Damietta attack: Where was the octagon?

Questions continue to circulate among Egyptians over who was behind the drone attack on Damietta Port in northern Egypt on 29^th July. The identity of those responsible remains unknown, as the attack came amid heightened regional tensions stemming from the US-Israeli war against Iran.

Conflicting official accounts, coupled with pro-government media reports attributing the incident to fires breaking out on two vessels without explaining their cause, fuelled further suspicion. The official announcement on the nature of the attack was delayed by around 16 hours, before the Egyptian Cabinet confirmed that the explosion had been caused by a drone, deepening the controversy and mistrust among Egyptians.

The questions and doubts have been further fuelled by the fact that the attack took place around three weeks after the opening of the Armed Forces’ Strategic Command headquarters, known as the Octagon, in the New Administrative Capital east of Cairo. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi attended the ceremony in military uniform, his first public appearance in such attire in around eight years and only his sixth since taking power in 2014.

Was the attack intended to personally embarrass el-Sisi? Was it an attempt to drag Egypt into the war raging across the region? Or was it punishment for Cairo’s support for the Gulf states through military aircraft and capabilities? And who stands to benefit from the attack on gas vessels at Damietta Port?

Scenarios on the table

Nearly two weeks after the attack, which caused no casualties, the Egyptian authorities have remained tight-lipped about the circumstances, citing the need to proceed cautiously and to complete the necessary investigations. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that any discussion of the incident should be based on specific information and conclusive evidence.

Damietta Port is one of Egypt’s most important commercial ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a major hub for maritime trade and the handling of containers and cargo. The targeting of the US-owned LNG facility Energos Winter at the port further underscores its strategic importance, making it a potential target for anyone seeking to harm US interests in the region.

Speaking to CNN, H A Hellyer, a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute in Britain, said the attack could have been an Iranian message, delivered through one of Tehran’s allied militias, demonstrating its ability to expand the conflict beyond the current theatre of operations.

Observers told Middle East Monitor that targeting Cairo for the first time in the ongoing conflict could have been a warning from a certain party to halt Egypt’s ongoing plans to provide military support to its Gulf allies. This follows reports that Egyptian forces are present in four Gulf states and that a detachment of Egyptian fighter jets was deployed to the United Arab Emirates in May, according to the Emirates News Agency (WAM).

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Political researcher Mohamed Mostafa, however, did not rule out the possibility that the attack was launched from within Egypt, specifically by elements opposed to the regime or an influential group. He cited the apparent failure of air-defence systems to intercept the attack, as well as its highly sensitive timing. The incident, he argued, largely undermined the significance of el-Sisi’s achievement and sent a message that the Octagon would not protect his regime in the future.

The Egyptian president, a former defence minister who came to power following the military coup of 3^rd July 2013, showcased surveillance and early-warning systems during the opening ceremony, alongside sophisticated, multi-layered air-defence systems designed to protect Egyptian airspace and strategic targets.

The list of suspects

Alongside Iran, the list of suspects includes Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Iraqi militias loyal to Tehran. The attack targeted a gas vessel owned by a US company, sending a message that the fronts for retaliation against the United States could be expanded, potentially extending the war into the Mediterranean and disrupting global shipping if attacks on infrastructure and power stations in Iran, the main backer of Hezbollah and the Houthis, continue.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi denied that his country was responsible for the Damietta attack, describing Egypt as “an important friend and partner in the region” whose security was “of the utmost importance to us”. In a post on X, he urged vigilance against Israeli plans aimed at undermining regional peace.

An economist who requested anonymity hinted at the possibility of Israeli or US involvement in the attack, either to widen the scope of regional tensions and push Egypt into joining the war against Iran, or to threaten Egypt’s energy security and increase the cost of importing Israeli gas. Damietta is one of the eastern Mediterranean’s key centres for the liquefaction and export of natural gas.

Egyptian opposition figures have pointed the finger at the UAE, suggesting that mercenaries or militias loyal to it could have carried out the attack from Libya near Egypt’s western border, or from Sudan near the country’s southern border. The aim, they argue, could be to push Cairo into siding with Abu Dhabi against Tehran, or perhaps to undermine the future of Egyptian ports and prevent them from taking market share away from UAE ports, which currently dominate much of the region’s maritime transport sector.

Serious vulnerabilities

Whatever the identity of those behind the Damietta attack, the incident has raised serious questions about the Egyptian authorities’ ability to protect the country’s airspace. It has also exposed major gaps in surveillance, monitoring and tracking systems, along with numerous weaknesses in Egypt’s national security apparatus.

The incident calls for “a comprehensive assessment of the air-defence system in terms of its deployment, readiness, surveillance and engagement mechanisms, as well as a review of operational procedures and accountability for any shortcomings, if identified.” This should be carried out alongside the completion of the technical and security investigations to precisely determine who carried out the attack, according to the Egyptian Institute for Political and Strategic Studies, based in Istanbul.

In its military assessment of the attack, the institute argues that “the striking of targets within a strategic area without interception or engagement requires a comprehensive review of surveillance and response procedures, as well as an assessment of the readiness of Egyptian air-defence systems”, particularly given the current regional environment, which is characterised by elevated levels of aerial and missile threats.

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Complicated choices

The list of those who could potentially benefit from the attack is extensive, encompassing both domestic and foreign actors, given the interests of Iran, the Houthis, Israel, the United States and the UAE. This, in turn, broadens the circle of potential suspects.

El-Sisi’s regime itself could also be among those benefitting, particularly if the incident is viewed in the context of attempts by online and media networks close to Egypt’s security and intelligence agencies to exploit the attack to generate public support for the political leadership and give it a mandate to confront potential threats. Such efforts have included calls for constitutional amendments that would allow el-Sisi to serve a fourth term extending to 2036.

No party has so far claimed responsibility for the incident, and Egypt is also unlikely to publicly accuse anyone. This could either reflect an inability to establish who was behind the attack or a desire to contain its consequences and keep the findings of the investigation confidential, thereby avoiding being drawn into a war with an uncertain outcome. Publicly naming the perpetrator would entail the possibility of a direct military response – precisely what Cairo does not want.

If the source of the attack is established, Egypt’s response could take more measured forms short of war: increased security coordination with selected countries, deeper defence cooperation with regional powers, and perhaps joining the Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish alliance. Cairo could also seek to rally diplomatic support at international forums and use the incident to secure compensation or new loans from international financial institutions, arguing that the Egyptian economy has been harmed by the attack.

A military response remains unlikely, but could become unavoidable if the attack is repeated. Egypt’s response would depend on a range of complex considerations, particularly the identity of those responsible and the drone’s launch point. In other words, the response would be very different if the perpetrator were Iran, Israel, the UAE or another actor.

One question continues to weigh heavily on the minds of Egyptians, though they dare not voice it publicly for fear of legal repercussions and security reprisals: Where was the Octagon?!

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.