani made similar statements regarding a united vision to reject federation. This was the first time that Iran had made any public criticism of its ally Russia and its policy in Syria.

Rouhani was very clear about this when he said that Iran defends the unity of Syria and the sovereignty of the state on all of its territory. He was also quoted as saying that the Iranian leadership informed Russia that the sovereignty of the Middle East countries is a principle that is stressed by Tehran, whether in Iraq or Syria. This issue could be a priority for Turkey as two Kurdish entities are set to appear its southern borders.

Based on this vision shared by Turkey and Iran, there are predictions that the relations between the two countries will enter a new phase, as in addition to the great economic interests there is talk of an exchange of political roles and alliances. Iran now views Turkey as a gateway for reducing the tension in its relationship with Saudi Arab and the Gulf States, which is at an unprecedented level. On the other hand, Turkey views Iran as the best channel for improving its own relationship with Russia, as Ankara believes that America and the West do not want to see better relations between Turkey and Russia; that the West wants to exhaust all parties, including its NATO ally, Turkey. What may push Ankara and Tehran to overlook their serious differences over Syria is their sense of marginalisation from the US-Russia agreement on resolving the crisis, despite their involvement in the conflict on the ground.

In conclusion, we can say that the federal system for Syria proposed by the Russian ally of the regime in Damascus may be nothing more than a negotiating tactic. The threat of a federation may push the parties opposed to a political solution favoured by Russia to accept it simply out of fear of the alternative.

Translated from Aljazeera.net, 15 March 2016.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.