The current situation in the Middle East and the re-election of Donald Trump have propelled Iran’s nuclear ambition and hastened the weaponisation of its nuclear programme. Iran intends to attain nuclear weapons with a view to ascertain nuclear deterrence and regional strategic stability. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also pointed towards the high levels of uranium enrichment by Iran, though it confirmed Iranian willingness to observe nuclear restraint. However, unilateral Western actions, such as a joint statement by the E3 countries over Iran’s “lack of cooperation”, push Iran towards nuclear brinkmanship. This leads to the most critical question: will Iran go nuclear?
Rapid strategic fluctuations in the Middle East – A catalyst for an Iranian nuclear bomb?
Since Bashar Al-Assad’s ouster, Israeli airstrikes on Syrian military infrastructure not only decimated Syrian military capabilities but also cut off the Iranian strategic supply chain to its proxies in West Asia, i.e. Hamas and Hezbollah. The rampant Israeli assault on Iranian proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah has massively debilitated Iranian influence in the region. The latest Israeli strikes on Yemen’s capital further illustrate Israeli resolve to annihilate its adversaries in the region. The Iranian strategy of forward defence that involves Israel’s containment through an axis of resistance appears to be crumbling. With the diminution of Iranian geo-political and strategic influence in the region, Israel has diverted its focus on its ultimate adversary in the region, Iran. Following Operation Days of Repentance in October 2024, where Israel targeted Iranian military facilities and air defence systems and also certain components of nuclear facilities, the possibility of full-scale Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear installations has augmented. In such a hostile strategic environment posing a threat to Iranian stability and its nuclear weapons programme, Iranian impetus to develop nuclear weapons has intensified. Iran appears to be in a state of survival and attaining nuclear deterrence seems to be the sole guarantee for its survival.
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The inception of Trump 2.0 – Throwing another log on the ‘literal’ fire
The re-election of Trump as US president also acts as an impulse for the weaponisation of the Iranian nuclear programme. Trump’s pull-out approach of rapprochement and engagement with Iran during his first tenure was reflected by his decision to pull out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He pursued the policy of disengagement, confrontation and containment as part of the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. Trump’s current rhetoric reflects similar aspirations, except this time, Trump calls for a direct attack on Iranian nuclear installations as he proclaimed at his election rally: “That’s the thing you wanna hit… It’s the biggest risk we have, nuclear weapons… Hit the nuclear first and worry about the rest later.” Trump’s inclination toward a direct attack on Iranian nuclear facilities ramps up the war frenzy and apprehension for Iran as his approach aligns with Israeli strategic objectives – the annihilation of the Iranian nuclear programme. This convergence of interests leaves Iran a short time to counteract. Iran’s nuclear programme faces a predicament to achieve nuclear deterrence as Iran perceives the rapid transformation of the regional political and strategic milieu as an existential threat. This amounts to an existential threat to the Iranian nuclear programme. Trump appears keen to implement his maximum pressure campaign, this time with the twist of a direct attack on Iranian nuclear installation, and the clock is ticking for Iran to ascertain weapons-grade enrichment.
Iranian nuclear bomb – set in stone?
Iran has reiterated its resolve to furnish a nuclear bomb to mitigate its emerging national security threats. With “tooth-breaking response” pledges, Iran had hinted at going nuclear both in theory and practice in the opportune. A faction of scholars proselytises the update of the nuclear doctrine of Iran in the wake of a crisis that otherwise bars nuclear weapon acquisition through the notable 2003 fatwa. Similarly, its technological advancement buttresses those claims.
The quagmire of inconclusive IAEA-Iran talks further affected the situation. Iran had de-designated the IAEA inspectors who raised suspicions about certain clandestine uranium facilities in Iran that could be involved in uranium enrichment. Similarly, the latest IAEA estimates Iran is on the cusp of acquiring nuclear weapons. The uranium enrichment level of Iran had reportedly reached 84 per cent for a 90 per cent level, which is not far away from the weapon-grade material. The Open Nuclear Network and Forecasting Research Institute report also predicts a 25 per cent probability that Iran will attain nuclear weapons by 2030. Additionally, Iran could not rectify the discrepancies in the uranium enrichment record that it submitted to the IAEA. Iran denies IAEA access to cameras at centrifuge plants and has used smaller, hence undetectable enrichment facilities. Iran’s irregularities regarding its submission of uranium enrichment records to the IAEA, restriction of access to certain facilities and denial to IAEA cameras at centrifuge plants have come under the radar. Iran renounced these notions, claiming Western bias.
Certain latest diplomatic engagements further diminish the prospects of nuclear restraint. E3 countries, comprising the UK, France and Germany – often cooperating in foreign policy milieu – issued a joint statement recently over Iran’s “lack of cooperation” and refusal to comply with modified code 3.1 requiring new facilities declaration. In response, Iran called the declaration a “baseless claim” and accused them of “bias” towards Iran’s nuclear programme and ordered the activation of “new and advanced” centrifuges.
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Middle Eastern strategic stability under duress?
Iran’s nuclear programme’s pace appears proportional to the political and strategic developments in the region. Israel had resorted to counterproliferation strikes to neutralise its nuclear neighbours such as Iraq, Syria and Iran. However, this time, the probability of a counterproliferation strike seems a distant dream owing to the evolution of Iran’s nuclear safety and security. It has evolved into “advanced” and “dispersed”, unlike the isolated ones that Israel successfully destroyed in several counterproliferation strikes. Even a highly sophisticated US massive ordnance penetrator would inflict limited damage. Moreover, these types of strikes hardly prevented but exacerbated Iran’s zeal to pursue nuclear goals as it enriched uranium from 3.67 per cent to 60 per cent in response to a similar Israeli counterproliferation strike at the Natanz Nuclear Facility in 2021.
Among other possible future scenarios, experts predict that Iran might use various stunts to gain an edge in negotiations. It can invoke Article X to withdraw from The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and get into precarious negotiations or update its nuclear doctrine and use rhetoric. In the overt nuclearisation scenario, the inability of Iran to complete its nuclear triad would pose a significant challenge to the strategic stability of the Middle East. Nuclear deterrence resorts to three pillars, among which Iran lacks the air bombers, though it tries to compensate for this shortcoming through a hefty investment in missile technology, as previously demonstrated in its attack on Israel on 1 October, 2024. In these perceived scenarios, the conflict escalation seems inevitable, which will embroil the region in nuclear turmoil. The nuclear arms race will embark on a new era of tensions and instability and even mutually assured destruction in the most adverse outcome.
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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.