Beirut’s compliance with the US risks a new internal conflict amidst the ongoing war with Israel

After years of institutional paralysis, Lebanon finally has a new president. But instead of moving toward internal reconciliation and national stability, the government of Joseph Aoun appears to be steering the country toward confrontation — at the direct behest of Washington and Riyadh.

The new Lebanese Government recently approved a plan to disarm Hezbollah and Amal by the end of the year. In a country where both parties represent not only armed groups but deeply rooted political and social institutions — and where they are widely seen as having led resistance against Israeli aggression, both past and present — such a move risks igniting political tensions that have long been simmering. For Lebanon’s long-marginalised Shia population, it amounts to provocation, not sovereignty. It is not a step toward consolidation, but a gamble with national cohesion.

The campaign to disarm Hezbollah is not driven by internal consensus. It is a product of sustained international pressure. In August, US officials reportedly warned that failure to comply would jeopardise the already tenuous ceasefire with Israel — a ceasefire that has, in fact, been regularly breached by Israeli airstrikes, particularly in southern Lebanon.

And yet, the Lebanese government yielded. Following discussions with American and Saudi diplomats Aoun’s administration chose external alignment over internal stability. It is treating the country’s most powerful non-state actor as a domestic threat, while continuing to neglect the systemic vacuum that enabled that actor to emerge in the first place.

The timing is no coincidence. Hezbollah has come out of the recent war with Israel militarily weakened. Key commanders were eliminated, weapons depots destroyed, and supply routes — especially through Syria with the fall of Assad — cut off. But the more significant loss was political: the death of Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli airstrike on Dahieh in September 2024. His successor, Sheikh Naim Qassem, lacks the cross-sectarian legitimacy that made Nasrallah a symbol of national resistance. For Lebanon’s Western partners, this was a window of opportunity — not for military escalation, but for political dismantling.

What is unfolding in Beirut today is not a neutral initiative to restore state control over arms. It is, effectively, the sidelining of an entire political bloc — one that has consistently challenged both Israeli impunity and Western hegemony in the region. It reflects the deliberate exclusion of a specific political force under the guise of institutional reform.

Even before Aoun defined his foreign policy, his face appeared alongside Trump, Netanyahu, and Mohammed bin Salman on a billboard in Tel Aviv, promoting a new “Abraham Alliance.” The symbolism was not subtle. The message was clear: Lebanon’s new leadership is aligned with the regional axis that seeks to neutralise the resistance — not through dialogue, but through policy.

Inside Lebanon, this agenda is dangerously detached from demographic and institutional realities. The Shia now constitute a relative majority, yet remain structurally excluded from executive power. The presidency (reserved for Maronites), the premiership (for Sunnis), and the military command are inaccessible. The speaker of parliament remains the sole high-ranking position designated for Shia — but is functionally powerless without a legislative majority. In that void, It is a resistance group that politically and militarily shapes a security and stability net for Lebanese citizens, especially after the heavy destructions in this war with Israel, while the government provides neither basic protection nor essential services in the aftermath of widespread destruction.

To disarm Hezbollah without offering any institutional or representative alternative is not a path to state-building — it is disenfranchisement. It threatens to rupture the already fragile peace.

The protests that erupted in Beeka, southern Lebanon, and Beirut this week must be read as more than isolated incidents. They signal a population unwilling to watch its only political representation be erased under foreign pressure. In his last public address on 5 August, Sheikh Qassem called the disarmament push a “grave sin”, warning that such a move violated the post-war consensus enshrined in the Taif Agreement and risked inflaming sectarian tensions at a moment of national vulne

This is not a theoretical concern. In 2008, the government attempted to dismantle Hezbollah’s telecommunications network. The result was armed clashes. Nasrallah at the time called it “a declaration of war.” Today, the government risks walking down that same path again.

It is not Hezbollah that is destabilising Lebanon — it is a political leadership willing to sacrifice internal equilibrium for external validation. The Lebanese army, barely capable of protecting the country’s borders, is now tasked with disarming the one force that has historically responded to Israeli incursions. How, then, is such a disarmament even feasible? The army lacks the resources, training, and public legitimacy to execute such a mandate. Meanwhile, international donors reject even minimal requests to bolster the army’s capacity. The message is unambiguous: either disarm the resistance, or face abandonment.

Joseph Daher, author of Hezbollah: The Political Economy of the Party of God, warned in the Guardian:

“This course will not lead to national consolidation, but will instead unite broader segments of the Shia population behind Hezbollah and Amal.”

Lebanon is not on a path toward peace. It is being pulled into domestic volatility and growing interstate tensions. While the term ‘civil war’ may seem alarmist, the trajectory suggests an increasing risk of violent escalation — not solely due to internal fragmentation, but as a result of a government that has made itself accountable not to its own people, but to foreign capitals, thereby prioritising external agendas over national reconciliation.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.