Assad’s support for Palestinian resistance was only vocal, British documents reveal

Twenty years ago, the US concluded that Bashar Al-Assad’s regime would not change unless it was placed under sustained pressure, a stance that created differences with the UK, newly released British government documents reveal.

The UK Cabinet Office documents, released by the National Archives, also show that the British government assessed Al-Assad’s support for Palestinian resistance groups as being only “vocal”.

Al-Assad inherited power in 2000 following the death of his father, Hafez, who had ruled Syria for nearly three decades.

In October 2001, Tony Blair, the then British prime minister, made an unprecedented visit to Syria, marking the first trip by a British premier to the country. Just 14 months after this visit, Al-Assad and his wife, Asmaa, were invited to the UK, where they met with the late Queen Elizabeth II and then Prince of Wales – now King – Charles, before having lunch with Blair at 10 Downing Street. This marked the first visit by a Syrian leader to the UK.

Blair’s government was optimistic that Al-Assad was ready to reform Syria, moving away from his father’s dictatorial legacy and opening up to the West. Downing Street at the time expressed its willingness to do whatever it could to support Al-Assad’s potential reform efforts.

However, documents reveal significant differences between London and Washington on how to handle Al-Assad’s regime. While the British government believed that engaging with Al-Assad would help address Middle Eastern issues, the George  W Bush administration in the US insisted on maintaining pressure “as the only effective way” to push for change in Syria.

In April 2004, Bush hosted Blair in Washington with Syria on the agenda. Blair’s team advised him to try to convince Bush that continued dialogue with Al-Assad could lead to change. A briefing paper from Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Blair’s foreign policy and defence adviser, alerted his boss that the US view of Syria was that “it will not change, and so ratcheting up the pressure is the only way in which to force it.”

The Bush-Blair summit came after Congress passed the Syria Accountability Act, which imposed sanctions on Al-Assad’s regime. The British predicted that additional pressure, including sanctions on civil aviation, bilateral trade and American companies investing in Syria, would follow.

The British “shared the US view that Syria has failed to properly address the issues that concern us most,” according to the paper.

It outlined the Syrian stand on Iraq, in particular border security, the activities of Palestinian “rejectionist groups” in Syria, counter-terrorism cooperation, its “occupation” of Lebanon, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and reform.

However, Blair was advised to explain to Bush that the British government judges that “high-level critical engagement with the Syrian [government], in conjunction with the increased US pressure, is a strategy that may deliver results.”

Iraq was a “major concern” for both the US and the UK. At the time, Bush faced intense political pressure ahead of the upcoming presidential election, with his approval ratings at their lowest of his presidency due to growing doubts and criticism over his Iraq policy.

According to a British embassy assessment, Bush “can’t win the election on Iraq alone, but he could lose on it.”

Blair’s team advised that Bush was “politically embattled” and “on the political defensive” for much of the year while events in Iraq “have the Administration under real pressure”.

Resistance to foreign occupation was escalating as the handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis approached on 1 July 2004, more than a year after the US-led coalition invaded Iraq and ousted Saddam Hussein.

The British assessed that Bush “needs to show a credible political process in Iraq leading to the transition and beyond”. Meanwhile, the Sunni insurgency, fueled by foreign fighters, posed a major problem for the occupying forces.

In early April 2004, the US and the UK desperately needed Syria’s help to de-escalate the volatile situation which threatened the project of the occupying powers in Iraq.

Matthew Rycroft, Blair’s private secretary for foreign and defence, reported that the coalition “has lost significant political capital in Iraq”, advising Blair to seek Bush’s “recognition or agreement” on this during their private meeting. In a briefing report to Blair, Rycroft stressed that the US and the UK “must get on the top of security”.

Blair’s team aimed to send two messages to the US about Syria. First, that Al-Assad’s regime “has to recognize the world has changed” and that the UK “has no intention of lowering the bar for Syria” as “its inaction on a range of concerns is unacceptable.”

Second, they emphasised the importance of Syrian cooperation on the issue of “the flow of terrorists” into Iraq from Syria. Blair was advised to reassure Bush that “we are pressing the Syrians hard to help stem that flow.” But the British insisted that there was “no more effective alternative to dialogue on this.”

They pointed out that London was looking at ways of pressing Al-Assad’s regime to “tighten border security”. One of these ways was convincing the Syrians to accept a visit of senior officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and Ministry of Defence to discuss “cooperation on stemming the flow of terrorists entering Iraq from Syria.”

Other British reports confirmed that Syria “have made some efforts to improve border security.” Blair was also told by his team that the US “has acknowledged the fact that there has been an increase in troops numbers and expertise on the border” with Iraq and that cross-border cooperation “has “improved”.

However, the British believed that Syria “can do more to crack down on those in Syria facilitating the movement of terrorists across the border.” Although the British “didn’t believe the regime was complicit in this”, they suspected that “individuals may be”.

Blair’s team also expected Bush to raise the issue of Syria’s stance on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) during their talks. Syria’s relations with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) were a major concern for both the US and the UK.

In May, 2003, Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, stated that Al-Assad told him he was taking action to close down the offices of Hamas, PIJ and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Powell added that Al-Assad promised he would restrict the ability of these groups to communicate.

However, the British assessment concluded this step was “purely cosmetic” and the Syrians “are careful not to be directly involved in activities” of Hamas and PIJ against Israel.

Blair’s team advised him to explain to the Americans that Syria’s support for these groups “vocal” and “rarely practical”. It assessed this support as “strategic” but predicted it “will fall away should Syria enter into serious peace negotiations with Israel.”

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