Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral defeat makes a resumption of the war on Iran a potential political escape route, while the cost of the war makes US President Donald Trump more hesitant to resume it, particularly after he acknowledged that the conflict had been a significant factor in his Republican Party’s defeat in the US midterm elections. Yet this divergence may prove temporary. The consequences of his party’s resounding electoral defeat may prompt Trump to hold back for now, but they will not stop him from seeking a victory later.
After Netanyahu’s bloc failed to retain its majority in the Knesset elections at the end of last month, and Israeli President Isaac Herzog tasked Gadi Eisenkot with forming a government, Netanyahu continued to press Trump to resume the war on Iran, as a major confrontation with Iran could derail Eisenkot’s efforts to form a government to replace Netanyahu’s. Netanyahu publicly linked the Iranian threat to the need for a unity government when he called on Eisenkot a few days ago to enter negotiations. Eisenkot has yet to announce the formation of a government, and Netanyahu remains caretaker prime minister. On 17th November, Eisenkot’s bloc wrested the Knesset speakership from Likud with the support of Palestinian lawmakers, while the ultra-Orthodox parties voted for Likud’s candidate. This illustrates the complexities of Israel’s political landscape as efforts to form a government continue. Eisenkot is prioritising an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties because his core bloc holds 48 seats, and Avigdor Lieberman, one of his partners, opposes forming a government that depends on the votes of Palestinian parties.
On 5th November, two days after the Republicans’ defeat in the congressional elections, Netanyahu discussed the war on Iran with Trump in a telephone call, as part of his efforts to persuade the US president to resume large-scale bombing. Netanyahu also sent Mossad chief Roman Gofman, one of his closest advisers, to Washington for talks with CIA Director John Ratcliffe on the matter.
Dennis Citrinowicz, a former Iran analyst in Israeli military intelligence, argues that Trump’s retreat from the option of attacking Iran leaves Netanyahu in a bind.
It is difficult to predict whether Trump will resume the full-scale war on Iran, given how he has oscillated between preparing to expand the fighting, suggesting that the conflict is nearing its end, and betting that the blockade will make either course unnecessary. As commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Trump has the practical ability to order large-scale strikes on Iran, although the limits of his authority to wage a prolonged war without congressional authorisation remain a matter of constitutional dispute. Ahead of the elections, the military option was on the table: he reviewed operational plans and ordered forces deployed to forward positions, before telling Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on 31st October that he intended to attack Iran after the vote. The crown prince urged him to hold back, a position also taken by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The Republicans’ defeat on 3rd November changed Trump’s calculations. He acknowledged that the war had contributed to his party’s result, while Vice President JD Vance, blaming the conflict for the electoral losses, called for it to end, stressing its political and economic costs. Although Trump had intended to launch an attack after the elections, he told his advisers that he might postpone large-scale strikes unless there was a fresh provocation from Iran or the Houthis. Last week, he declared that Washington had no need for a deal as long as, in his view, it controlled Iran’s funds and the Strait of Hormuz. Within the administration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio argued that the US was relying on the blockade to pressure Tehran into making concessions that would allow an acceptable deal to be reached. This approach was reinforced by a US intelligence assessment indicating that another round of bombing would be unlikely to change Iran’s negotiating terms.
Nevertheless, military tensions across the region escalated after the elections. Following a period of cautious calm last month, during which pressure on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz continued, the confrontation then widened. Exchanges of strikes resumed between Iranian territory and US bases on the opposite shore of the Gulf, and the targeting extended to include navigation systems on Oman’s Didamar Island, which serve vessels passing through the strait. Immediately after the elections, US forces continued to strike targets on Iran’s Qeshm Island in the Strait of Hormuz. The latest US strike on the island was followed by Iranian attacks on Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, the first Iranian attack on the country since September. Bahrain announced that it had intercepted Iranian attacks for the third time in a single week. The Saudi-led coalition also announced that it had intercepted attacks launched from Yemen towards the capital, Riyadh. In the latest incident in the Strait of Hormuz, the crew of the Panama-flagged LPG tanker Tara Gas abandoned ship off Oman on 17th November after it was struck by projectiles, with one crew member missing, two days after an ADNOC-managed crude tanker, Al Dhannah, was hit in the strait.
William Wechsler, a former Pentagon official, suggests that the electoral defeat itself could push Trump in two different directions over time. In the immediate aftermath of the vote, it is difficult for him to expand a war he has acknowledged cost his party dearly. But if the stalemate persists, his domestic agenda is obstructed by the new Congress, and he comes to believe that a settlement with Iran would cement the image of failure, he may see a military victory as a way out of this predicament. Aaron David Miller, a former US State Department negotiator and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, takes the view that Washington has opted for economic strangulation for now, while keeping the door open to military action before the Democrats take control of Congress in January.
The US debate over resuming the war has taken a new turn, as discussion has shifted from alleged Iranian plots to target American officials abroad to the possibility of targeting them in Washington itself.
This week, US media outlets, citing intelligence reports, have been promoting claims that Tehran could target senior Trump administration officials in the capital with a ‘dirty bomb’ or a chemical weapon. By contrast, warnings issued in October focused on alleged attempts to target US personnel and officials in the Middle East and elsewhere outside the United States. Although Tehran has categorically denied the allegations, they nevertheless allow Washington to keep its options open towards Iran.
Throughout its history, the United States has repeatedly warned of grave threats to its security to justify military action, only for those threats later to prove non-existent. In August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson’s administration received reports of a North Vietnamese attack on US naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin, following an earlier confrontation. Johnson ordered retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam and secured broad congressional authorisation to use force. Decades later, Robert Hanyok, a historian at the US National Security Agency, concluded from the agency’s records that the attack used to justify the war had never taken place. In the case of Iraq, the United States asserted before the UN Security Council in early 2003 that the country possessed weapons of mass destruction, paving the way for the invasion and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The weapons stockpiles invoked to justify the war were never found.
Today, the search for justifications for launching a devastating war on Iran has returned to the fore, with the interests of several parties seemingly poised to fan the flames. Trump has taken the possibility of such a threat seriously, warning Iran of a severe response if it targets American officials in Washington with a chemical weapon or dirty bomb.
Will the political price Trump has paid rein in Netanyahu’s push for war, or will talk of an Iranian threat on American soil give advocates of escalation the justification they need to launch one?
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.







