Oman’s longstanding independent foreign policy and constructive neutrality have been challenged by the ongoing Iran War. What was once a preference for strategic autonomy, that is the expansion of its international reach, gaining greater economic independence, and developing a security system for the region where Gulf countries can determine their own security, is increasingly looking like a necessity.
Since the modern state of Oman was founded in 1970, the basis of its foreign policy has been characterised by a seemingly straightforward strategy of being a “friend to all”, as the Sultanate’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls it. However, the Iran War in particular has significantly tested the sustainability and robustness of this model. After Oman tried playing the role of mediator between the US and Iran over the future of the Strait of Hormuz, US President Donald Trump threatened to “blow up” Oman were it to “get in the way of negotiations. Separately, a Trump administration official accused Omani officials of being “almost like employees of Iran”.
Instead of seeking a replacement for the US in light of such remarks by becoming a client of China, Oman seems determined to pursue a different course that makes its independence more immune to the dictates of great powers, such as the US.
This is not to say that Oman will abandon its traditional legacy of neutrality, because as policy expert Hamed al-Ghaithi observes, “diversifying partnerships is the oldest instinct in modern Omani statecraft.” The Iran War has, however, changed the urgency of this instinct, whereby we are seeing an evolved brand of neutrality for Oman from purely being a mediator, to an actor that more actively pursues strategic autonomy. In this context, this refers to the Sultanate’s ability to create the necessary economic, diplomatic, and regional security networks to safeguard its independence of action.
How neutrality has enabled Oman’s strategic diversification
Oman’s evolving strategy is observable through the sheer acceleration of its diplomatic activity in recent months. Sultan Haitham bin Tariq undertook eight state visits between his succession in 2020 and the end of 2025. His Majesty has embarked on six more state visits since September alone, travelling to Botswana, Angola, Kazakhstan, the United Kingdom, China, and Brunei Darussalam. This is in addition to an official visit to France in June, a fraternal visit to the UAE, and hosting a state visit for Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in mid-November.
While the number of visits is noteworthy, particular attention should be paid to the geographical spread of the visits. Oman is strengthening relationships and expanding avenues for cooperation across Asia, Africa and Europe, while maintaining its long-standing ties with its neighbours and traditional western partners, such as the United States or the United Kingdom.
Of course, the Iran War cannot be said to be the sole cause of this hastier diplomatic expansion. However, the timing of the breadth of engagement seems consistent with a more intentional effort by Muscat to diversify its international network in order to redistribute the risk that pressure from any one partner will narrow its sphere of maneuverability.
Sultan Haitham’s visit to China in early November very much underpinned this strategy. In fact the Diwan of Royal Court’s official statement gave credence to the Sultanate’s ambitions. Indeed, it wrote that Oman hoped to “develop relations of friendship and cooperation towards broader and more comprehensive horizons across all fields.”
This is not to say that this breadth of engagement and diversification of partnerships automatically translates to greater strategic autonomy for Oman, but the scale of agreements between China and Oman was telling for the strategy of diversification Oman wants to pursue.
Overall, the Oman investment Authority and Omani institutions signed 23 agreements, memoranda of understanding (MoU) and a cooperation protocol. Sultan Haitham and Chinese President Xi Jinping also separately witnessed the signing of one agreement, 14 MoUs and a cooperation protocol. The point is not that China has suddenly become a prominent partner for Oman; it was already Oman’s largest trading partner, and Oman is China’s fourth largest Arab trading partner. However, the relationship had historically been limited primarily to hydrocarbons. Now, we see that this has been extended to cover core areas such as mining, renewable energy, logistics, space technology and artificial intelligence.
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However, diversification alone does not guarantee strategic autonomy. One of the biggest challenges for Oman is whether or not it can ensure that the implementation of these wide-ranging agreements can facilitate the transfer of knowledge and expertise to Omani institutions and the local workforce.
There are promising signs for this to be the case, especially given that the recent Sino-Omani agreements also include scholarships for 30 Omani postgraduate students in China and training for 1,000 Omani specialists.
From a geographical standpoint, Oman’s partnership with China is also very important in its pursuit for strategic autonomy. With the Strait of Hormuz far from fully open as it was pre-war, the Sultanate’s primary deep-water ports on the Arabian Sea in Salalah and Duqm have been positioned as alternative routes, not to replace Hormuz for Gulf energy exports, but as a viable and convenient international shipping route. Although China absorbed the global energy shock that resulted from the Iran war relatively well, 38 percent of Chinese oil consumption depends on imports from the Middle East. This makes Oman’s alternative shipping routes particularly attractive. If Oman were to continue developing these ports, therefore, it may have the dual effect of positioning itself as a logistics and industrial hub on the one hand, and expanding the economic value of its location outside the Strait on the other.
The international composition of investment in Duqm is a clear illustration of this exact ambition. In June, Duqm’s Special Economic Zone (SEZ) announced potential investments of approximately $7.5 billion across ten agreements involving global investors, including those from South Korea, the Philippines, Germany and Egypt. The Chinese component of the SEZ’s announced investments include a $500 million battery-anode material project, but the largest disclosed project is a $4.2 billion green hydrogen project by India’s AMCE Group.
This distinction importantly shows that the Duqm SEZ investment programme is far more than just a Chinese industrial enclave. Instead, it demonstrates what legal researcher Otari Kakhidze calls “a high degree of internationalisation”. Oman is attracting capital and industrial activity through diverse partnerships which, in turn may reduce its reliance on any one given partner and expand its options for financing and developing strategic infrastructure.
How Oman Vision 2040 and strategic autonomy are mutually reinforcing
Announced by Sultan Haitham in 2020, Vision 2040 is Oman’s national development strategy aimed at diversifying the economy beyond oil and gas. With oil’s share of GDP at 39 percent in 2017, as part of the initiative it is targeted to fall to 8.4 percent in 2040. The necessity to meet its Vision 2040 ambitions offer another lens to understanding Oman’s increasingly active diplomacy. Yet the pursuit of these ambitions raises an apparent dilemma: how can Oman secure the foreign capital and expertise needed without allowing new economic dependencies to constrain its independent foreign policy or political choices?
This is a question that has permeated scholarly circles before. As Dr James Worrall, associate professor in International Relations and Middle East Studies at the University of Leeds, warned in his 2021 analysis of Omani mediation, the high costs of economic diversification could constrain Muscat’s freedom of manoeuvre, particularly if investments are attached to political conditions.
Related to Oman’s current strategy, therefore, it is not enough for the Sultanate to simply widen the pool of its investors. What matters most is whether these resulting partnerships strengthen Oman’s own productive capacity and reduce its vulnerability to external pressure.
Viewed in this light, it becomes clearer why Oman’s recent diplomatic activity has extended far beyond China. Sultan Haitham’s visit to France in June produced 12 agreements, memoranda of understanding and declarations of intent, including cooperation on logistics, ports and the proposed Muscat Metro. Similarly, the Sultan’s October state visit to the United Kingdom, Oman’s largest major arms supplier, reaffirmed defence cooperation while linking economic collaboration to advanced industries and investment.
All of these relationships and networks serve different purposes, offering varied economic, technological and security benefits to Oman. Their cumulative value, however, lies in giving Oman a wider pool of economic, technological and security partners through which to pursue its Vision 2040 goals, while reducing the risk that any one partner gains disproportionate influence.
Thus, Vision 2040 and strategic autonomy are better understood not as parallel objectives, but as mutually reinforcing. Economic diversification can strengthen the domestic foundations on which Oman’s foreign-policy independence relies upon. The Iran War has brought this relationship into sharper focus, showing that Oman’s ability to pursue its long-term economic ambitions are closely tied to its capacity to preserve freedom of action in a volatile regional environment.
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A regional security order beyond external guarantees
The clearest articulation of a more explicit expression of Oman’s strategic autonomy ambitions came during Omani Foreign Minister Sayyid Badr Al-Busaidi’s lecture at Cambridge University in October. He voiced his desire for a regional security framework involving all six GCC countries, alongside Iran and Iraq, with a non-aggression pact at its centre.
Adding to this he, rather bluntly for Omani standards, proclaimed that Gulf states could “no longer rely upon cooperation of external partners” as the foundation of their security.
As Dr Andreas Krieg, senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies, King’s College London, argues, “for Muscat, an international order in which the Gulf monarchies depend on Israeli-US military domination and permanent pressure on Iran, is not a stable order.” Worth mentioning is that Oman is not advocating for external powers to withdraw from the Gulf or for Beijing to replace Washington as its historical patron. Rather, Muscat views external partnerships as being unable to serve as a substitute for an inclusive regional security arrangement. Its expanding economic relationship with China can therefore coexist with its call for greater regional ownership of security.
Conclusion
Under the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said, neutrality primarily enabled Muscat to facilitate negotiations and maintain access to competing powers. Under Sultan Haitham, particularly in light of the Iran war, there has not been a realignment of Omani foreign policy, but the Sultanate’s neutrality is increasingly being used to pursue a broader objective: strategic autonomy.
For Oman, this means building the economic capacity, international networks and regional security arrangements necessary to preserve its freedom of decision-making, even when its interests diverge from the political dictates of global powerhouses.
Whether Muscat’s new investment partnerships can translate into lasting domestic economic capacity, and whether its proposed security framework can gain regional support, remain open questions.
The Sultanate may not yet have achieved its desired strategic autonomy, but this year has shown that it has begun to articulate a more ambitious vision of neutrality that transcends its traditional role as the region’s quiet mediator.
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