The latter is no longer immortalised or mentioned in his country, despite his dramatic decision in the mid-1970s to turn his back on Moscow and face toward Washington. In addition to the policy of openness toward the West which he pursued, he went on to sign a peace treaty with Israel. However, Sadat's 'achievements' are no longer associated with anything good in Egypt, and since his burial 30 years ago, the man is no longer respected.
Purulis added that on the day immediately after Sadat's assassination, horror scenes began to be played out in Israel. This caused countless people to question whether his successors would adhere to the agreements signed with Israel. This is the same question that currently reverberates within Israel's political establishment. The sceptics believe that war is at the door; that the peace agreement was worth nothing and neither was the 30 years of peace on the borders, almost half of Israel's life. A matter they disparage.
In his praise of Mubarak, Purulis noted that his years in power were three times as long as his predecessor Sadat, and that he had gained the confidence and respect of the Israelis. They appreciated the stands he took when the Israeli army entered Beirut  and during both the first and second Palestinian uprisings.
During the ceremony to mark the signing of the Oslo accords he stood on the podium and castigated Arafat appallingly, using words that no other politician would have the audacity to utter. Today, he has become the target of accusations, including partiality toward Israel with whom an economic agreement was signed to buy gas at depressed rates, while significant funds flowed into his pockets from other directions.
Purulis added that Mubarak was "the man we had hoped for" and Netanhyahu was right when he described him as a great friend of Israel. And just as his predecessor, Sadat, behaved with honour and courage toward the defeated Shah of Iran; giving him asylum in Egypt at a time when the world looked on through glistening eyes imbued with romanticism at the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Tehran. As such, Israel should act with the same courage and magnanimity toward Mubarak.
Purulis ends his article with his proposal in which he calls for one of the districts of Haifa to be named after Hosni Mubarak out of respect and loyalty to him as with Sadat. Israelis have never forgotten Sadat for the peace treaty he signed with them in 1979 which was akin to a second establishment for the Hebrew state following its formal declaration in 1948. This background was rehashed on the day Mubarak was brought to trial to remind us of his foreign policy record which was based on two fundamental pillars, namely; the strategic alliance with the US on the one hand and with Israel on the other.
If the Americans do not go into detail about his services to them, perhaps because this goes beyond certain restrictions, then Israel will not fail in bestowing praise upon him. An Israeli minister, Binyamin Ben Eliezer, considered him a strategic treasure; Netanyahu described him in his recent interview with an Arab satellite channel as a "great friend"; some Israeli rabbis have made great efforts to pray for his recovery or to request that the Sheikh of al-Azhar support him and that he not be brought to trial.
One feels humiliation and disgust when this shameful record is replayed and a person finds that the head of their great state, with all his self-confidence and pride, had been for the last 30 years a strategic treasure and a great friend to his country's strategic enemy.
If today he is being tried in court for reasons other than this, then the courts of history will have no mercy upon him, and their judgement against him will be far harsher than any judgement issued by Cairo's criminal court. Particularly if it is proven that he benefitted Israel significantly and that the harm he caused to Egypt was even greater.
The author is an Egyptian writer. This article appeared in Arabic on his blogspot, 3rd August 2011
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.