Vienna and the future of relations between the West and Iran

After more than four decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran is still engaged in the same struggle as when the revolution toppled the Shah in February 1979. On that day, the revolutionaries led by Ayatollah Khomeini raised many slogans, among them independence, freedom and the Islamic regime. To confirm these principles, there were constants built into its foreign policy, the most important of which were the issue of Palestine; confronting what it called “global arrogance” or “the Great Satan” represented by the US; the unity of Muslims; and support for the weak.

One of the first measures taken after the victory of the revolution was to cut ties with Israel and the apartheid regime in South Africa, and to cut off oil supplies to both. This was followed by the severing of relations with the US eight months later. This came after Iranian students seized the US Embassy in Tehran and held its diplomats hostage for 444 days. Despite the passage of time, this relationship scenario has remained constant, almost frozen in another age. Tehran still refuses to build bridges with Washington, and continues to declare its policies, not only regarding Palestine, but also about the expansion of American influence in the world, especially in the Middle East.

It is true that Cuba, led by Fidel Castro, who overthrew the US-backed regime of President Fulgencio Batista in 1959, preceded Iran in its estrangement with the US, but that separation remained mostly regional, despite the “internationalism” of the communist project that Castro, allied with the Soviet Union, adopted. The tension reached its peak in 1962, when photographs taken from a US reconnaissance aircraft showed that Soviet nuclear missile bases were being built in Cuba. The “Cuban missile crisis” was the first direct confrontation between Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and US President John F. Kennedy, providing the basis for international agreements to reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide.

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The split between Tehran and Washington did not lead to a direct armed conflict between them, but smaller flashpoints have continued. These led to tensions that almost ignited a full-blown military conflict, but with neither able to predict the end result with confidence, they held back. Two years ago, the tension peaked after the US assassinated General Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the leader of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces. Soleimani was basically second in command in Iran after Ayatollah Khamenei. The Iranian response targeted Ain Al-Assad military base with more than 20 missiles, and the threat of further revenge for Soleimani’s killing remains. America has refrained from responding to the Ain Al-Assad attack, for fear of the consequences.

The 1990s witnessed relative calm due to America’s preoccupation with the Kuwait crisis and its targeting of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq until its overthrow in 2003. Iran’s position was based on shared interests with America, but the matter soon changed. Iraq is the latest arena for the struggle between Iran and America for influence.

The situation is now finely balanced, with each side possessing different military and technological capabilities. While there are occasional armed clashes, they are also engaged in ideological, psychological, technological, cyber and strategic warfare, both openly and covertly. America’s greatest achievement in this sense is to get Israel involved, as it presents a direct challenge to Iran in the Gulf through the normalisation project with the UAE and Bahrain. This is a dangerous development in the strategic balance that Iran has so far been unable to neutralise. It is possible that this frantic state of affairs will open the Gulf to a Chinese and Russian military presence; there are already hints of a strategic alliance between Tehran, Beijing and Moscow intended to confront the expansion of US influence in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia and the South China Sea. Although tit for tat terror attacks in the region may be a deterrent to a comprehensive war, this is neither a permanent nor a preferable solution for any of the parties, because such attacks could well spark off a major confrontation.

However, Iran has other leverage options, as it still sponsors the “political Islam” project and it knows that all of its manifestations in the Arab countries are targeted by the counter-revolutionary forces backed by America. Political Islam remains a source of concern for Washington and its allies. This has resulted in the persecution of Islamic groups and movements, as well as individuals. Some Iranian politicians seek to reformulate relations with the US in a way that eases the tension, but the Supreme Leader of the revolution affirms that it is the Islamic Republic’s destiny to continue its commitment to these constants, and that its identity will change completely if it accepts a compromise on its principles.

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Those who believe that the conflict between Iran and the US is limited in its scope, horizons and manifestations are mistaken. America has taken every possible opportunity to besiege Iran, using its usual influence and bullying tactics against those who oppose US hegemony. Economic sanctions are comprehensive, and even include medicine and food. Two years ago, the US tightened its sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, isolating Tehran from the global banking system. Moreover, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) severed its ties with Iranian financial organisations included in the sanctions.

Despite this, Tehran has surprised everyone with its ability to absorb the negative effects of the blockade, even if its currency loses value as a result. Optimists view these sanctions as one of the main factors behind Iran’s ability to achieve relative self-sufficiency in many vital sectors, even nuclear power, which is subject to a comprehensive siege.

Furthermore, Iran’s regional relations have not declined much, and may have even expanded in recent years, especially as it enjoys reasonable links with three members of the Gulf Cooperation Council: the Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait and Qatar. It has friendly relations with Turkey and Pakistan, as well as influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, it is the nuclear agreement (the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) about which several rounds of negotiations have been held in Vienna, which remains the clearest indicator of the extent to which Western relations with Iran have calmed or escalated. The Iranians are aware of Israel’s role in putting pressure on America and its allies to complicate the ongoing talks in order to contain Iran’s military industries, especially the production of missiles, which Iran has mastered to the extent that it supplies them to some regional allies. Tehran will not negotiate in this regard because to do so will have a direct impact on Iran’s national security. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the stalled Vienna negotiations could be the gateway through which either war or peace between the West and the Islamic Republic of Iran will emerge.

This article first appeared in Arabic in Al-Quds Al-Arabi  on 6 February 2022

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.